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Abstract
This thesis comprises four papers on the economics of networks.
The first provides a survey of methods for econometric work with networks, summarising
what is known in the economics literature, and incorporating methods from other fields including
mathematics, computer science, and sociology.
The second explains why informal insurance networks are able to provide consumption
smoothing, but not credit for investment. It develops a dynamic contracting model to explain
the difference in these motivations, generates from this a number of testable predictions, and
then provides evidence in support of the model using data from Bangladesh.
The third examines the trade-off between economic and cultural incentives for migrants. It
develops a model of network formation combined with a game-on-a-network, to capture this
trade-off. The model’s predictions are then tested using data from US censuses in the early
1900s.
The fourth studies the impact of tax audits by HMRC, the UK tax authority, on the future
tax reporting behaviour of self-assessment taxpayers. It shows that income sources which are
not also reported by a third party are more likely to be initially underreported, and that being
audited increases future reports for a number of years. Future work in this area will study the
spillover effects of the audits onto taxpayers connected to those who are audited, where networks
of connections can be measured by sharing a place of residence, place of work, being partners in
a common business, and sharing a common accountant.
5
Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to my advisors Richard Blundell and Imran Rasul for their unrelenting support
and encouragement throughout the PhD process. I learned a great deal from them both about
how to do good research and how to communicate it clearly. Their generosity with their time,
their advice, and their patience as I found my way, have made me a better economist and
shaped my thinking more generally. I am also grateful to Orazio Attanasio and A´ureo de Paula
for their insightful suggestions and guidance, and for helping me see my own work from different
perspectives.
Thanks also to my coauthors on work included in this thesis: Bansi Malde (Chapter 2),
Bryony Reich (Chapter 4), and William Elming and Jonathan Shaw (Chapter 5) — not least
for permission to include our joint work in this thesis! Working with each of them has taught
me new skills, as well as being a lot of fun.
During my PhD I had the good fortune to find many fantastic peers and mentors at UCL, too
numerous to mention individually, who were an invaluable source of advice, computer tips, and
coffee breaks. As well as this, I benefitted from being based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies,
which provided both funding and a stimulating research environment.
Having thanked so many sources of encouragement in my professional life, it would be remiss
of me to omit some more personal sources. Without the steadfast support of my parents I
would never have had either the freedom or confidence to make the choices I did. Their advice,
encouragement, humour, and occasional proof-reading, have all been an immense help during
the PhD process. Most of all I am grateful to Rebecca for being my unwavering support and
partner through all the ups and downs that come from a life in research. Rebecca, this thesis is
dedicated to you.
6
Funding
This thesis was made possible by financial support from the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) through the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (CPP) at
the Institute for Fiscal Studies (grant numbers ES/H021221/1 and ES/M010147/1), as part of
the IFS PhD Scholars programme. Additional financial support for the work in Chapter 2 was
received from the ESRC-NCRM Node ‘Programme Evaluation for Policy Analysis’ (grant num-
ber ES/I02574X/1). Additional financial support for the work in Chapter 3 was received from
the Royal Economics Society (RES), through the RES Junior Fellowship Scheme. Additional
financial support for the work in Chapter 4 was received from the European Research Coun-
cil (ERC) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC
Grant Agreement no. 313234. Finally, additional financial support for the work in Chapter 5
was received from the ESRC through the Tax Administration Research Centre (grant number
ES/K005944/1). This funding is all gratefully acknowledged.
Data Provision
The US Census data used in Chapter 4 come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS-USA), and are housed at the Minnesota Population Center. Neither the owners nor
distributors bear any responsibility for the interpretation of the data.
Analysis in Chapter 5 is based on statistical data from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC), which is Crown Copyright. The research datasets used may not exactly reproduce
HMRC aggregates. The use of HMRC statistical data in this work does not imply the endorse-
ment of HMRC in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the information.
7
.8
Contents
List of Tables 13
List of Figures 15
1 Introduction 17
2 Empirical Methods for Networks Data 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Social Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.1 Organising Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Local Average Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.3 Local Aggregate Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.4 Hybrid Local Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.5 Models with Network Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.6 Experimental Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3.7 Identification of Social Effects with Endogenous Links . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4 Network Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.1 In-sample prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.2 Reduced form models of network formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.3 Structural models of network formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Empirical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5.1 Defining the network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5.2 Methods for Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.3 Sources of Measurement Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.5.4 Correcting for Measurement Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.7.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.7.2 Quadratic Assignment Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9
3 Informal Insurance and Endogenous Poverty Traps 107
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.2 A Model of Insurance, Investment, and a Poverty Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.2.1 Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment without Investment . . . . . . . 114
3.2.2 Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment with Investment . . . . . . . . 118
3.2.3 Poverty Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.2.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.3 Data from a Randomised Control Trial in Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3.1 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3.2 Program Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.3.3 Defining Risk-Sharing Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.3.4 Final Sample Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.3.5 Verifying Model Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.4 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.4.1 Evidence for a Network-Level Poverty Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.4.2 Evidence for Limited Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.4.3 Evidence for Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.7 Theoretical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.7.1 Proof that one can take the maximum inside the integral . . . . . . . . . 159
3.7.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1: Weakly dominant investment allocation rule . . . . 159
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1: Threshold income level for investment . . . . . 160
3.7.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2: The Thresholds are Decreasing in Capital . . . . . . 161
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2: Investment is an Inverted-U in Income Inequality 162
3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3.3: Investment is Increasing in Network Size . . . . 163
3.8 Additional Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4 Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: The Formation of Heterogeneous Communities 179
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.2.1 Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.2.2 Social Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
4.2.3 Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.3 Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.3.1 Characterisation of Nash Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
10
4.3.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.4 Evidence from the Age of Mass Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.4.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.4.2 Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.4.4 Discussion of results and limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
4.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
4.6 Theoretical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
4.6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
4.6.2 Extending the model to action choices along more than two dimensions . 211
4.6.3 Discussion of alternative models of link formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
4.6.4 Heterogeneous costs of switching culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
4.6.5 Welfare results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
4.7 Extending the Model: Multiple Generations with Cultural Transmission . . . . . 218
4.8 Additional empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
5 The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits 235
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
5.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
5.2.1 Policy context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
5.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
5.2.3 Audit descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
5.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5.3.1 Parameters of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5.3.2 Assessing balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
5.3.3 Propensity score matching approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
5.4.1 Aggregate results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
5.4.2 Results for different income components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
6 Conclusion 259
6.1 Social Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
6.2 Network Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.3 Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Bibliography 263
11
.12
List of Tables
2 Empirical Methods for Networks Data
2.1 Findings on sampling-induced bias in estimated network statistics . . . . . . . . 90
2.2 Findings on sampling-induced bias in parameter estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3 Informal Insurance and Endogenous Poverty Traps
3.1 Household characteristics, by wealth grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.2 Risk-sharing network characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.3 Location of the poverty trap threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.4 Using the program randomisation to test the poverty trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.5 How does investment vary with income inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.6 How does investment vary with network size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.7 How does capital injection affect prices and aspirations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.8 Share of eligible’s links to other categories of household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.9 Townsend Test: How does expenditure change with income changes . . . . . . . . 166
3.10 Methods used by households to cope with crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.11 Other variables are smooth at the kink in investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4 Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: The Formation of Heterogeneous Communities
4.1 Descriptive statistics for key variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.2 Testing for a threshold effect in share speaking English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.3 Testing for a threshold effect on share in-married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
4.4 Comparing threshold locations for linguistically far and near cohorts . . . . . . . 204
4.5 Lowest weight link between equilibrium sets, for 1− α < L and α R L . . . . . . 225
4.6 Lowest weight link between equilibrium sets, for 1− α > L and α T L . . . . . . 227
4.7 Number of observed cohorts by nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
4.8 Threshold effect in share speaking English - Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.9 Threshold effect in in-married - Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
13
5 The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits
5.1 Average number of cases selected for income tax audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
5.2 Random audit lags and durations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5.3 Random audit outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5.4 Balancing tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
5.5 Matched balancing tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
5.6 Impact of audit: aggregate results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
5.7 Proportion of individuals reporting positive income, by income component . . . . 251
5.8 Impact of audit: results for reported income components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
5.9 Third-party reporting arrangements in the UK for different income components . 255
14
List of Figures
2 Empirical Methods for Networks Data
2.1 Intransitive triad in undirected and directed networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Identification with network fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Star Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Sampled networks with different sampling rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.5 Sampling from uniform random and small world networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6 Sampling with star and induced subgraphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.7 Network Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3 Informal Insurance and Endogenous Poverty Traps
3.1 Distribution of aggregate value of capital injection provided by the program . . . 153
3.2 Distribution of aggregate assets across networks, broken down by type . . . . . . 154
3.3 Impact of capital injection on further investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.4 Impact of capital injection on further investment, either side of threshold . . . . 156
3.5 Investment is an inverted-U in income inequality (interquartile range) . . . . . . 157
3.6 Higher investment threshold for smaller network size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.7 Placebo test – impact of future capital injection on investment . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.8 Impact of capital injection on investment – whole village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
3.9 Impact of capital injection on investment – only eligible households . . . . . . . . 171
3.10 Hansen Test for threshold location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.11 Investment is an inverted-U in income inequality (standard deviation) . . . . . . 173
3.12 Investment is increasing in network size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.13 Average return on cows is declining in number of transfer recipients . . . . . . . 175
3.14 Program doesn’t affect the price of milk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.15 No impact on further investment from share of households treated . . . . . . . . 177
15
4 Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: The Formation of Heterogeneous Communities
4.1 Nash equilibria and minority group size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.2 An increase in c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.3 A reduction in α . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.4 Share of people in the cohort that speak English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.5 Share of married people in the cohort that are in-married . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.6 Share of people in the cohort that speak English, by linguistic distance . . . . . . 205
4.7 Share of married people in the cohort that are in-married, by linguistic distance . 205
5 The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits
5.1 Impact of audit on survival in self assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
5.2 Impact of audit on reported total taxable income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
5.3 Impact of audit on total tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
5.4 Impact of audit on reported self employment profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
5.5 Impact of audit on reported pension income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
5.6 Impact of audit on reported property income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
16
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis comprises four papers on the economics of networks. The first provides a compre-
hensive review of the literature studying the econometrics of networks, addressing questions of
social effect identification, estimation of models of network formation, and techniques to account
for measurement error. The following two chapters investigate the role of networks in different
economic environments: informal risk sharing in Bangladesh, and among migrants to the United
States in the early 1900s, respectively. To do this they first contain theoretical models which
capture the key trade-offs in the environment studied, followed by empirical evidence to show
the relevance of the proposed mechanisms. The fourth paper studies the dynamic impact –
the impact on future income and tax declarations – from auditing taxpayers, as the first step
towards studying the spillover effects of such audits on to other taxpayers linked to those who
are audited.
Each chapter is a self-contained paper, with Chapters 3 to 5 having their own literature
reviews (and Chapters 2 being a review). However, since each investigates a different area of
networks in economics, I use this introduction to provide a brief overview of each chapter in
turn, and then to pick out some overarching themes and commonalities.
Chapter 2 (“Empirical Methods for Networks Data”, with Bansi Malde) reviews the current,
burgeoning literature on econometric methods for analysing network data. Work on this topic
aims to tackle three questions: (i) how does the action of one economic agent affect another;
(ii) how do agents choose which other agents to interact with; and (iii) how can one collect data
to answer these questions empirically. After setting out some notation, the chapter provides a
survey of approaches to answering each of these questions in turn.
To study the effect of one agent on another, we lay out a common framework in which
to think about different economic models of social effects. We explain why the general model
cannot (point) identify the social effect parameter, and discuss important special cases where
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identification is possible. In each case we explain first the model(s) of behaviour which would
generate the econometric specification. We then set out the conditions under which the social
effect parameter can be identified, and some of the important practical issues that arise when
trying to estimate the parameter in practice.
We next discuss the estimation of models of network formation. The key challenge is that
the number of potential networks increases very rapidly in the number of agents, so as with
models of social effects, some restrictions must be imposed on how the decision over one link can
depend on the other possible link combinations. We first describe methods used in the statistics
literature for estimating such models, using only information on what links are present, slowly
relaxing the restrictions imposed to allow more general forms of correlation in link structure. We
then discuss how information on covariates for the nodes can be used to learn more about the
formation process. Work on estimating such models in a way that allows for interdependency in
linking decisions is at the forefront of current research in this area, including several recent job
market papers (Sheng, 2012; Mele, 2013; Leung, 2015; and Gualdani, 2017).
Finally, we examine the issues of sampling and measurement error. Both sampling and other
sources of measurement error can lead to badly biased estimates of many network statistics,
because nodes and links are interrelated in a way that means random sampling over one will not
(generally) give a random sample over the other. We review the different approaches that have
been developed to tackle this problem, depending on the network statistic of interest.
Chapter 3 (“Informal Insurance and Endogenous Poverty Traps”) investigates why house-
holds in developing countries rarely use informal networks to borrow for investment, even though
it is well-understood that they use these networks to borrow for consumption-smoothing. Recent
work has shown high rates of return on investments in livestock, across a range of developing
countries (Banerjee et al., 2015b; Bandiera et al., forthcoming). Since these are a well-understood
technology, this raises a puzzle: why was more investment not already taking place? Existing
work has shown the difficulties households face in saving for investment (Dupas and Robinson,
2013; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016), and in borrowing formally (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee
and Newman, 1993; and Aghion and Bolton, 1997), but informal borrowing for consumption-
smoothing is prevalent (e.g. Udry, 1994). The explanation I propose is that borowing for
investment, unlike borrowing for consumption, changes the future value of the borrowing rela-
tionship, by changing the future need to engage in risk-sharing. Since investments will typically
reduce the need for – and hence value of – risk-sharing, the lending households are worse off
after making such a loan, as the borrower’s incentives to repay and to remain in the relationship
decline.
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To formalise this argument, I build a simple model, in the spirit of Kocherlakota (1996)
and Ligon et al. (2002). The model has four ingredients: (i) households have idiosyncratically
variable incomes; (ii) households are risk-averse; (iii) households are able to walk away from
any relationship that is not in their interest; and (iv) households are able to engage in lumpy
investments. The first three are the elements of a standard model of risk-sharing with limited
commitment. On adding this fourth ingredient, I can capture the mechanism described above.
The model also generates additional predictions, including the existence of a poverty trap at the
level of the risk-sharing network.
Using data from 1400 villages in Bangladesh, I provide empirical evidence of such a poverty
trap, as well as for additional predictions of the model. Exploiting an asset transfer program
that handed out cows to certain households in (randomly assigned) treated villages, I show
that on average when more than 14% of the network receives cows, this is sufficient to push the
network out of the trap, and to allow borrowing for the purpose of investment to take place. This
highlights the importance of taking in to account spillovers when designing policies. In particular,
the impact of such asset transfer programs could be increased dramatically if threshold effects
were taken into account: a budget neutral reallocation of the same cows could have increased
the additional investment by 44%.
Chapter 4 (“Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: The Formation of Heterogeneous Communities”,
with Bryony Reich) examines the trade-off between economic and social incentives for migrants.
On the one hand, interaction with natives is likely to be economically valuable, since there
may be gains from trade: gathering information, working for (or employing) natives, finding
future customers for items produced. On the other hand, interacting with natives is likely to
be more costly than interacting with migrants (of the same nationality), since natives will have
differences in language and in other cultural and religious practices. We model the choices
faced by combining a network formation game with a game-on-the-network. Individuals are of
migrant or native type, and choose what links to form, as well as what actions to play in terms of
cultural and non-cultural activities. Individuals have ex ante preferences over cultural activities,
depending on their migrant status, but have no ex ante preference over the non-cultural ones.
The gain from forming a link is increasing in the number of shared activities.
This relatively parsimonious model generates a prediction that is simultaneously obvious
and surprising. It is obvious that larger migrant groups will be less likely to form links with
natives and more likely to keep the migrant culture. It is perhaps not so immediately clear
that, rather than a smooth tranisition, there will be a sharp threshold between starkly different
equilibria. Migrants move from necessarily assimilating – interacting with and behaving like
natives – when they are only a small group, to possibly being able to segregate – interact only
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with other migrants and maintain their own culture – when the migrant group size exceeds some
threshold.1 The presence of this threshold comes about because of strategic complementarity
in migrant choices: if some migrants choose to switch action and adopt native practices, this
reduces the gain to the remaining migrants of keeping their own culture and interacting with
their own type, and also increases the gain from interacting with people who choose the native
cultural action.
We test the prediction that such a threshold exists, as well as testing additional comparative
static predictions by looking at how the location of the threshold varies, using data from the
United States in the early 20th Century, at the end of the Age of Mass Migration. At this
time there was a lot of variation in the share of the local community that were of various
migrant types. We show that there does appear to be a sharp theshold in household actions as
the migrant share of the community increases above 1/3, and verify the additional predictions.
These results have important implications for migrant settlement policies, particularly in light
of the current political climate: not only is it important to avoid ‘ghettoising’ communities, but
the move from integration to segregated outcomes can be sudden and sharp. Additionally, for
a given number of migrants, there can be gains from mixing distinct migrant types together, to
reduce the attractiveness of segregation.
Chapter 5 (“The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits”, with William Elming and Jonathan Shaw)
switches focus slightly, to study the role of tax audits on future tax reporting behaviour. In the
search for revenue, governments have traditionally made choices about tax bases and tax rates.
However, recent work by Kleven et al. (2011), Slemrod and Gillitzer (2013), and others, highlights
the importance of a third policy choice: tax administration and enforcement. With a ‘tax gap’
of £36bn in 2014-15 (HMRC, 2016), worth around 7% of revenue collected, this has been an
increasing focus in the UK. Tax compliance is typically enforced by auditing a proportion of
returns, and punishing those who are found to have reported incorrectly. The effect of such
audits is not only the direct revenue raised from fines and adjustments to tax paid, but also the
indirect revenue raised by changes in reporting behaviour.
We study the impact of audits on future tax reporting – the dynamic effect – by exploiting
the random audit program carried out by the UK tax authority, HMRC. This program is used to
gather information on what characteristics are correlated with misreporting, to calibrate HMRC’s
targeted audit program. We compare randomly audited taxpayers with taxpayers who could have
been, but were not, audited, and study how the difference in their tax declarations evolves over
time. We show that audits have a significant dynamic component: that is, they raise additional
revenue in the years after the audit has been completed. Unusually, we are able to follow
1In fact it is the share of the community made up of the migrant type, rather than their absolute number,
that matters.
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taxpayers for up to a decade after audit. This allows us to see that the additional revenue appears
to last for (only) four tax years after the audited year, before becoming indistinguishable from
the non-audited. We examine also how these impacts vary across income sources.2 Consistent
with Kleven et al. (2011), we see that income sources which are subject to third party reporting
are much less likely to be misreported. These results suggest that audits are more valuable than
would be understood simply from studying their direct effects. If this is not taken into account
by policymakers, there is likely to be an undersupply of auditors and audits.
The study of networks is the common feature that links these four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews
how to collect and analyse network data to answer different economic questions. Chapter 3
models and empirically studies the conditions under which a network of households engaged in
informal risk-sharing can allow borrowing within the network for productive lumpy investments.
Chapter 4 studies the network formation decisions, and other behaviours, of migrants, beginning
with a theoretical model and then testing the predictions generated. Chapter 5 examines the
dynamic effects of tax audits, as a prelude to the study of network spillovers: how does auditing
an individual affect the declarations of family members, business partners, and co-workers.
Chapters 3 and 4 are also linked by a use of theory to discipline the empirical work. In
particular, both models generate group-level predictions, and these are of non-linear relationships
and threshold effects. In Chapter 3 this takes the form of a kink in the relationship between assets
transferred and additional investment by the network. In Chapter 4 the prediction is a shift in
the share of the migrant group that takes a particular action as migrant group size (relative
to native size) increases. Both thresholds are at unknown locations, so similar econometric
techniques are used to provide evidence for the mechanisms proposed.
In terms of data usage, each chapter uses data from entirely different sources. Despite this,
there are important synergies. Chapters 4 and 5 both use administrative data: the US census,
and data from the UK tax authority respectively. Such data are large, containing many millions
of observations, but are relatively more limited in the availability of covariates. It is crucial
then, to think carefully about how to handle issues of unobserved heterogeneity, since many
characteristics important to any research question are likely not to be available. Chapters 3
and 5 also share some similarities in making use of a third-party’s experiment: transfers of
cows and random audits of taxpayers respectively. Although in both cases the experiments were
not designed for the research questions under consideration, the exogenous variation from the
experiment can usefully be exploited to provide a credible answer.
The next four chapters contain the work described above. The final chapter, Chapter 6,
concludes with some directions for future research, following a similar structure to Chapter 2.
2Recent work in the US by DeBacker et al. (2015), which was developed concurrently with our work, also
investigates this.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Methods for Networks
Data
1
2.1 Introduction
Whilst anonymous markets have long been central to economic analysis, the role of networks
as an alternative mode of interaction is increasingly being recognised. Networks might act as a
substitute for markets, for example providing access to credit in the absence of a formal financial
sector, or as a complement, for example transmitting information about the value of a product.
Analysis that neglects the potential for such social effects when they are present is likely to
mismeasure any effects of interest.
In this paper we provide an overview of econometric methods for working with network data
– data on agents (‘nodes’) and the links between them – taking into account the peculiarities
of the dependence structures present in this context. We draw on both the growing economic
literature studying networks, and on research in other fields, including maths, computer science,
and sociology. The discussion proceeds in three parts: (i) estimating social effects given a
(conditionally) exogenous observed network; (ii) estimating the underlying network formation
process, given only a single cross-section of data; and (iii) data issues, with a particular focus on
accounting for measurement error, since in a network-context this can have particularly serious
consequences.
The identification and estimation of social effects – direct spillovers from the characteristics
or outcome of one agent to the outcome of others – are of central interest in empirical research
1This chapter is co-authored with Bansi Malde. We are grateful to Imran Rasul for his support and guidance.
We also thank Richard Blundell, Andreas Dzemski, Toru Kitagawa, Aureo de Paula, and Yves Zenou for their
useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the ESRC-NCRM Node ‘Programme Evaluation for
Policy Analysis’, Grant reference RES-576-25-0042 is gratefully acknowledged.
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on networks in economics. Whilst researchers have tended to focus on the effects from the
average characteristics and outcomes of network ‘neighbours’, different theoretical models will
imply different specifications for social effects. In Section 2.3 we begin by setting out a common
framework for social effects, which has as a special case the common ‘linear-in-means’ specifi-
cation, as well as a number of other commonly used specifications. Since the general model is
not identified, we then go through some important special cases, first outlining the theoretical
model which generates the specification, before discussing issues related to identification of pa-
rameters.2 For most of our discussion we focus on identification of the parameters using only
observational data, since this is typically what researchers have available to them. We then go on
to consider the conditions under which experimental variation can help weaken the assumptions
needed to identify the parameters of interest.
The key challenge for credible estimation of social effects comes from the likely endogeneity
of the network. Thus far, most of the empirical literature has simply noted this issue without
tackling it head on, but more recently researchers have tried to tackle it directly. The main
approach to doing this has been to search for instruments which change the probability of a link
existing without directly affecting the outcome. Alternatively, where panel data are available,
shocks to network structure – such as node death – have been used to provide exogenous variation.
These approaches naturally have all the usual limitations: a convincing story must be provided
to motivate the exclusion restriction, and where there is heterogeneity they identify only a local
effect. Additionally, they rely on the underlying network formation model having a unique
equilibrium. Without uniqueness we do not have a complete model, as we have not specified
how an equilibrium is chosen. Hence a particular realisation of the instrument for some group
of nodes is consistent with multiple resulting network structures, and a standard IV approach
cannot be used.
This provides one natural motivation for the study of network formation models: being able
to characterise and estimate a model of network formation would, in the presence of exclusion
restrictions (or functional form assumptions motivated by theory), allow us to identify social
effects using the predicted network. Formation models can also be useful for tackling measure-
ment error, by imputing unobserved links. Finally, in some circumstances we might be interested
in these models per se, for example to understand how we can influence network structure and
hence indirectly the distribution of outcomes.
In Section 2.4 we consider a range of network formation models, drawing from literatures
outside economics as well as recent work by economists, and show how these methods relate
2A different presentation of some of the material in this part of Section 2.3 can be found in Topa and Zenou
(2015). Of the models we discuss, their focus is on two of the more common specifications used. Topa and Zenou
(2015) compare these models to each other, and also to neighbourhood effect models, and discuss the relationship
between neighbourhood and network models.
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to each other. We first consider purely descriptive models that make use of only data on the
observed links, and can be used to make in-sample predictions about unobserved links given the
observed network structure. Next we turn to reduced form economic models, which make use
of node characteristics in predicting links, but which do not allow for dependencies in linking
decisions. Lastly we discuss the growing body of work estimating games of strategic network
formation, which allow for such dependencies and so at least, in principle, can have multiple
equilibria.3
The methods discussed until now have all assumed access to data on a population of nodes and
all the relevant interconnections between them. However, defining and measuring the appropriate
network is often not straightforward. In Section 2.5 we begin by discussing issues in network
definition and measurement. We then discuss different sampling approaches: these are important
because networks are comprised of interrelated nodes and links, meaning that a sampling strategy
over one of these objects will define a non-random sampling process over the other. For example
if we sample edges randomly, and compute the mean number of neighbours for the nodes to whom
those edges belong, this estimated average will be higher than if the average were computed across
all nodes, since nodes with many edges are more likely to have been included in the sample by
construction. Next we discuss different sources of measurement error, and their implications for
the estimation of network statistics and regression parameters. We end with an explanation of
the various methods available to correct for these problems, and the conditions under which they
can be applied.
Given the breadth of research in these areas alone, we naturally have to make some restrictions
to narrow the scope of what we cover. In the context of social effects estimation, we omit entirely
any discussion of peer effects where all that is known about agents’ links are the groups to which
they belong. A recent survey by Blume et al. (2010) more than amply covers this ground, and
we direct the interested reader to their work. We also restrict our focus to linear models, which
are appropriate for continuous outcomes but may be less suited to discrete choice settings such
as those considered by Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2007). Similarly in our
discussion of network formation, we do not consider in any detail the literature on the estimation
of games. Although strategic models of network formation can be considered in this framework,
the high dimension of these models typically makes it difficult to employ the same methods as
are used in the game context. For readers who wish to know more about these methods, the
survey paper by de Paula (2013) is a natural starting point. Finally, for a survey of applied work
on networks in developing countries, see the review by Chuang and Schechter (2014).
3Another review of the material on strategic network formation is provided by Graham (2015).
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We round off the paper with some concluding remarks, drawing together the various areas
discussed, noting the limits of what we currently know about the econometrics of networks, and
considering the potential directions for future research. Subsection 2.7.1 then provides detailed
definitions of the various network measures and topologies that are mentioned in the text below.
2.2 Notation
Before we proceed, we first outline the notation we use throughout the paper.4 We define
a network or graph g = (Ng, E g) as a set of nodes, Ng, and edges or links, Eg.5 The nodes
represent individual agents, and the edges represent the links between pairs of nodes. In economic
applications, nodes are usually individuals, households, firms or countries. Edges could be social
ties such as friendship, kinship, or co-working, or economic ties such as purchases, loans, or
employment relationships. The number of nodes present in g is Ng = |Ng|, and the number of
edges is Eg = |Eg|. We define GN = {g : |Ng| = N} as the set of all possible networks on N
nodes.
In the simplest case – the binary network – any (ordered) pair of nodes i, j ∈ Ng is either
linked, ij ∈ Eg, or not linked, ij /∈ Eg. If ij ∈ Eg then j is often described as being a neighbour
of i. We denote by neii,g = {j : ij ∈ Eg} the neighbourhood of node i, which contains all nodes
with whom i is linked. Nodes that are neighbours of neighbours will often be referred to as
‘second degree neighbour’. Typically it is convenient to assume that ii /∈ Eg ∀i ∈ Ng. Edges may
be directed, so that a link from node i to node j is not the same as a link from node j to node
i; in this case the network is a directed graph (or digraph). In Section 2.4 we will at times find
it useful to explicitly enumerate the edges; we denote by Λ this set of enumerated edges, with
typical element l. Unlike Eg, Λ is an ordered set, with order 12, 13, ...N(N − 1), so that we may
use (l − 1) to denote the element in the set one position before l.
A more general case than the binary graph is that of a weighted graph, in which the edge set
contains all possible combinations of nodes, other than to the node itself. That is, Eg = {ij :
∀i, j ∈ Ng, i 6= j}. Moreover, edges have edge weights wei(i, j) which measure some metric of
distance or link strength. Care is needed in interpreting the value of weights, as these differ by
context. ‘Distance’ weighted graphs, which arise for example when weights represent transaction
costs between two nodes, would typically have weid(i, j) ∈ [0,∞), with weid(i, j) = ∞ being
equivalent to i and j being unconnected in the binary graph case. Conversely, ‘strength’ weighted
graphs, where weights capture for example the frequency of interaction between agents, typically
4In Subsection 2.7 we provide further useful definitions.
5In a slight abuse of notation, we will also use g to index individual networks when data from multiple
networks is available.
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have weis(i, j) ∈ [0, w¯], with weis(i, j) = 0 being equivalent to i and j being unconnected in the
binary graph case and w¯ <∞.6 Which definition is used depends on the context and application,
but similar methods can be used for analysis in either case.7
Network graphs, whether directed or not, can also be represented by an adjacency matrix,
Gg, with typical element Gij,g. This is an Ng×Ng matrix with the leading diagonal normalised
to 0. When the network is binary, Gij,g= 1 if ij ∈ Eg, and 0 otherwise, while for weighted
graphs, Gij,g = wei(i, j). We will use the notation Gi,g to denote the i
th row of the adjacency
matrix Gg, and G
′
i,g to denote its i
th column.8 Many models defined for binary networks make
use of the row-stochastic adjacency matrix or influence matrix, G˜g.
9 Elements of this matrix
are generally defined as G˜ij,g = Gij,g/
∑
j Gij,g if two agents are linked and 0 otherwise.
When we describe empirical methods for identifying and estimating social effects, we will
frequently work with data from a number of network graphs. Graphs for different networks
will be indexed, in a slight abuse of notation, by g = 1, ...,M , where M is the total number
of networks in the data. Node-level variables will be indexed with i = 1, ..., Ng, where Ng is
the number of nodes in graph g. Node-level outcomes will be denoted by yi,g, while exogenous
covariates will be denoted by the 1×K vector xi,g and common network-level variables will be
collected in the 1×Q vector, zg.
The node-level outcomes, covariates and network-level variables can be stacked for each node
in a network. In this case, we will denote the stacked Ng × 1 outcome vector as yg and the
Ng ×K matrix stacking node-level vectors of covariates for graph g as Xg. Common network-
level variables for graph g will be gathered in the matrix Zg = ιgzg where ιg denotes an Ng × 1
vector of ones. The adjacency and influence matrices for network g will be denoted by Gg and
G˜g. At times we will also make use of the Ng × Ng identity matrix, Ig, consisting of ones on
the leading diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.
Finally, we introduce notation for vectors and matrices stacking together the network-level
outcome vectors, covariate matrices and adjacency matrices for all networks in the data. Y =
(y
′
1, ...,y
′
M )
′
is an
M∑
g=1
Ng×1 vector that stacks together the outcome vectors; G = diag{Gg}g=Mg=1
denotes the
M∑
g=1
Ng ×
M∑
g=1
Ng block-diagonal matrix with network-level adjacency matrices along
the leading diagonal and zeros off the diagonal, and analogously G˜ = diag{G˜g}g=Mg=1 (with similar
dimensions as G) for the influence matrices; and X = (X
′
1, ...,X
′
M )
′
and Z = (Z
′
1, ...,Z
′
M )
′
are
6In both of these examples, wei(i, j) = wei(j, i). More generally this need not be true. For example, in some
settings one might use ‘flow weights’ where weif (i, j) represents the net flow of, say, resources from i to j. Then
by definition weif (i, j) = −weif (j, i), and the weighted adjacency matrix, defined shortly, is skew-symmetric.
7With distance weighted graphs, one must be careful in dealing with edges where weid(i, j) = ∞. A good
approximation can usually be made by replacing infinity with an arbitrarily high finite value.
8G′i,g is the i
th row of G′g , which is the ith column of Gg .
9A row stochastic (also called ‘right stochastic’ matrix) is one whose rows are normalised so they each sum
to one.
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respectively,
M∑
g=1
Ng × K and
M∑
g=1
Ng × Q matrices, that stack together the covariate matrices
across networks. Finally, we define the vector ι as a
M∑
g=1
Ng × 1 vector of ones and the matrix
L = diag{ιg}g=Mg=1 , as an
M∑
g=1
Ng ×M matrix with each column being an indicator for being in a
particular network.
2.3 Social Effects
Researchers are typically interested in understanding how the behaviour, choices and outcomes
of agents are influenced by the agents that they interact with, i.e. by their neighbours. This
section reviews methods that have been used to identify and estimate these social effects.10 We
consider a number of restrictions that would allow parameters of interest to be recovered, and
place them into a broader framework. We focus on linear estimation models, which cover the
bulk of methods used in practice.
We begin by providing a common organisational framework for the different empirical spec-
ifications that have been applied in the literature. Thereafter, we discuss in turn a series of
commonly used specifications, the underlying theoretical models that generate them, and outline
conditions for the causal identification of parameters with observational cross-sectional data. We
then briefly discuss how experimental and quasi-experimental variation could be used to uncover
social effects. Finally, we discuss some methods that can be applied to overcome confounding
due to endogenous formation of edges, and discuss their limitations. A comprehensive overview
of models of network formation is provided in Section 2.4.
We will use a specific example throughout this section to better illustrate the restrictions
imposed by each of the different models and empirical specifications. Specifically, we will consider
how we can use these methods to answer the following question: How is a teenager’s schooling
performance influenced by his friends? This is a widely studied question in the education and
labour economics literatures, and is of great policy interest.11
We take as given throughout this section that the researcher knows the network(s) for which
he is trying to estimate social effects and that he observes the entirety of this network without
error. In Section 2.5 we will discuss how these data might be collected, and the consequences of
having only a partial sample of the network and/or imperfectly measured networks.
10We leave aside the important issues of inference, in order to keep the scope of this survey manageable.
11See Sacerdote (2011) for an overview of this literature.
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2.3.1 Organising Framework
Almost all (linear) economic models of social effects can be written as a special case of the
following equation (written in matrix terms using the notation specified in Section 2.2):
Y = αι+wy(G, Y )β +Xγ +wx(G, X)δ + Zη +Lν + ε (2.1)
Y is a vector stacking individual outcomes of nodes across all networks.12 X is a matrix
of observable background characteristics that influence a node’s own outcome and potentially
that of others in the network. G is a block-diagonal matrix with the adjacency matrices of each
network along its leading diagonal, and zeros on the off-diagonal. wy(G, Y ) and wx(G, X) are
functions of the adjacency matrix, and the outcome and observed characteristics respectively.
These functions indicate how network features, interacted with outcomes and exogenous char-
acteristics of (possibly all) nodes in the network, influence the outcome, Y . The block-diagonal
nature of G means that only the characteristics and outcomes of nodes in the same network
are allowed to influence a node’s outcome. Z is a matrix of observed network-specific variables;
ν = {νg}g=Mg=1 is the associated vector of network-specific mean effects, unobserved by the econo-
metrician but known to agents; and ε is a vector stacking the (unobservable) error terms for all
nodes across all networks.
We make the following assumptions on the ε term:
E[εi,g|Xg,Zg,Gg] = 0 ∀ i ∈ g; g ∈ {1, ...,M} (2.2)
Cov[εi,gεk,h|Xg,Xh,Zg,Zh,Gg,Gh] = 0 ∀ i ∈ g; k ∈ h; g, h ∈ {1, ...,M}; g 6= h (2.3)
Equation 2.2 says that the error term for individual nodes in a network is mean independent
of observed node-level characteristics of all network members, of network-level characteristics
and of the network structure, as embodied in the adjacency matrix Gg. The network, is in this
sense assumed to be exogenous, conditional on individual-level observable characteristics and
network-level observable characteristics. Later in Subsection 2.3.7 below, we will review some
approaches taken to relax this assumption. In addition, Equation 2.3 implies that the error terms
of all nodes, i and k in different networks, g and h, are uncorrelated conditional on observable
characteristics of the nodes, the observable characteristics of the networks, and the structure
of the network. Finally, note that no assumptions are imposed on the covariance of node-level
error terms within the same network.
12We allow Y to be univariate, so individuals have only a single outcome. A recent paper by Cohen-Cole
et al. (forthcoming) discusses how to relax this assumption, and provides some initial evidence that restricting
outcomes to only a single dimension might be important in empirical settings.
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In some cases, the following assumption is made on ν:
E[νg|Xg,Zg,Gg] = 0 ∀ g ∈ {1, ...,M} (2.4)
That is, the network-level unobservable is mean independent of observable node- and network-
level characteristics, and of the network. Many of the models that we consider below relax this
assumption and allow for correlation between ν and the other right hand side variables in
Equation 2.1.
The social effect parameter that is most often of interest to researchers is β - the effect of a
function of a node’s neighbours’ outcomes (e.g. an individual’s friends’ schooling performance)
and the network. This is also known as the endogenous effect, to use the term coined by Manski
(1993). This parameter is often of policy interest, since in many linear models, the presence of
endogenous effects implies the presence of a social multiplier: the aggregate effects of changes
in X, wx(G, X), and Z are amplified beyond their direct effects, captured by γ, δ, and η.
The parameters δ and η are known as the exogenous or contextual effect while ν captures a
correlated effect.
This representation nests a range of models estimated in the economics literature:
1. Local average models: This model corresponds with wy(G, Y ) = G˜Y and wx(G, X) =
G˜X, which arises when node outcomes are influenced by the average behaviour and char-
acteristics of his direct neighbours. In our schooling example, this model implies that an
individual’s schooling performance is a function of the average schooling performance of his
friends, his own characteristics, the average characteristics of his friends and some back-
ground network characteristics. This can apply, for example, when social effects operate
through a desire for a node to conform to the behaviour of its neighbours. The identifi-
ability of the parameters β, γ, and δ from the data available to a researcher depends on
the structure of the network and the level of detail available about the network:13
(a) With data containing information only on the broad peer group that a node belongs
to and where a node can belong to a single group only (e.g. a classroom), it is common
to assume that the node is directly linked with all other nodes in the same group and
that there are no links between nodes in different groups. In this case, the peer group
corresponds to the network. All elements of the influence matrix of a network g, G˜g,
(including the diagonal) are set to 1Ng where Ng is the number of agents within the
network.14 This generates the linear-in-means peer group model studied by Manski
13The parameter η can also be identified under the assumption that E[ν|X,Z,G] = 0.
14Note that in this case, since all nodes are linked to all others (including themselves), the total number of i’s
edges (or degree), di,g =
∑
j Gij,g = Ng ∀ i ∈ g. Hence by definition, all elements of G˜g are set to 1Ng .
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(1993) among others. Manski (1993) shows that identification of the parameter β
is hampered by a simultaneity problem that he labels the reflection problem: it is
not possible to differentiate whether the choices of a node i in the network influence
the choices of node j, or vice versa. An alternative definition for G˜ sets all diagonal
terms of the network-level influence matrices, G˜g, to 0 and off-diagonal terms to
1
Ng−1 ,
which implies using the leave-self-out mean outcome as the regressor generating social
effects. With this definition, identification of the parameters β, γ, and δ is possible
in some circumstances as shown by Lee (2007).15 Identification issues related to
this model with single peer groups have been surveyed in detail elsewhere, and thus
will not be considered here. The interested reader should consult the comprehensive
review by Blume et al. (2010).
(b) If instead detailed network data (i.e. information on nodes and the edges between
them) are available, or if nodes belong to multiple partially overlapping peer groups,
it may be possible to separately identify the parameters β, γ, and δ from a single
cross-section of data. In this case, elements of the network-level influence matrices,
G˜g are defined as G˜ij,g =
1
di,g
when a link between i and j exists, where di,g is
the total number of i’s links (or degree); and 0 otherwise. Identification results for
observational network data have been obtained by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). These are
explored in more detail in Subsection 2.3.2 below.
2. Local aggregate models: When there are strategic complementarities or substitutabilities
between a node’s outcomes and the outcomes of its neighbours one can obtain the local
aggregate model. In our schooling example, it may be more productive for an individual to
put in more effort in studying if his friends also put in more effort, consequently leading to
better schooling outcomes. In this case a node’s outcome depends on the aggregate outcome
of its neighbours. In the context of Equation 2.1, this implies that wy(G, Y ) = GY
and wx(G, X) is typically defined to be G˜X, implying that the outcome of interest is
influenced by the average exogenous characteristics of a node’s neighbours.16 Identification
and estimation of this model in observational networks data has been studied by Calvo´-
Armengol et al. (2009), Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu et al. (2014b). More details are
provided in Subsection 2.3.3 below.
15Other solutions to the reflection problem have also been proposed, such as those by Glaeser et al. (1996),
Moffitt (2001), and Graham (2008). Kwok (2013) provides a general study of the conditions under which identi-
fication of parameters can be achieved. He finds that network diameter – the length of the longest geodesic – is
the key parameter in determining identification.
16This choice of definition for wx(G, X) is, to our understanding, not based on any explicit theoretical
justification. It does, however, ease identification as wx(.) and wy(.) are now different functions of G.
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3. Hybrid local models: This class of models nests both the local average and local aggregate
models. This allows the social effect to operate through both a desire for conformism
and through strategic complementarities/substitutabilities. In the schooling example, the
model implies that individuals may want to ‘fit-in’ and thus put in similar amounts of
effort in studying as their friends, but their studying efforts may also be more productive
if their friends also put in effort. Both of these channels then influence their schooling
performance. In the notation of Equation 2.1, it implies that wy(G,Y ) = GY + G˜Y .
As in the local average and aggregate models above, wx(G, X) is typically defined to be
G˜X. Identification and estimation of this model with observational data is studied by Liu
et al. (2014a). See Subsection 2.3.4 for more details.
4. Networks may influence node outcomes (and consequently aggregate network outcomes)
through more general features or functionals of the network. For instance, the DeGroot
(1974) model of social learning implies that an individual’s eigenvector centrality, which
measures a node’s importance in the network by how important its neighbours are, deter-
mines how influential it is in affecting the behaviour of other nodes.17 In the schooling
context, if an individual’s friends are also friends of each other (a phenomenon captured
by clustering), he may have to spend less time maintaining these friendships due to scale
economies, allowing him more time for school work thereby leading to better schooling
performance.
Denoting a specific network statistic (such as eigenvector centrality in the social learning
model above) by ωr, where r indexes the statistic, we can specialise the term wy(G, Y )β
in Equation 2.1 for node i in network g in a model with node-level outcomes as:
•
R∑
r=1
ωri,gβr: R different network statistics; or
•
R∑
r=1
∑
j 6=i
Gij,gyj,gω
r
j,gβr: the sum of neighbours’ outcomes weighted by R different net-
work statistics; or
•
R∑
r=1
∑
j 6=i
G˜ij,gyj,gω
r
j,gβr: the average of neighbours’ outcomes weighted by R different
network statistics.
Analogous definitions are used for wx(G, X)δ. Models of this type have been estimated
by Jackson et al. (2012) and Alatas et al. (2014).
When researchers are interested in aggregate network outcomes, rather than node level
17Eigenvector centrality is a more general function of the network than those considered above, since it relies
on the whole structure of the network.
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outcomes, the following specification is typically estimated:
y¯ = φ0 + w¯y¯(G)φ1 + X¯φ2 + w¯X¯(G, X¯)φ3 + u (2.5)
where y¯ is an (M ×1) vector stacking the aggregate outcome of the M networks, w¯y¯(G) is
a matrix of R¯ network statistics (e.g. average degree) that directly influence the outcome,
X¯ is an (M × K) matrix of network-level characteristics (which could include network-
averages of node characteristics) and w¯X¯(G, X¯) is a term interacting the network-level
characteristics with the network statistics. φ1 captures how the network-level aggregate
outcome varies with specific network features while φ2 and φ3 capture, respectively, the
effects of the network-level characteristics and these characteristics interacted with the
network statistic on the outcome. Models of this type have been estimated by among
others, Banerjee et al. (2013), and are discussed further in Subsection 2.3.5.
In Subsections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5 below, we review methods relating to identification of the param-
eters β, γ, δ, φ1 and φ2 and φ3 in these models, under the assumption that the network is
exogenous conditional on observable individual and network-level variables.18 For each case
discussed, we start by outlining a theoretical model that generates underlying the resulting
empirical specification, and outline identification conditions using observational data.
Thereafter, in Subsection 2.3.6, we outline how experimental and quasi-experimental varia-
tion has been used to uncover social effects, and highlight some of the challenges faced in using
such variation to uncover parameters of the structural models outlined in Subsections 2.3.2
to 2.3.4 below.
Subsection 2.3.7 outlines methods used by researchers to relax the assumption made in Equa-
tion 2.2: that the individual error term is mean independent of the network and observed in-
dividual and network-level characteristics. Dealing with endogenous formation of social links
is quite challenging, and so most of the methods outlined in this section fail to satisfactorily
deal with the identification challenges posed by endogenous network formation. Moreover, none
of these methods deal with the issue of measurement error in the network. These issues are
considered in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.
2.3.2 Local Average Models
In local average models, a node’s outcome (or choice) is influenced by the average outcome of its
neighbours. Thus, an individual’s schooling performance is influenced by the average schooling
performance of his friends. The outcome for node i in network g, yi,g, is typically modelled as
18η can also be identified in some cases, particularly when the assumption E[ν|X,Z,G] = 0 is imposed.
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being influenced by its own observed characteristics, xi,g, scalar unobserved heterogeneity εi,g,
observed network characteristics zg, unobserved network characteristic νg, and also the average
outcomes and characteristics of neighbours. Below, we consider identification conditions when
data are available from multiple networks, though some results apply to data from a single
network.19
Stacking together data from multiple networks yields the following empirical specification,
expressed in matrix terms:
Y = αι+βG˜Y +Xγ + G˜Xδ +Zη +Lν + ε (2.6)
where Y , ι, X, Z, L and ν are as defined previously; and G˜ is a block diagonal matrix
stacking network-level influence matrices along its leading diagonal, with all off-diagonal terms
set to 0. The social effect, β, is a scalar in this model.
Given the simple empirical form of this model, it has been widely applied in the economics
literature. Examples include:
• Understanding how the average schooling performance of an individual’s peers influences
the individual’s own performance in a setting where students share a number of different
classes (e.g. De Giorgi et al., 2010), or where students have some (but not all) common
friends (e.g. Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
• Understanding how non-market links between firms arising from company directors being
members of multiple company boards influence firm choices on investment and executive
pay (e.g. Patnam, 2013).
Although this specification is widely used in the empirical literature, few studies consider or
acknowledge the form of its underlying economic model, even though parameter estimates are
subsequently used to evaluate alternative policies and to make policy recommendations. Indeed,
parameters are typically interpreted as in the econometric model of Manski (1993), whose pa-
rameters do not map back to ‘deep’ structural (i.e. policy invariant) parameters without an
economic model.
An economic model that leads to this specification is one where nodes have a desire to
conform to the average behaviour and characteristics of their neighbours (Patacchini and Zenou,
2012b). In our schooling example, conformism implies that individuals would want to exert as
much effort in their school work as their friends so as to ‘fit in’. Thus, if one’s friends may want
19When data on only a single network are available, the empirical specification is as follows: yg = a +
βG˜gyg +Xgγ+G˜gXgδ+εg , where a = αιg +Zgη + ιgνg in our earlier notation, capturing all of the network-
level characteristics.
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to exert no effort in their school work, the individual would also not want to exert any effort in
his school work.
Below we show how this model leads to Equation 2.6. However, this is not the only economic
model that leads to an empirical specification of this form: a similar specification arises from, for
example, models of perfect risk sharing, where a well-known result is that under homogeneous
preferences, when risk is perfectly shared, the consumption of risk-averse households will move
with average household consumption in the risk sharing group or network (Townsend, 1994).
Conformism is commonly modelled by node payoffs that are decreasing in the distance be-
tween own outcome and network neighbours’ average outcomes. Payoffs are also allowed to
vary with an individual heterogeneity parameter, pii,g, which captures the individual’s ability or
productivity associated with the outcome:20
Ui(yi,g;y−i,g,Xg, G˜i,g) =
pii,g − 1
2
yi,g − 2β Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gyj,g
 yi,g (2.7)
β in Equation 2.7 can be thought of as a taste for conformism. Although we write this
model as though nodes are perfectly able to observe each others’ actions, this assumption can
be relaxed. In particular, an econometric specification similar to Equation 2.6 can be obtained
from a static model with imperfect information (see Blume et al., 2013).
The best response function derived from the first order condition with respect to yi,g is thus:
yi,g = pii,g + β
Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gyj,g (2.8)
Patacchini and Zenou (2012b) derive the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists,
and characterise properties of this equilibrium.
The individual heterogeneity parameter, pii,g , can be decomposed into a linear function of
individual and network characteristics (both observed and unobserved):
pii,g = xi,gγ +
Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gxj,gδ + zgη + νg + εi,g (2.9)
Substituting for this in Equation 2.8, we obtain the following best response function for individual
outcomes:
yi,g = β
Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gyj,g + xi,gγ +
Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gxj,gδ + zgη + νg + εi,g (2.10)
20Notice that in Equation 2.7,
∑Ng
j=1 G˜ij,gyj,g is identical to the i
th row of G˜gyg , which appears in Equa-
tion 2.6.
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Then, stacking observations for all nodes in multiple networks, we obtain Equation 2.6, which
can be taken to the data.
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) study the identification and estimation of Equation 2.6 in observa-
tional data with detailed network information or data from partially overlapping peer groups.21
To proceed further, one needs to make some assumptions on the relationship between the unob-
served variables – ν and ε – and the other right hand side variables in Equation 2.6.
One specific assumption is that E[ε|X,Z, G˜] = 0, i.e. the individual level error term, ε, is
assumed to be mean independent of the observed individual and network-level characteristics and
of the network. The network level unobservable is also initially assumed to be mean independent
of the right hand side variables, i.e. E[ν|X,Z, G˜] = 0; though this assumption will be relaxed
further on.
Under these assumptions, the parameters {α, β,γ, δ,η} are identified if {I, G˜, G˜2} are lin-
early independent. Identification thus relies on the network structure. In particular, the condi-
tion would not hold in networks composed only of cliques – subnetworks comprising of completely
connected components – of the same size, and where the diagonal terms in the influence matrix,
G˜ are not set to 0. In this case, G˜2 can be expressed as a linear function of I and G˜. More-
over, the model is then similar to the single peer group case of Manski (1993), and the methods
outlined in Blume et al. (2010) apply.
In an undirected network (such as the in the left panel in Figure 2.1 below), this identification
condition holds when there exists a triple of nodes (i, j, k) such that i is connected to j but not
k, and j is connected to k. The exogenous characteristics of k, xk,g, directly affect j’s outcome,
but not (directly) that of i, hence forming valid instruments for the outcome of i’s neighbours
(i.e. j’s outcome) in the equation for node i. Intuitively this method uses the characteristics of
second-degree neighbours who are not direct neighbours as instruments for outcomes of direct
neighbours.
 
 
(a) Intransitive triad in undirected network (b) Intransitive triad in directed network 
 
Figure 2.1: Intransitive triad in an undirected network (left panel) and a directed
network (right panel)
21Similar identification results have been independently described by De Giorgi et al. (2010), who have data
with overlapping peer groups of students who share a number of classes.
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It is thus immediately apparent why identification fails in networks composed only of cliques:
in such networks, there is no triple of nodes (i, j, k) such that i is connected to j, and j is
connected to k, but i is not connected to k.
In the directed network case, the condition is somewhat weaker, requiring only the presence
of an intransitive triad: that is, a triple such that ij ∈ E , jk ∈ E and ik /∈ E (as in the right
panel of Figure 1 above).22 This is weaker than in undirected networks, which would also require
that ki /∈ E .
As an example, consider using this method to identify the influence of the average schooling
performance of an individual’s friends on the individual, controlling for the individual’s age and
gender, the average age and gender of his friends, and some observed school characteristics (such
as expenditure per pupil). Assume first that the underlying friendship network in this school
is undirected as in the left panel of Figure 2.1, so that if i considers j to be his friend, j also
considers i to be his friend. j also has a friend k who is not friends with i. We could then use
the age and gender of k as instruments for the schooling performance of j in the equation for
i. If instead, the network were directed as in the right panel of Figure 2.1, where the arrows
indicate who is affected by whom (i.e. i is affected by j in the Figure, and so on), we can still
use the age and gender of k as instruments for the school performance of j in the equation for i
even though k is connected with i. This is possible since the direction of the relationship is such
that k’s school performance is affected by i’s performance, but the converse is not true.
The identification result above requires that the network-level unobservable term be mean
independent of the observed covariates, X and Z, and of the network, G˜. However, in many
circumstances one might be concerned that unobservable characteristics of the network might be
correlated with X, so that E[ν|X,Z, G˜] 6= 0. For example, in our schooling context, when we
take the network of interest to be constrained to be within the school, it is plausible that children
with higher parental income will be in schools with teachers who have better unobserved teaching
abilities, since wealthier parents may choose to live in areas with schools with good teachers.
In this case, a natural solution when data on more than one network is available, is to include
network fixed effects, Lν˜ in place of the network-level observables, Z, and the network-level
unobservable, Lν; where ν˜ is an M × 1 vector that captures the network fixed effects.
Since the fixed effects themselves are generally not of interest, to ease estimation they are
removed using a within transformation. This is done by pre-multiplying Equation 2.6 by Jglob,
a block diagonal matrix that stacks the network-level transformation matrices Jglobg = Ig −
22Equivalently, a triple such ji ∈ E , kj ∈ E and ki /∈ E forms an intransitive triad.
37
1
Ng
(ιgι
′
g) along the leading diagonal, and off-diagonal terms are set to 0.
23 The resulting model,
suppressing the superscript on Jglob for legibility, is of the following form:
JY = βJG˜Y + JXγ + JG˜Xδ + Jε (2.11)
In this case, the identification condition imposes a stronger requirement on network structure.
In particular, the matrices {I, G˜, G˜2, G˜3} should be linearly independent. This requires that
there exists a pair of agents (i, j) such that the shortest path between them is of length 3, that
is, i would need to go through at least two other nodes to get to j (as in Figure 2.2 below).
The presence of at least two intermediate agents allows researchers to use the characteristics of
third-degree neighbours (neighbours-of-neighbours-of-neighbours who are not direct neighbours
or neighbours-of-neighbours) as an additional instrument to account for the network fixed effect.
Figure 2.2: Identification with network fixed effects
Notes: The picture on the left panel shows an undirected network with an agent l who is at least 3 steps away
from i, while the picture on the right panel shows the same for a directed network.
A concern that arises when applying this method is that of instrument strength. Bramoulle´
et al. (2009) find that this varies with graph density, i.e., the proportion of node pairs that are
linked; and the level of clustering, i.e. the proportion of node triples such that precisely two of
the possible three edges are connected.24 Instrument strength is declining in density, since the
number of intransitive triads tends to zero. The results for clustering are non-monotone, and
depend on density.
The discussion thus far has assumed that the network through which the endogenous social
effect operates is the same as the network through which the contextual effect operates. It is
possible to allow for these two networks to be distinct. This could be useful in a school setting, for
instance, where contextual effects could be driven by the average characteristics of all students
in the school, while endogenous effects by the outcomes of a subset of students who are friends.
This might occur if the contextual effect operates through the level of resources the school has,
which depends on the parental income of all students, whilst the peer learning might come only
from friends.
23This is a global within transformation, which subtracts the average across the entire network from the
individual’s value. Alternatively, a local within transformation, J locg = Ig − G˜g , can be used, which would
subtract only the average of the individual’s peers rather than the average for the whole network. The latter
transformation has slightly stricter identification conditions than the former, since it does not make use of the
fact that the network fixed effect is common across all network members, and not just among directly linked
nodes.
24This definition is also referred to as the clustering coefficient.
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Let GX,g and Gy,g denote the network-level adjacency matrices through which, respectively,
the contextual and endogenous effects operate. As before we define the block diagonal matrices
GX = diag{GX,g}g=Mg=1 and Gy = diag{Gy,g}g=Mg=1 . Blume et al. (2013) study identification of
this model assuming that the two networks are (conditionally) exogenous and show that when
the matrices Gy and GX are observed by the econometrician, and at least one of δ and γ is
non-zero, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the parameters of Equation 2.6 to be
identified are that the matrices I, Gy, GX and GyGX are linearly independent.
Although all parameters of interest can be identified by this method, the assumption that
the network structure is conditionally exogenous is highly problematic. Though endogeneity
caused by selection into a network can be overcome by allowing for group fixed effects which
can be differenced out, endogenous formation of links within the network remains problematic
and is substantially more difficult to overcome. Formally, the problem arises from the fact that
agents’ choices of with whom to link are correlated with unobservable (at least to the researcher)
characteristics of both agents, so Pr(Gij,g = 1|εi,g) 6= Pr(Gij,g).
This means that the absence of a link between two nodes i and k may be correlated with εi,g
and εk,g, meaning that E[εi,g|Xg,Zg,Gg] 6= 0.25 Consequently the condition in Equation 2.2 no
longer holds. This is problematic for the method of Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), where the absence
of a link is used to identify the social effect, and this absence could be for reasons related to the
outcome of interest, thereby invalidating the exclusion restriction. For instance, more motivated
pupils in a school may choose to link with other motivated pupils; or individuals may choose
to become friends with other individuals who share a common interest (such as an interest
in reading, or mathematics) that is unobserved in the data available to the researcher. In such
examples, the absence of a link is due to the unobserved terms of the two agents being correlated
in a specific way rather than the absence of correlation between these terms. Solutions to this
problem are considered in Subsection 2.3.7.
2.3.3 Local Aggregate Model
The local aggregate class of models considers settings where agents’ utilities are a function of the
aggregate outcomes (or choices) of their neighbours. Such a model applies to situations where
there are strategic complementarities or strategic substitutabilities. For example:
• An individual’s costs of engaging in crime may be lower when his neighbours also engage
in crime (e.g. Bramoulle´ et al., 2014).26.
25Similarly, E[εk,g |Gg ] 6= 0.
26The games considered in both Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) are not strictly
linear models, since there are corner solutions at zero.
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• An agent is more likely to learn about a new product and how it works if more of his
neighbours know about it and have used it.
The local aggregate model corresponds empirically to Equation 2.1 with wy(G, Y )=GY and
wx(G, X)=G˜X, and a scalar social effect parameter, β. This specification can be motivated by
the best responses of a game in which nodes have linear-quadratic utility and there are strategic
complementarities or substitutabilities between the actions of a node and those of its neighbours.
A model of this type has studied by Ballester et al. (2006).27 In particular, the utility function
for node i in network g takes the following form:
Ui(yi,g;y−i,g,Xg,Gg) =
pii,g − 1
2
yi,g + β
Ng∑
j=1
Gij,gyj,g
 yi,g (2.12)
where yi,g is i’s action or choice, and pii,g is, as before, an individual heterogeneity parame-
ter.28 pii,g is parameterised as
pii,g = xi,gδ +
n∑
j=1
G˜ij,gxj,gγ + zgη + νg + εi,g
so that individual heterogeneity is a function of a node’s own characteristics, the average charac-
teristics of its neighbours, network-level observed characteristics, and some unobserved network-
and individual-level terms.
The quadratic cost of own actions means that in the absence of any network, there would be
a unique optimal amount of effort the node would exert. β > 0 implies that neighbours’ actions
are complementary to a node’s own actions, so that the node increases his actions in response
to those of his neighbours. If β < 0, then nodes’ actions are substitutes, and the reverse is true.
Nodes choose yi,g so as to maximise their utility.
The best response function is:
y∗i,g(Gg) = β
n∑
j=1
Gij,gyj,g + xi,gδ +
n∑
j=1
G˜ij,gxj,gγ + zgη + νg + εi,g (2.13)
Ballester et al. (2006) solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game when β > 0 and show
that when |βωmax(Gg)| < 1, where ωmax(Gg) is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix Gg, the
equilibrium is unique and the equilibrium outcome relates to a node’s Katz-Bonacich centrality,
which is defined as b(Gg, β) = (Ig − βGg)−1(ιg).29
27Ballester et al. (2006) focus on the case where there are strategic complementarities. Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)
study the case where there are strategic substitutabilities and characterise all equilibria of this game.
28Notice that
∑Ng
j=1 Gij,gyj,g = Gi,gyg .
29A more general definition for Katz-Bonacich centrality is b(Gg , β, a) = (Ig − βGg)−1(aGgιg), where a > 0
is a constant (Jackson, 2008).
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Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) study the game with strategic substitutabilities between the action
of a node and those of its neighbours. They characterise the set of Nash equilibria of the game
and show that, in general, multiple equilibria will arise. A unique equilibrium exists only when
β|ωmin(Gg)| < 1, where ωmin(Gg) is the lowest eigenvalue of the matrix Gg. When there are
multiple equilibria possible, they must be accounted for in any empirical analysis. Methods
developed in the literature on the econometrics of games may be applied here (Bisin et al.,
2011a). See de Paula (2013) for an overview.
When a unique equilibrium exists, this theoretical set-up implies the following empirical
model (stacking data from multiple networks):
Y = αι+ βGY +Xγ + G˜Xδ +Zη +Lν + ε (2.14)
which corresponds to Equation 2.1 with wy(G, Y )=GY and wx(G, X)=G˜X, and where
all other variables and parameters are as defined above in Subsection 2.3.1.
Identification of Equation 2.14 using observational data has been studied by Calvo´-Armengol
et al. (2009), Lee and Liu (2010) and Liu et al. (2014b). They proceed under the assumption
that E[ε|X,Z,G, G˜] = 0 and E[ν|X,Z,G, G˜] 6= 0. That is, the node-varying error component
is conditionally independent of node- and network-level observables and of the network, while
the network-level unobservable could be correlated with node- and network-level characteristics
and/or the network itself.
These assumptions imply a two-stage network formation process. First agents select into
a network based on a set of observed individual- and network-level characteristics and some
common network-level unobservables. Then in a second stage they form links with other nodes.
There are no network-level unobservable factors that determine link formation once the network
has been selected by the node. Moreover, there are no node-level unobservable factors that
determine the choice of network or link formation within the chosen network.
To proceed, we assume that data is available for multiple networks. Then, as in Subsec-
tion 2.3.2, we replace the network-level observables, Z, and the network-level unobservable, Lν
in Equation 2.14 with network fixed effects, Lν˜, where ν˜ is a M × 1 vector that captures the
network fixed effects.
To account for the fixed effect, a global within-transformation is applied, as in Subsec-
tion 2.3.2. This transformation is represented by the block diagonal matrix Jglob that stacks
the following network-level transformation matrices – Jglobg = Ig − 1Ng (ιgι′g) – along the leading
diagonal, with off-diagonal terms set to 0. Again we suppress the superscript on Jglob in the
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rest of this subsection. The resulting model, analogous to Equation 2.11, is:
JY = βJGY + JXγ + JG˜Xδ + Jε (2.15)
The model above suffers from the reflection problem, since Y appears on both sides of the
equation. However, the parameters of Equation 2.15 can be identified using linear IV if the
deterministic part of the right hand side, [E(JGY ),JX,JG˜X], has full column rank. To see
the conditions under which this is satisfied, we examine the term with the endogenous variable,
E(JGY ). Under the assumption that |βωmax(Gg)| < 1, we obtain the following from the
reduced form equation of Equation 2.14:
E(JGY ) = J(GX + βG2X + ...)γ + J(GG˜X + βG2G˜X + ...)δ
+J(GL+ βG2L+ ...)ν˜ (2.16)
We can thus see that if there is variation in node degree within at least one network g (which
means that Gg and G˜g are linearly independent), and the matrices {I,G, G˜,GG˜} are linearly
independent with γ, δ, and ν˜ each having non-zero terms, the parameters of Equation 2.14 are
identified.30 This is a special case of the Blume et al. (2013) result discussed earlier. Node
degree (GL), along with the total and average exogenous characteristics of the node’s direct
neighbours (i.e. GX and G˜X) and sum of the average exogenous characteristics of its second-
degree neighbours (i.e. GG˜X) can be used as instruments for the total outcome of the node’s
neighbours (i.e. GY ). The availability of node degree as an instrument can allow one to identify
parameters without using the exogenous characteristics, X, of second- or higher-degree network
neighbours, which could be advantageous in some situations as we will see in Section 2.5 below.
In terms of practical application, consider using this method to identify whether there are
complementarities between the schooling performance of an individual and that of his friends,
conditional on how own characteristics (age and gender), the composition of his friends (average
age and gender), and some school characteristics. Then, if there are individuals in the same
network with different numbers of friends, and the matrices {I,G, G˜,GG˜} are linearly indepen-
dent, the individual’s degree, along with the total and average characteristics of his friends (i.e.
total and average age and gender) and the sum of the average age and gender of the individual’s
friends of friends can be used as instruments for the sum of the individual’s friends’ schooling
performance.
30See Liu et al. (2014b) for a different identification condition that allows for some linear dependence among
these matrices under additional restrictions.
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Parameters can still be identified if there no variation in node degree within a network for all
networks in the data, but there is variation in degree across networks. In this case, Gg = d¯gG˜g
and [E(JGY ),JX,JG˜X] has full column rank if the matrices {I,G, G˜,GG˜, G˜2,GG˜2} are
linearly independent and γ and δ each have non-zero terms.31 Finally, when there is no variation
in node degree within and across all networks in the data, parameters can be identified using a
similar condition as encountered in Subsection 2.3.3 above: the matrices {I, G˜, G˜2, G˜3} should
be linearly independent.
It is possible to identify model parameters in the local aggregate model in networks where
the local average model parameters cannot be identified. For example, in a star network (see
Figure 2.3) there is no pair of agents that has a geodesic distance (i.e. shortest path) of 3 or more,
so this fails the identification condition for the local average model (see Subsection 2.3.2 above).
However, there is variation in node degree within the network and the matrices Ig,Gg, G˜g,GgG˜g
can be shown to be linearly independent, thus satisfying the identification conditions for the local
aggregate model.
Figure 2.3: Star Network
2.3.4 Hybrid Local Models
The local average and local aggregate models embody distinct mechanisms through which social
effects arise. One may be interested in jointly testing these mechanisms, and empirically iden-
tifying the most relevant one for a particular context. Liu et al. (2014a) present a framework
nesting both the local aggregate and local average models, allowing for this.
The utility function for node i in network g that nests both the (linear) local aggregate and
local average models has the following form:
31See Liu et al. (2014b) for a different identification condition that allows for some linear dependence among
these matrices under additional restrictions.
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Ui(yi,g;y−i,g,Xg, G˜i,g,Gi,g) =
pii,g + β1 Ng∑
j=1
Gij,gyj,g − 1
2
yi,g − 2β2 Ng∑
j=1
G˜ij,gyj,g
 yi,g
(2.17)
where pii,g is node-specific observed heterogeneity, which affects the node’s marginal return
from the chosen outcome level yi,g. A node’s utility is thus affected by the choices of its neigh-
bours through changing the marginal returns of its own choice (e.g. in a schooling context, an
individual’s studying effort is more productive if his friends also study), as in the local aggregate
model, and by a cost of deviating from the average choice of its neighbours (i.e. individuals face
a utility cost if they study when their friends don’t study), as in the local average model.
The best reply function for a node i nests both the local average and local aggregate terms.
Liu et al. (2014a) prove that under the condition that β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0 and dmaxg β1 + β2 < 1,
where dmaxg is the largest degree in network g, the simultaneous move game has a unique interior
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The econometric model, assuming that the node-specific observed heterogeneity parameter
takes the form pii,g = xi,gγ +
∑Ng
j=1 G˜ij,gxj,gδ + zgηg + νg + εi,g, is as follows:
Y = αι+ β1GY + β2G˜Y +Xγ + G˜Xδ +Zη +Lν + ε (2.18)
using the same notation as before (see e.g. Subsection 2.3.1).
With data from only a single network it is not possible to separately identify β1 and β2
and hence test between the local aggregate and local average models (or indeed find that the
truth is a hybrid of the two effects). Identification of parameters is considered when data
from multiple networks are available under the assumption that E[εi,g|Xg,Zg,Gg, G˜g] = 0 and
E[νg|Xg,Zg,Gg, G˜g] 6= 0. Thus, as in Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 above, the individual error
term, εi,g is assumed to be mean independent of node- and network-level observable characteris-
tics and the network. The network-level unobservable, νg, by contrast is allowed to be correlated
with node- and network-level characteristics and/or the network.
To proceed, as in the local average and local aggregate model, Zη and Lν are replaced by
a network-level fixed effect, Lν˜, which is then removed using the global within-transformation,
Jglob. Again, we suppress the superscript on Jglob. The resulting transformed network model is:
JY = β1JGY + β2JG˜Y + JXγ + JG˜Xδ + Jε (2.19)
When there is variation in the degree within a network g, then the reduced form equation
of Equation 2.19 implies that JG(I − β1G − β2G˜)−1L can be used as an instrument for the
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local aggregate term JGY and JG˜(I − β1G− β2G˜)−1L can be used as an instrument for the
local average term JG˜Y . The model parameters may thus be identified even if there are no
node-level exogenous characteristics, X, in the model. Caution must be taken though when
the model contains no exogenous characteristics, X, since, in this case, the model may be
only tautologically identified if β1 = 0 (Angrist, 2013). The availability of such characteristics
offers more possible IVs: in particular, the total and average exogenous characteristics of direct
and indirect neighbours can be used as instruments. These are necessary for identification
when all nodes within a network have the same degree, though average degree may vary across
networks. In this case, parameters can be identified if the matrices {I,G, G˜,GG˜, G˜2,GG˜2, G˜3}
are linearly independent. If, however, all nodes in all networks have the same degree, it is not
possible to identify separately the parameters β1 and β2.
This specification nests both the local average and local aggregate models, so a J-test for
non-nested regression models can be applied to uncover the relevance of each mechanism. The
intuition underlying the J-test is as follows: if a model is correctly specified (in terms of the set of
regressors), then the fitted value of an alternative model should have no additional explanatory
power in the original model, i.e. its coefficient should not be significantly different from zero.
Thus, to identify which of the local average or local aggregate mechanisms is more relevant for a
specific outcome, one could first estimate one of the models (e.g. the local average model), and
obtain the predicted outcome value under this mechanism. In a second step, estimate the other
model (in our example, the local aggregate model), and include as a regressor the predicted
value from the other (i.e. local average) model. If the mechanism underlying the local average
model is also relevant for the outcome, the coefficient on the predicted value will be statistically
different from 0. The converse can also be done to test the relevance of the second model (the
local aggregate model in our case). See Liu et al. (2014a) for more details.
2.3.5 Models with Network Characteristics
The models considered thus far allow for a node’s outcomes to be influenced only by outcomes
of its neighbours. However, the broader network structure may affect node- and aggregate
network- outcomes through more general functionals or features of the network. Depending on
the theoretical model used, there are different predictions on which network features relate to
different outcomes of interest. For example, the DeGroot (1974) model of social learning implies
that a node’s eigenvector centrality, which measures its ‘importance’ in the network by how
important its neighbours are, determines how influential it is in affecting the beliefs of other
nodes.
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Empirical testing and verification of the predictions of these theoretical models has greatly
lagged the theoretical literature due to a lack of datasets with both information on network
structure and socio-economic outcomes of interest. The recent availability of detailed network
data from many contexts has begun to relax this constraint.
The following types of specification are typically estimated when assessing how outcomes
vary with network structure, for node-level outcomes:
Y = fy(wy(G, Y ),X,wx(G, X),Z) + ε (2.20)
and network-level outcomes:
y¯ = fy¯(w¯y¯(G), X¯, w¯x¯(G, X¯)) + u (2.21)
fy(.) and fy¯(.) are functions that specify the shape of the relationship between the network
statistics and the node- and network-level outcomes. When fy(.) is simply a linear index in its
argument, Equation 2.22 remains nested in Equation 2.1. Though, in principle, the shape of
fy(.) should be guided by theory (where possible), through the rest of this subsection, we take
fy(.) to be a linear index in its argument. wy(G, Y ) includes R network statistics that vary
at the node- or network-level and that may be interacted with Y while w¯y¯(G) contains the R¯
network statistics in the network-level regression.32 X is a matrix of observable characteristics
of nodes, wx(G, X) interacts network statistics with exogenous characteristics of nodes, and Z
and X¯ are network-level observable characteristics. w¯X¯(G, X¯) interacts network statistics with
network-level observable characteristics.
The complexity of networks poses an important challenge in understanding how outcomes
vary with network structure. In particular, there are no sufficient statistics that fully describe the
structure of a network. For example, networks with the same average degree may vary greatly
on dimensions such as density, clustering and average path length among others. Moreover, the
adjacency matrix, G, which describes fully the structure of a network, is too high-dimensional
an object to include directly in tests of the influence of broader features of network structure.
Theory can provide guidance on which statistics are likely to be relevant, and also on the shape of
the relationship between the network statistic and the outcome of interest. A limitation though
is that theoretical results may not be available (given currently known techniques) for outcomes
one is interested in studying. This is a challenge faced by, for instance Alatas et al. (2014) who
study how network structure affects information aggregation.
32The term wy(G, Y ) will be endogenous when network statistics are interacted with Y .
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Below we outline methods that have been applied to analyse the effects of features of network
structure on socio-economic outcomes. We do so separately for node-level specifications and
network-level specifications. This literature is very much in its infancy and few methods have
been developed to allow for identification of causal parameters.
Node-Level Specifications
Many theoretical models predict how node-level outcomes vary with the ‘position’ of a node in
the network, captured by node varying network statistics such as centrality; or with features of
the node’s local neighbourhood such as node clustering; or with the ‘connectivity’ of the network,
represented by statistics that vary at the network-level such as network density.
A common type of empirical specification used in the literature correlates network statistics
with some relevant socio-economic outcome of interest. This approach is taken by, for example,
Jackson et al. (2012) who test whether informal favours take place across edges that are supported
(i.e. that nodes exchanging a favour have a common neighbour), which is the prediction of their
theoretical model.
This corresponds with wy(G,Y ) in Equation 2.20 above being defined as wy(G,Y ) = ω,
where ω is an (
∑M
g=1Ng × R) matrix stacking ωi,g, the (1 × R) node-level vector of network
statistics of interest for all nodes in all networks, and wx(.) being defined as ι. Here, wy(G,Y )
is defined to be a function of the network only.
When fy(.) is linear, the specification is as follows:
Y = αι+ ωβ +Xγ + Zη + ε (2.22)
where the variables and parameters are as defined above and the parameter of interest is β.
Defining W = (ω,X,Z), the key identification assumption is that E [ε′W ] = 0, that is that
the right hand side terms are uncorrelated with the error term. This may not be satisfied if
there are unobserved factors that affect both the network statistic (through affecting network
formation decisions) and the outcome, Y or if the network statistic is mismeasured. Both of
these are important concerns that we cover in detail in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 below.
In some cases, one may also be interested in estimating a model where an agent’s outcome
is affected by the outcomes of his neighbours, weighted by a measure of their network position.
For example, in the context of learning about a new product or technology, the DeGroot (1974)
model of social learning implies that nodes’ eigenvector centrality determines how influential they
are in influencing others’ behaviour. Thus, conditional on the node’s eigenvector centrality, its
choices may be influenced more by the choices of his neighbours with high eigenvector centrality.
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Thus, one may want to weight the influence of neighbours’ outcomes on own outcomes by their
eigenvector centrality, conditional on own eigenvector centrality. This implies a model of the
following form:
Y = αι+wy(G, Y )β + X˜γ˜ +wx(G, X˜)δ˜ + Zη +Lν + ε (2.23)
wy(G, Y ) is an
∑
g Ng × R matrix, with the (i, r)th element being the weighted sum of i’s
neighbours’ outcomes,
∑
j 6=i
Gij,gyj,gω
r
j,g or
∑
j 6=i
G˜ij,gyj,gω
r
j,g, with weights ω
r
j,g being the neigh-
bour’s rth network statistic. X˜ = (X˜ ′1, X˜
′
2, ..., X˜
′
M )
′, where X˜g = (Xg,ωg) is a matrix stacking
together the network-level matrices of exogenous explanatory variables and network statistics of
interest. wx(G, X˜) could be defined as GX˜ or G˜X˜. Identification of parameters in this case
is complicated by the fact that wy(G, Y ) is a (possibly non-linear) function of Y , and thus
endogenous. It may be possible to achieve identification using network-based instrumental vari-
ables, as done in Subsections 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.4 above, though it is not immediately obvious
how such an IV could be constructed. Future research is needed to shed light on these issues.
Network-level Specifications
Aggregate network-level outcomes, such as the degree of risk sharing or the aggregate penetration
of a new product, may also be affected by how ‘connected’ the network is, or the ‘position’ of
nodes that experience a shock or who first hear about a new product.
Empirical tests of the relationship between aggregate network-level outcomes and network
statistics involves estimating specifications such as Equation 2.21, where the shape of the function
fy¯(.) and the choice of statistics in w¯y¯(G) = ω¯, where ω¯ is an (M × R¯) matrix of network
statistics, are, ideally, motivated by theory. With linear fy¯(.), this implies the following equation:
y¯ = φ0 + ω¯φ1 + X¯φ2 + w¯X¯(G, X¯)φ3 + u (2.24)
where the variables are as defined after Equation 2.21. The parameter of interest is typically
φ1. Defining W¯ = (ω, X¯, w¯X¯(G, X¯)), the key identification assumption is that E
[
uW¯
]
= 0,
which will not hold if there are unobserved variables in u that affect both the formation of the
network and the outcome y¯; or if the network statistics are mismeasured. Recent empirical work,
such as that by Banerjee et al. (2013), has used quasi-experimental variation to try and alleviate
some of the challenges posed by the former issue in identifying the parameter φ1.
Since this specification uses data at the network-level, estimation will require a large sample
of networks in order to recover precise estimates of the parameters, even in the absence of
endogeneity from network formation and mismeasurement of the network. This is a problem
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in practice, since as we will see below in Subsection 2.5.3, the difficulties and costs involved in
collecting network data often mean that in practice researchers have data for a small number of
networks only.
2.3.6 Experimental Variation
Subsections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5 above considered the identification of the social effect parameters
using observational data. In this subsection, we consider identification of these parameters using
experimental data. We focus on the case where a policy is assigned randomly to a sub-set of
nodes in a network. Throughout we assume that the network is pre-determined and unchanged
by the exogenously assigned policy.33
We focus the discussion on identifying parameters of the local average model specified in Sub-
section 2.3.2 above. The issues related to using experimental variation to uncover the parameters
of the local aggregate model are similar. As outlined above, this model implies that a node’s
outcome is affected by the average outcome of its network neighbours, its own and network-level
exogenous characteristics (which may be subsumed into a network fixed effect), and the average
characteristics of its network neighbours. We are typically interested in parameters β, γ, and δ
in the following equation:
Y = αι+βG˜Y +Xγ + G˜Xδ +Lν˜ + ε (2.25)
where the variables are as defined above.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that the policy shifts outcomes for the nodes that
directly receive the policy.34 To proceed further, we first assume that a node that does not receive
the policy (i.e. is untreated, to use the terminology from the policy evaluation literature), is
only affected by the policy through its effects on the outcomes of the node’s network neighbours.
This implies the following model for the outcome Y :
Y = αι+βG˜Y +Xγ + G˜Xδ + ρt+Lν˜ + ε (2.26)
where t is the treatment vector, and ρ is the direct effect of treatment. We assume that
E[ε|X,Z, G˜, t] = 0. Moreover, random allocation of the treatment implies that t ⊥⊥X,Z, G˜, ε.
Applying the same within-transformation as in Subsection 2.3.2 above to account for the
network-level fixed effect leads to the following specification:
33This assumption is not innocuous. Comola and Prina (2014) provide an example where the policy interven-
tion does change the network.
34Below, we will consider identification conditions in the case where a node may be affected by the treatment
status of his network neighbours even if their outcomes do not shift in response to the treatment.
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JY = αJι+βJG˜Y + JXγ + JG˜Xδ + ρJt+ Jε (2.27)
We can use instrumental variables to identify β as long as the deterministic part of the
right hand side of Equation 2.27, [E(JG˜Y ),JX,JG˜X] has full column rank. JX and JG˜X
can be used as instruments for themselves. We thus need an instrument for E[JG˜Y ]. We use
the following expression for JG˜Y , derived from the reduced form of Equation 2.26 under the
assumption that |β| < 1, to construct instruments:
E[JG˜Y ] = JG˜
∞∑
s=0
βsG˜sαι+ J(G˜Xγ + βG˜2Xγ + ...) + J(G˜2Xδ + βG˜3Xδ + ...)
+J(ρG˜t+ βρG˜2t+ ...) (2.28)
From this equation, we can see that G˜t, the average treatment status of a node’s network
neighbours, does not appear in Equation 2.26. It can thus be used as an instrument for G˜Y ,
either in addition to, or as an alternative to G˜2X and G˜3X, the average characteristics of the
node’s second- and third-degree neighbours. Thus, the policy could be used to identify the model
parameters, albeit under a strong assumption on who it affects.35
In many cases, however, the assumption that the policy affects a node’s outcome only if it is
directly treated may be too strong. The treatment status of a node’s neighbours could affect its
outcome even when the neighbours’ outcomes do not shift in response to receiving the policy.
An example of such a case, studied by Banerjee et al. (2013), is when the treatment involves
providing individuals with information on a new product, and the outcome of interest is the
take-up of the product. Then neighbours’ treatment status could affect the individual’s own
adoption decision by (1) shifting his neighbours’ decision (endorsement effects), and also (2)
through neighbours passing on information about the product and letting the individual know
of its existence (diffusion effect).36 In this case, a more appropriate model would be as follows:
Y = αι+ βG˜Y +Xγ + G˜Xδ + ρt+ G˜tµ+ ε (2.29)
where ρ captures the direct treatment effect, i.e. the effect of a node itself being treated, and
µ is the direct effect of the average treatment status of social contacts. This highlights the limits
to using exogenous variation from randomised experiments to identify social effect parameters.
We might want to use the exogenous variation in the average treatment allocation of a node’s
neighbours, G˜t, as an instrument for neighbours’ outcomes, G˜Y . However, this will identify β
35Similar results can be shown for the local aggregate model when |βωmax(G)| < 1. However, as shown above,
node degree can also be used as an additional instrument in this model.
36The study of how to use these effects to maximise the number of people who adopt relates closely to study
of the ‘key player’ in work by Ballester et al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2014b).
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only under the assumption that µ = 0, i.e. there is no direct effect of neighbours’ treatment
status. This rules out economic effects such as the diffusion effect.
We can still make use of the treatment effect for identification, by using the average treatment
status of a node’s second-degree (and higher-degree) neighbours, G˜2t, as instruments for the
average outcome of his neighbours (G˜Y ). This is the same identification result as discussed
earlier, from Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), and simply treats G˜2t in the same way the other covariates
of second-degree neighbours, G˜2X. Such instruments rely not only on variation in treatment
status, but also on the network structure, with identification not possible for certain network
structures as we saw in Subsection 2.3.2.37
Thus far, we have discussed how exogenous variation arising from the random assignment
of a policy can be used to identify the social effect associated with a specific model – the local
average model – which, as we saw, arises from an economic model where agents conform to their
peers. In empirical work, though, it is common for researchers to directly include the average
treatment status of network neighbours, rather than their average outcome, as a regressor in the
model. In other words, the following type of specification is usually estimated:
Y = b1ι+ b2G˜t+Xb3 + G˜Xb4 + b5t+ u (2.30)
A non-zero value for b2 is taken to indicate the presence of some social effect. However,
without further modelling, it is not possible to shed light on the exact mechanism underlying
this social effect, or the value of some ‘deep’ structural parameter.
2.3.7 Identification of Social Effects with Endogenous Links
In the previous subsections we focused on the identification of social effects under the assumption
that the edges along which the effects are transmitted are exogenous. By exogenous we mean that
the probability that agent i forms an edge with agent j is mean independent of any unobservables
that might influence the outcome of interest for any individual in our social effects model.
Formally, we assumed E[ε|X,Z, G˜] = 0.38
However, in many contexts this may not be hold. Suppose we have observational data on
farming practices amongst farmers in a village, and want to understand what features influence
take-up of a new practice. We might see that more connected farmers are more likely to take
up the practice. However, without further analysis we cannot necessarily interpret this as being
caused by the network.
37Note that instruments based on random treatment allocation and network structure (e.g. G˜t and G˜2t) may
be more plausible than those based on the exogenous characteristics, X, and the network structure (e.g. G˜2X),
since t has been randomly allocated, whereas X need not be.
38Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) suggest a test for endogeneity.
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One possibility is that there is some underlying correlation in the unobservables of the out-
come and connection equations. More risk-loving people, who might be more likely to take up
new farming practices, may also be more sociable, and thus have more connections. The endo-
geneity problem here comes from not being able to hold constant risk-preferences. Hence the
coefficient on the network measures is not independent of this unobserved variable. This problem
could be solved if we could find an instrument: something correlated with network connections
that is unrelated to risk-preferences.
Another possibility is that connections were formed explicitly because of their relationship
with the outcome. If agents care about their outcome yi,g, and if the network has some impact
on yi,g, then they have incentives to be strategic in choosing the links in which they are involved.
Suppose agents’ utility (or profit) varies with yi,g, but that some agents have a higher marginal
utility from increases in yi,g. Agents have incentives to manipulate the parts of the network they
are involved in i.e. the elements of the ith row and ith columns of Gg – {Gi,g,G′i,g} – to try to
maximise yi,g. Moreover, if links are costly, but there is heterogeneity in the agents’ valuations
of yi,g, then agents who value yi,g most should form more costly links, and have higher yi,g, but
the network is a consequence and not a cause of the individual value for yi,g.
Returning to the farming example, some agents may have a greater preference for taking up
new technologies. If talking to others is costly, but can help in understanding the new techniques,
these farmers will form more connections. Now the unobservable factors which influence the
outcome – preference for take up – will be be correlated with the number of connections. Unlike
the previous case, this time we cannot find an ‘instrumental’ solution: it is the same unobservable
driving both yi and Gi.
To overcome this issue experimentally one would need to be able to assign links in the
network. However, with the exception of rare examples (including one below), this is difficult
to achieve in practice. Additionally there can be external validity issues, as knowing the effect
that randomly assigned networks have may not be informative about what effect non-randomly
assigned networks have. Alternatively, one can randomly assign treatment status, as discussed
in Subsection 2.3.6.39
Carrell et al. (2013) provide a cautionary example of the importance of considering network
formation when using estimated social effects to inform policy reform. Carrell et al. (2009) use
data from the US Air Force Academy, where students are randomly assigned to classrooms. They
estimate a non-linear model of peer effects, implicitly assuming that conditional on classroom
39However, when the network is allowed to be endogenous, one needs to make (implicit) assumptions on the
network formation process in order to obtain causal estimates. For example, if we assume that the network
formation process is such that nodes with similar observed and unobserved characteristics hold similar positions
in the resulting network, we can obtain causal estimates if we compare outcomes of nodes with similar network
characteristics and different levels of indirect treatment exposure – i.e. exposure to the treatment through their
neighbours. See Manski (2013) for more discussion on these issues.
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assignment friendship formation is exogenous. They find large and significant peer effects in
maths and English test scores, and some non-linearity in these effects. Carrell et al. (2013) use
these estimated effects to ‘optimally assign’ a random sample of students to classrooms, with the
intention of maximising the achievement of lower ability students. However, test performance
in the ‘optimally assigned’ classrooms is worse than in the randomly assigned classrooms. They
suggest that this finding comes from not taking into account the structure of the linkages between
individuals within classrooms.40
Instrumental Variables
In the first example above, the outcome y was determined by an equation of the form of Equa-
tion 2.1, where the network G was determined potentially by some of the observables already
in Equation 2.1 and also the unobservables u, and E[ε|X,Z, G˜] 6= 0. The failure of the mean
independence assumption prevents us from identifying the parameters of Equation 2.1 in the
ways suggested previously.
If our interest is in identifying only those parameters, one (potential) solution to the problem
is to randomly assign the network structure. However, this is typically prohibitively difficult to
enforce in real world settings. It is also unlikely to be representative of the edges people actually
choose (see for example Carrell et al., 2013).41
Alternatively we can attempt to overcome the endogeneity of the network by taking an
instrumental variables (IV) approach and finding an exclusion restriction. Here one needs to
have a covariate that affects the structure of the network in a way relevant to the outcome
equation – something which changes wy(G, Y ) – but is excluded from the outcome equation
itself. For example, if the outcome equation has only in-degree as a network covariate, then
one needs to find a covariate that is correlated with in-degree but not the outcome. If instead
the outcome equation included some other network covariate, for example Bonacich centrality,
a different variable might be appropriate as an instrument.
Mihaly (2009) takes this approach. In trying to uncover the effect of popularity – as measured
by various network statistics – on the educational outcomes of adolescents in the US, she uses
an interaction between individual and school characteristics as an instrument for popularity.42
This is a valid instrument if the composition of the school has no direct effect on educational
40Booij et al. (2015) have a different interpretation of this result. They suggest that the problem with the
assignment based on the results of Carrell et al. (2009) is that the peer groups constructed fall far outside the
support of the data used. Hence predictions about student performance come from extrapolation based on the
functional form assumptions used, which should have been viewed with caution.
41In the models discussed this means we might observe outcomes that wouldn’t be seen without manipulation,
because we have changed the support of G. In interpreting these results in the context of unmanipulated data
we need to be cautious, since we are relying heavily on the functional form assumptions as extrapolate outside
the support of what we observe.
42She uses four definitions of popularity: in-degree, network density (which only varies between networks),
eigenvector centrality, and Bonacich centrality.
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attainment (something which the education literature suggests is unlikely), but does affect all of
the measures of popularity.
As ever with instrumental variables, the effectiveness of this approach relies on having a
good instrument: something which has strong predictive power for the network covariate but
does not enter the outcome equation directly. As noted earlier, if individuals care about the
outcome of interest, they will have incentives to manipulate the network covariate. Hence such
a variable will generally be easiest to find when there are some exogenous constraints that make
particular edges much less likely to form than others, despite their strong potential benefits.
For example Munshi and Myaux (2006) consider the role of strong social norms that prevent
the formation of cross-religion edges even where these might otherwise be very profitable, when
studying fertility in rural Bangladesh. The restrictions on cross-religion connections means that
having different religions is a strong predictor that two women are not linked. Alternatively,
secondary motivations for forming edges that are unrelated to the primary outcome could be
used to provide an independent source of variation in edge formation probabilities.43
It is important to note that this type of solution can only be employed when the underlying
network formation model has a unique equilibrium. Uniqueness requires that there is only one
network structure consistent with the (observed and unobserved) characteristics of the agents
and environment. However, when multiple equilibria are possible, which will generally be the
case if the incentives for a pair of agents to link depend on the state of the other potential links,
IV solutions cannot be used. We discuss further in Section 2.4 issues of uniqueness in network
formation models, and how one might estimate the formation equation in these circumstances.
One should also be aware, when interpreting the results, that if there is heterogeneity in β
then this approach delivers a local average treatment effect (LATE). This is a particular weighted
average of the individual-specific β’s, putting more weight on those for whom the instrument (in
our example, school composition) creates most variation in the network characteristic. Hence if
the people whose friendship decisions are most affected by school characteristics are also those
who, perhaps, are most affected by their friends’ outcomes, then the estimated social effect will
be higher than the average social effect across all individuals.
Jointly model formation and social effects
In our second example at the beginning of Subsection 2.3.7 we considered the case where the
outcome y was determined by an equation of the form of Equation 2.1, and the network G was
strategically chosen to maximise the (unobserved) individual return from this outcome, subject
to unobserved costs of forming links. Here the endogeneity comes from G being a function of u.
43An application of this idea is provided by Cohen-Cole et al. (forthcoming), who consider multiple outcomes
of interest, but where agents can form only a single network which influences all of these.
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If there is heterogeneity in the costs of forming links, these costs might be useful as instruments,
if observed.44 Without this we must take an alternative approach.
Rather than treating the endogeneity of the network as a problem, jointly modelling G and
y uses the observed choices over links to provide additional information about the unobservables
which enter the outcome equation. Rather than looking for a variable that can help explain
the endogenous covariate but is excluded from the outcome, we now model an explicit economic
relationship, and rely on the imposed model to provide identification. Such an approach is
taken, for example, by Badev (2013), Blume et al. (2013), Hsieh and Lee (2014), and Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens (2013).
Typically the process is modelled as a two-stage game, where agents first form a network
and then make outcome decisions.45 Agents are foresighted enough to see the effect of their
network decisions on their later outcome decisions. Consequently they solve the decision process
by backward induction, first determining actions for each possible network, and then choosing
network links with knowledge of what this implies for outcomes. For this approach to work one
needs to be able to characterise the payoff of each possible network, so as to account for agents’
network formation incentives in a tractable way.
There are two main limitations for this approach. First, by avoiding the use of exclusion
restrictions, the role of functional form assumptions in providing identification becomes critical.
Since theory rarely specifies precise functional forms, it is not unreasonable to worry about
the robustness of results based on assumptions that are often due more to convenience than
conviction.
Second, we typically need to impose limits on the form of the network formation model that
mean the model is unable to generate many of the features of observed networks, such as the
relatively high degree of clustering and low diameter. Particularly restrictive, and discussed
further in Section 2.4, is the restriction that links are formed conditionally independently.
Changes in network structure
An alternative approach to those suggested above relies on changes in network structure to
provide exogenous variation. In some circumstances one might believe that particular nodes
or edges are removed from the network for exogenous reasons (this is sometimes described as
‘node/edge failure’). For example, Patnam (2013) considers a network of interlocking company
board memberships in India. A pair of firms is considered to be linked if the firms have a common
board member. Occasionally edges between companies are severed due to the death of a board
44However, even this will depend on the timing of decisions. See Blume et al. (2013) for details on when such
an argument might not hold.
45Of the papers mentioned above, Badev (2013) models the choice of friendships and actions simultaneously,
whilst the others assume a two-stage process.
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member, and to the extent that this is unpredictable, it provides plausibly exogenous variation
in the network structure. One can then see how outcomes change as the network changes, and
this gives a local estimate of the effect of the network on the outcome of interest. A similar
idea is used by Waldinger (2010, 2012) using the Nazi expulsion of Jewish scientists to provide
exogenous changes in academic department membership.
The difficulty with this approach in general is finding something that exogenously changes
the network, but to which agents do not choose to respond.46 Non-response includes both not
adjusting edges in response to the changes that occur, and not ex ante choosing edges strate-
gically to insure against the probabilistic exogenous edge destruction process. In the examples
above these relate to not taking into account a board member’s probability of death when hir-
ing (e.g. not considering age when recruiting), and not hiring new scientists to replace those
expelled.
2.4 Network Formation
Network formation is commonly defined as the process of edge formation between a fixed set of
nodes. Although, in principle, one could also consider varying the nodes, in most applications
the set of nodes will be well-defined and fixed. The empirical study and analysis of this process
is important for three reasons.
First, the analysis in most of the previous section described how one might estimate social
effects under the critical assumption that the networks of connections were themselves exogenous,
or exogenous conditional on observed variables. In many circumstances, such as those described
in Subsection 2.3.7, one might think that economic agents are able to make some choice over
the connections they form, and that if their connections influence their outcomes they might be
somewhat strategic in which edges they choose to form. In this case the social effects estimated
earlier will be contaminated by correlations between an individual’s observed covariates and
the unobserved covariates of his friends. This is in addition to the problems of correlations in
group-level unobservables that is well-known in the peer effects literature. For example, someone
with a pre-disposition towards smoking is likely to choose to form friendships with others who
might also enjoy smoking. An observed correlation in smoking decision, even once environmental
characteristics are controlled for, might then come from the choice of friends, rather than any
social influence. One solution to this problem, is to use a two-step procedure, in which a predicted
network is estimated as a first stage. This predicted network is then used in place of the observed
46It is important to note that one also needs access to a panel of data for the network, which is not often
available.
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network in the second stage. This approach is taken by Ko¨nig et al. (2014).47 Again the first
stage will require estimation of a network formation process.
Second, an important issue when working with network data is that of measurement error.
We return to this more fully in the next section, but where networks are incompletely observed,
direct construction of network statistics using the sampled data typically introduces non-classical
measurement error in these network statistics. If these statistics are used as covariates in models
such as those in Section 2.3, we will obtain biased parameter estimates. One potential solution
to this problem – proposed in different contexts by Goldberg and Roth (2003), Popescul and
Ungar (2003), Hoff (2009), and Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) – is to use the available data
and any knowledge of the sampling scheme to predict the missing data. This can be used to
recover the (predicted) structure of the entire network, which can then be used for calculating
any network covariates. Such procedures require estimation of network formation models on the
available data.
Finally, we saw in Section 2.3 that social contacts can be important for a variety of outcomes,
including education outcomes (Duflo et al., 2011; De Giorgi et al., 2010), risk-sharing (Ambrus
et al., 2014; Angelucci et al., forthcoming; Jackson et al., 2012), and agricultural practices
(Conley and Udry, 2010). Hence one might want to understand where social connections come
from per se and how they can be influenced, in order to create more desirable outcomes. For
example, there is substantial evidence of homophily (Currarini et al., 2010). Homophily might in
some circumstances limit the benefits of connections, since there may be bigger potential gains
from interaction by agents who are more different, e.g. ceteris paribus the benefits of mutual
insurance are decreasing in the correlation of income. We might then want to consider what the
barriers are to the creation of such links, and what interventions might support such potentially
profitable edges.
The key challenge to dealing with network formation models is the size of the joint distribution
for edges. For a directed binary network, this is a N(N − 1)-dimensional simplex, which has
2N(N−1) points of support (potential networks).48 To give a sense of scale, for a network of more
than 7 agents the support of this space is larger than the number of neurons in the human brain,49
with 13 agents it is larger than the number of board configurations in chess,50 and with 17 agents
it is larger than the number of atoms in the observed universe.51 Yet networks with so few agents
are clearly much smaller than one would like to work with in practice. Hence simplifications will
47The same idea is used by Kelejian and Piras (2014) in the context of spatial regression.
48Through Section 2.4 we will be concerned with the identification and estimation of network formation models
using data on a single network only. Throughout this section we therefore suppress the subscript g.
49Estimated to be around 8.5× 1010 (Azevedo et al., 2009).
50Around 1046.25 (Chinchalkar, 1996).
51Around 1080 (Schutz, 2003).
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typically need to be made to limit the complexity of the probability distribution defined on this
space, in order to make work with these distributions computationally tractable.
We begin in Subsection 2.4.1 by considering methods which allow us to use data on a subset
of observed nodes to predict the status of unsampled nodes. Here the focus is purely on in-
sample prediction of link probabilities, not causal estimates of model parameters, so econometric
concerns about endogeneity can be neglected. Such methods allow us to impute the missing
network edges, providing one method for dealing with measurement error.
In Subsection 2.4.2, we then discuss conditions for estimating a network formation model,
when the ultimate objective is controlling for network endogeneity in the estimation of a social
effects model, as discussed in Subsection 2.3.7. Now we may have data on some or all of the
edges of the network, and methods used for estimation will in many cases be similar to those for
in-sample prediction. The key difference is that only exogenous predictors/covariates may be
used. Additionally, in order to be useful as a first-stage for a social effects model, there must be
at least one covariate which is a valid instrument i.e. it must have explanatory power for edge
status, and not directly affect the outcome in the social effects model.
Next in Subsection 2.4.3, we consider economic models of network formation. Here we think
about individual nodes as being economic agents, who make choices to maximise some objective
e.g. students maximising their utility by choosing who to form friendships with. We first
consider non-strategic models of formation, where the formation of one edge does not generate
externalities, so that Pr(Gij = 1|Gkl) = Pr(Gij = 1)∀ij 6= kl. Estimation of these models is
relatively straightforward, and again relates closely to the discussion in the first two subsections.
Finally, we end with a discussion of more recent work on network formation, which has begun
allowing for strategic interactions. Here the value to i of forming edges with j might depend on
the status of other edges in the network. For example, when trying to gather information about
jobs, individuals might find it more profitable to form edges with highly linked individuals who
are more likely to obtain information, rather than those with few contacts. This dependence
of edges on the status of other edges introduces important challenges, particularly when only
a single cross-section of data are observed, as will typically be the case in applications. Since
this work is at the frontier of research in network formation, we will focus on describing the
assumptions and methods that have so far been used to estimate these models, without being
able to provide any general guidance on how practitioners should use these methods.
2.4.1 In-sample prediction
Network formation models have long been studied in maths, computer science, statistical physics,
and sociology. These models are characterised by a focus on the probability distribution Pr(G)
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as the direct object of interest.52 For economists the main use for such models is likely to be
for imputation/in-sample prediction when all nodes, and only a subset of edges in a network are
observed.
The data available are typically a single realisation for a particular network, although occa-
sionally multiple networks are observed and/or the network(s) is (are) observed over time. We
focus on the case of one observation for a single network, since even when multiple networks are
observed their total number is still small.53 If multiple networks are available one could clearly
at a minimum use the procedures described below, treating each separately, although one could
also impose some restrictions on how parameters vary across networks if there is a good justi-
fication for doing so in a particular context. For example, suppose one observed edges between
children in multiple classrooms in a school, with no cross-edges existing between children in dif-
ferent classes. If one believed that the parameters affecting edge formation were common across
classrooms then one could improve the efficiency of estimation by combining the data. It could
also provide additional identifying power, as network-level variables could also be incorporated
into the model.
Identifying any non-trivial features of the probability distribution over the set of possible
(directed) networks, Pr(G), is not possible from a single observation without making further
restrictive assumptions. It is useful to note that Pr(G) is by definition equal to the joint distri-
bution over all of the individual edges, Pr
(
G12, ..., GN(N−1)
)
. Hence a single network containing
N agents can be seen instead as N(N − 1), potentially dependent, observations of directed edge
statuses.54 This joint distribution can be decomposed into the product of a series of condition-
als. For notational ease, let l ∈ Λ index edges, so Λ = {12, 13, ..., 1N, 21, 23, ..., N(N − 1)}.
Then we can write Pr(G) =
∏
l∈Λ Pr(Gl|Gl−1, ..., G1), so that each conditional distribution in
the product is the distribution for a particular edge conditional on all previous edges. This
conditioning encodes any dependencies which may exist between particular edges.
We begin with the simplest model of network formation, which assumes away both hetero-
geneity and dependence in edge propensities, and then reintroduce these features, describing the
costs and benefits associated with doing so.
Independent edge formation
The Bernoulli random graph model is the simplest model of network formation. It imposes a
common edge probability for each edge, and that probabilities are independent across edges.
52Economists, in contrast, are often interested in microfoundations, so the focus is typically instead on under-
standing the preferences, constraints, and/or beliefs of the agents involved in forming G. We consider models of
this form in Subsection 2.4.3.
53As noted in footnote 48, we therefore suppress the subscript g throughout this section to avoid unnecessarily
cluttered notation.
54If the network is undirected there are only half that many edges.
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Independence ensures that the joint distribution Pr
(
G12, ..., GN(N−1)
)
is just the product of the
marginals,
∏
l∈Λ Pr(Gl). A common probability for each edge means that Pr(Gl) = p ∀ l ∈ Λ,
so all information about the distribution Pr(G) is condensed into a single parameter, p, the
probability an edge exists.55 This can be straightforwardly estimated by maximum likelihood,
with the resulting estimate of the edge probability pˆ = |E|N(N−1) , equal to the proportion of
potential edges that are present.56
A natural extension of this model allows the probability Pr(Gij = 1) to depend on charac-
teristics of the nodes involved, (xi, xj), but conditional on these characteristics independence
across edges is maintained. This type of model can be motivated either by pairs of individuals
with particular characteristics (xi, xj) being more likely to meet each other and hence form
edges, or by the benefits of forming an edge depending on these characteristics, or some com-
bination of these. In general one cannot separate meeting probabilities from the utility of an
edge without either parametric restrictions or an exclusion restriction, so additional assumptions
will be needed if one wants to interpret the parameters structurally. We discuss this further in
Subsection 2.4.3.
The key restriction here is the assumption of independence across edge decisions. In many
cases this is unlikely to be reasonable. For example, in a model of directed network formation,
there might well be correlation in edges Gij and Gil driven by some unobservable node-specific
fixed effect for node i e.g. i might be very friendly, so be relatively likely to form edges. Use of
the estimated model to generate predicted networks will be problematic, as it will fail to generate
some of the key features typically observed, such as the high degree of clustering.
Allowing for fixed effects
The simplest form of dependencies that one might want to allow for are individual-specific
propensities to form edges with others, and to be linked to by others. Such models were developed
by Holland and Leinhardt (1981) and are known as p1-models. They parameterise the log
probability an edge exists, log(pij), as a linear index in a (network-specific) constant θ0, a fixed
effect for the edge ‘sender’ θ1,i, and a fixed effect for the edge ‘receiver’ θ2,j , so log(pij) =
θ0 + θ1,i + θ2,j . The fixed effects are interpreted as individual heterogeneity in propensity to
make or receive edges. Additional restrictions
∑
i θ1,i =
∑
j θ2,j = 0 provide a normalisation
that deals with the perfect collinearity that would otherwise be present.
The use of such fixed effects creates inferential problems, since increasing the size of the
network also increases the number of parameters,57 sometimes described as an incidental pa-
55Theoretical work on this type of model was done by Gilbert (1959), and it relates closely to the model of
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959).
56Or twice that probability if edges are undirected, so that there are only 1
2
N(N − 1) potential edges.
57Every new node adds two new parameters to be estimated.
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rameters problem. One natural solution to the latter problem is to impose homogeneity of the
θ1 and θ2 parameters within certain groups, such as gender and race.
58 If there are C groups,
then the number of parameters is now 2C + 1 and this remains fixed as N goes to infinity. This
removes the inference problem and also allows agents’ characteristics to be used in predicting
edge formation.59
Alternatively, if node-specific effects are uncorrelated with node characteristics, then varia-
tions in edge formation propensity ‘only’ create a problem for inference. This comes from the
unobserved node-specific effects inducing a correlation in the residuals, analogous to random ef-
fects. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) show how clustering can be used to adjust standard errors
appropriately.
However, in both cases the maintenance of the conditional independence assumption across
edges continues to present a problem for the credibility of this method. In particular it rules
out cases where the status of other edges, rather than just their probability of existence, affects
the probability of a given edge being present. This would be inappropriate if for example i’s
decision on whether to form an edge with j depends on how many friends j actually has, not
just on how friendly j is.
Allowing for more general dependencies
As discussed earlier in this section, identification of features of Pr(G) whilst allowing for com-
pletely general dependencies in edge probabilities is not possible. However, it is possible to allow
the probability of an edge to depend on a subset of the network, where this subset is specified
ex ante by the researcher. Such models are called p∗-models (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996)
or exponential random graph models (ERGMs). These have already been used in economics by,
for example, Mele (2013), who shows how such models can arise as the result of utility maximis-
ing decisions by individual agents, and Jackson et al. (2012) studying favour exchange among
villagers in rural India.
Frank and Strauss (1986) showed how estimation could be performed in the absence of
edge independence under the assumption that the structure of any dependence is known. For
example, one might want to assume that edge ij depends not on all other edges, but only
on the other edges that involve either i or j. This dependency structure, Prθ(Gij |G−ij) =
Prθ(Gij |Grs ∀ r ∈ {i, j}or s ∈ {i, j} but rs 6= ij) where θ is a vector of parameters and G−ij =
G\Gij , is called the pairwise Markovian structure.
58This is sometimes described as block modelling, since we allow the parameters, and hence edge probability,
to vary across ‘blocks’/groups.
59A related approach to solving this problem is suggested by Dzemski (2014).
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Drawing from the spatial statistics literature, where this is a more natural assumption, Frank
and Strauss show how an application of the Hammersley-Clifford theorem can be used to ac-
count for any arbitrary form of dependency.60 The key result is that if the probability of the
observed network is modelled as an exponential function of a linear index of network statistics,
appropriately defined, any dependency can be allowed for.
To construct the appropriate network statistics, they first construct a dependency graph, gdep.
This graph contains N(N−1) nodes, with each node here representing one of the N(N−1) edges
in the original graph.61 Then an edge between a pair of nodes ij and rs in the dependency graph
denotes that the conditional probability that edge ij exists is not independent of the status of
edge rs i.e. Prθ(Gij = 1|Grs) 6= Prθ(Gij = 1). Further, conditional on the set of neighbours
of node ij in the dependency graph, neidepij , Pr(Gij = 1) is independent of all other edges in
the original graph. So Prθ(Gij = 1|G−ij) = Prθ(Gij = 1|Grs ∈ neidepij ). For example, the p1
graph, with independent edges, has a dependency graph containing no edges. By contrast, a
5-node graph with a pairwise Markovian dependency structure would have, for example, edge
12 dependent on edges (13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 41, 42, 51, 52), i.e. all edges which have one
end at either 1 or 2.
We let A be the set of cliques of the dependency graph, where isolates are considered to be
cliques of size one.62 For example, if Gij is independent of all other edges conditional on Gji then
A = {(ij), (ij, ji)}i6=j .63 Then we define A as representing the different architectures or motifs
in A. In the previous example these would be ‘edges’, (ij), and ‘reciprocated edges’ (ij, ji). This
imposes a homogeneity assumption: that the probability a particular graph g is selected from
GN depends only on the number of edges and reciprocated edges, rather than to whom those
edges belong, so all networks with the same overall architecture (called ‘isomorphic networks’)
are equally likely.64 If instead we allow dependence between any edges that share a common
node, then A is the set of all edges (ij), reciprocated edges (ij, ji), triads (ij, ir, rj), and k-stars
(ij1, ij2, ..., ijk). Now A represents ‘edges’, ‘reciprocated edges’, ‘triads’, and ‘k-stars’.
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Invoking the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, Frank and Strauss (1986) note that the proba-
bility distribution over the set of graphs GN allows for the imposed dependencies if it takes the
60Originally due to Hammersley and Clifford (1971) in an unpublished manuscript, and later proved indepen-
dently by Grimmett (1973); Preston (1973); Sherman (1973); and Besag (1974).
61Nodes in this graph will be referred to by the name of the edge they represent in the original graph.
62A clique is any group of nodes such that every node in the group is connected to every other node in the
group.
63(i, j) is always a member of A, since we defined isolates as cliques of size one. Dependence of ij on ji means
that we can also define (ij, ji) as a clique, since in the dependency graph these nodes are connected to each other.
64Formally, two networks are isomorphic iff we can move from one to the other only by permuting the node
labels. For example, all six directed networks composed of three nodes and one edge are isomorphic. Isomorphism
implies that all network statistics are also identical, since these statistics are measured at a network level so are
not affected by node labels.
65This represents all triads in an undirected network, but in a directed network there are six possible edges
between three nodes, since ij 6= ji, so we may define a number of different triads.
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form
Pr θ(G) =
1
κ(θ)
exp
{∑
A
θASA(G)
}
(2.31)
where SA(G) is a summary statistic for motif A calculated fromG, θA is the parameter associated
with that statistic, and κ(θ) is a normalising constant, sometimes described as the partition
function, such that
∑
G∈GN Prθ(G) = 1.
66 In particular, SA(G) must be a positive function of
the number of occurrences of motif A in G. Since we are working with binary edges, without
loss of generality we can define SA(G) as simply a count of the number of occurrences of motif A
in the graph represented by G. For example, defining S(G) as the vector containing the SA(G),
if A = {(ij), (ij, ji)}i6=j then S(G) is a 2× 1 vector containing a count of the number of edges
and a count of the number of reciprocated edges.
Estimation of the ERGM model is made difficult by the presence of the partition function,
κ(θ). Since this function normalises the probability of each graph so that the probabilities
across all potential graphs sum to unity, it is calculated as
∑
G∈GN exp {
∑
A θASA(G)}. The
outer summation is a sum over the 2N(N−1) possible graphs. As noted earlier, even for moderate
N this is a large number, so computing the sum analytically is rarely possible.
Three approaches to estimation have been taken to overcome this difficulty: (1) the coding
method ; (2) the pseudolikelihood approach; and (3) the Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach.
The first two are based on the maximising the conditional likelihoods of edges, rather than the
joint likelihood, thus obviating the need for calculating the normalising constant, whilst the third
instead calculates an approximation to this constant.
Coding Method The coding method (Besag, 1974) writes the joint distribution of the edge
probabilities as the product of conditional distributions
Prθ(G) =
∏
l∈Λ Prθ(Gl|Gl−1, ..., G1), where as before Λ is the set of all N(N − 1) potential
edges. Under the assumption that edge Gl depends only on a subset of other edges Gl′ ∈ neidepl
one could ‘colour’ each edge, such that each edge depends only on edges of a different colour.67
All edges of the original graph that have the same colour are therefore independent of each other
by construction. Let Λc be the set of all edges of a particular colour. One could then estimate the
parameter vector of interest, θ, by maximum likelihood, using only Prθ(Gl|Gl′ ∈ neidepl )∀l ∈ Λc,
which treats only edges of the same colour as containing any independent information.
We define the ‘change statistic’ DA(G; l) := SA(Gl = 1,G−l) − SA(Gl = 0,G−l) as the
change in statistic SA from edge Gl being present, compared with it not being present, given all
66In a slight abuse of notation we write
∑
G∈GN Prθ(G) to mean
∑
g∈GN Prθ(Gg).
67This is equivalent to saying that no two adjacent (i.e. linked) nodes of the dependency graph should have
the same colour. Note that this colouring will not be unique. For example, one could trivially always colour every
edge a different colour. However, for estimation it is optimal to try to minimise the number of colours used, as
this makes the most of any information available about independence.
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the other edges G−l. Then, given the log-linear functional form assumption that we have made
(see Equation 2.31), the conditional probability of an edge l can be estimated from the logit
regression log
{
Pr(Gl=1|G−l)
Pr(Gl=0|G−l)
}
=
∑
A θADA(G; l). This can be implemented in most standard
statistical packages. Hence we can estimate θ using maximum likelihood under the assumption
that the edge probability takes a logit form and treating the edges l ∈ Λc as independent,
conditional on the edges not in Λc. Since all the conditioning edges which go into SA are of
different colours, they are not included in the maximisation, so θˆc will be consistent.
By performing this maximisation separately for each colour, a number of different estimates
can be recovered. Researchers may choose to then report the range of estimates produced, or to
create a single estimate from these many results, for example taking a mean or median.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting estimates will each be inefficient,
since they treat the edges l /∈ Λc as if they contain no information about the parameters. In
practice the proportion of edges in even the largest colour set Λc is likely to be small. For example,
if any edges that share a node are allowed to be dependent, then the number of independent
observations will only be 12N .
68 Hence efficiency is far from a purely theoretical concern in this
environment.
Pseudolikelihood approach The pseudolikelihood approach, introduced to the social net-
works literature by Strauss and Ikeda (1990), attempts to overcome the inefficiency problem, by
finding θ which jointly maximises all the conditional distributions, not just those of the same
colour. We write the log likelihood based on edges of colour c as Lc =
∑
l∈Λc log Prθ(Gl = 1|Gl′ ∈
neidepl ), with θˆc as the maximiser of this. Besag (1975) notes that the log (pseudo)likelihood
PL =
∑
c Lc =
∑
c
∑
l∈Λc log Prθ(Gl = 1|Gl′ ∈ nei
dep
l ), constructed by simply combining all
the data as if there were no dependencies, is equivalent to a particular weighting of the indi-
vidual, ‘coloured’ log likelihoods. This likelihood is misspecified, since the correct log likelihood
using all the data should be L =
∑
l log Prθ(Gl = 1|Gl−1, ..., G1), whilst here we have instead
L =
∑
l log Prθ(Gl = 1|G−l) =
∑
l log Prθ(Gl = 1|GL, ...Gl+1, Gl−1, ..., G1).69 Nevertheless,
under a particular form of asymptotics it may still yield consistent estimates.
We have already noted that for any given colour, the standard maximum likelihood con-
sistency result applies, as the observations included are independent. If the number of colours
are held fixed as the number of potential edges is increased,70 then under some basic regularity
68Or 1
2
(N − 1) if N is odd.
69A likelihood based on Prθ(Gl|G−l) without any correction suffers from simultaneity, since the probability of
each edge is being estimated conditional on all others remaining unchanged. In a two node directed network, as
a simple example, we effectively have two simultaneous equations, one for Prθ(G12|G21) and Prθ(G21|G12). It is
well-known that such systems will not generally yield consistent parameter estimates if the dependence between
the equations is not considered, and that strong restrictions will typically be needed even to achieve identification.
70In the language of spatial statistics, this is described as ‘domain increasing asymptotics’.
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conditions (Besag, 1975), maximising the log pseudolikelihood function PL(θ) as though there
were no dependencies will also give a consistent estimate of θ.
Unfortunately, in practice this approach suffers from a number of problems. First, although
it makes use of more information in the data, so is potentially more efficient, the standard
errors that are produced by standard statistical packages such as Stata will clearly be incorrect
as they will not take into account the dependence in the data. Little is known about how to
provide correct standard errors, but in some cases inference can proceed using an alternative,
non-parametric procedure: multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP). This
method can provide a test as to whether particular edge characteristics or features of the local
network, such as a common friend, are important for predicting the probability that a pair
of individuals is linked. It is based on the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP): a type of
permutation test for correlation between variables. For more details see Subsection 2.7.2.
A second issue is that in network applications we need to impose some structure on the
way in which new nodes are added to the network when we do asymptotics (Boucher and
Mourifie´, 2013; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013). If, as we increase the sample size, new
nodes added could be linked to all the existing nodes, then there is no reduction in dependence
between links. In the spatial context for which the theory was developed, the key idea is that
increasing sample size creates new geographic locations that are added at the ‘edge’ of the data.
If correlations reduce with distance, then as new, further away, locations are added, they will
be essentially independent from most existing locations. Such asymptotics are called domain-
increasing asymptotics. The analogy in a networks context, proposed by Boucher and Mourifie´
(2013) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013), is that new nodes are further away in the
support of the covariates. If there is homophily, so that nodes which are far apart in covariates
never link, then the decisions of these nodes are almost independent. Asymptotics results from
the spatial case can then be used.
Third, Kolaczyk (2009) suggests that in practice this method only works well when the extent
of dependence in the data is small. In general there is no reason to assume dependence will be
small in network data; indeed it is precisely because we did not wish to assume this that we
considered ERGMs at all.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood An alternative approach, not based
on the ad-hoc weighting provided by the pseudolikelihood approach, is to use Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) maximum likelihood (Geyer and Thompson, 1992; Snijders, 2002; Hand-
cock, 2003). As noted earlier, the key difficulty with direct maximum likelihood estimation of
Equation 2.31 is the presence of the partition function κ(θ) =
∑
G∈G exp {
∑
A θASA(G)}. This
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normalising constant is an intractable function of the parameter vector θ. In this estimation
approach, MCMC techniques can be used to create an estimate of κ(θ) based on a sample of
graphs drawn from GN .
The original log likelihood can be written as L(θ) =
∑
A θASA(G) − κ(θ). Maximis-
ing this is equivalent to maximising the likelihood ratio LR = L(θ) − L(θ(0)) since the lat-
ter is just a constant for some arbitrary initial θ(0). Writing this out in full we get LR =∑
A
[
θA − θ(0)A
]
SA(G) −
[
κ(θ)− κ(θ(0))]. The second component can be approximated by
drawing a sequence of W graphs, (G1, ...,GW ), from the ERGM under θ
(0), and computing
log
∑
w∈W exp
{∑
A(θA − θ(0)A )SA(G(w))
}
(see Kolaczyk (2009) pp185-187 for details). Under
this procedure the maximiser of the approximated log likelihood will converge to its true value
θ as the number of sampled graphs W goes to infinity.
This approach has two major disadvantages. The first is that implementation of this method
is very computationally intensive. Second, although this approach avoids the approximation of
the likelihood by directly evaluating the normalising constant, its effectiveness depends signifi-
cantly on the quality of the estimate of
[
κ(θ)− κ(θ(0))]. If this cannot be approximated well
then it is not clear that this approach, although more principled, should be preferred in practical
applications.
Recent work by Bhamidi et al. (2008) and Chatterjee et al. (2010) suggests that in practice
the mixing time – time taken for the Markov chain to reach its steady state distribution – of
such MCMC processes is very slow (exponential time). This means that as the space of possible
networks grows, the number of replications in the MCMC process that must be performed
in order to achieve a reasonable approximation to
[
κ(θ)− κ(θ(0))] rises rapidly, making this
approach difficult to justify in practice.
Statistical ERGMs Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014) also note that practitioners often
report obtaining wildly different estimates from repeated uses of ERGM techniques on the same
set of data with the same model, with variation far exceeding that expected given the claimed
standard errors. They propose a technique which they call Statistical ERGM (SERGM), which is
easier to estimate, as an alternative to the usual ERGM. With this they are not able to recover
the probability that we observe a particular network, but instead focus on the probability of
observing a given realisation, s, of the network statistics, S.71
In an ERGM the sample space consists of the set of possible distinct networks on the N
nodes. This set has 2N(N−1) elements (in the case of a directed network), and we treat each
isomorphic element as being equally likely. Our reference distribution is a uniform distribution
71S is a |A| × 1 dimensional vector stacking the network statistics SA, and θ a 1× |A| dimensional vector of
parameters.
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across these 2N(N−1) elements i.e. this is the null distribution against which we are comparing
the observed network.
If our interest is only in the realisations of the network statistics, we can reduce the size of
the sample space we are working with. Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014) define SERGMs as
ERGMs on the space of possible network statistics, S. This sample space will typically contain
vastly fewer elements than the space of possible networks.
We can then rewrite Equation 2.31 using the space of network statistics as sample space.
In this case the probability of observing statistics S(G) taking value s is Prθ(S(G) = s) =
#S(s) exp(θs)∑
s′ #S(s′) exp(θs′)
, where #S(s) = |{G ∈ G : S(G) = s}| is the number of potential networks
which have S = s.
So far we have only rewritten our originally ERGM by defining it over a new space. We
defined our reference distribution in the ERGM to put equal weight on each possible network.
To maintain this distribution when the sample space is the space of statistics, we must weight the
usual (unnormalised) probability of observing network G, exp(θs), by the number of networks
which exhibit this configuration of statistics, #S(s
′).
Much of the difficulty in estimating ERGM models comes from use of these weights, since we
are required to know in how many networks a particular combination of statistics exists. Since
this is typically not possible to calculate analytically, we discussed how MCMC approaches might
be used to sample from the distribution of networks.
Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014) complete their definition of SERGMs as a generalisation
of ERGMs by allowing any reference distribution, KS(s) to be used in the place of #S(s
′).
However, to ease estimation relative to ERGMs, they then define the ‘count SERGM’, which
imposes KS(s) =
1
|S| .
72 The key here is not that these weights are constant, but that they
no longer depend on the space of networks. Since KS(s) is now known, unlike #S(s
′) which
needed to be calculated, if |S| is sufficiently small, exact evaluation of the partition function
κ˜(θ) =
∑
s′ KS(s
′) exp {θs′} is now possible.
Since count SERGMs – and any other SERGMs with known KS(s
′) – can be estimated di-
rectly and without approximation, they are easier to implement than standard ERGMs. Chan-
drasekhar and Jackson (2014) also provide assumptions under which the parameters of the
SERGM, θSERGM , can be estimated consistently.
The key drawback to this method is in interpretation. The estimated parameters, θSERGM ,
are not the same as the parameters θ in Equation 2.31, and the predicted probabilities are now
the probability of a particular configuration of statistics, rather than of a particular network.
Nevertheless, for a researcher interested in which network motifs are more likely to be observed
72Count SERGMs also restrict the setA to include only network motifs such as triangles and nodes of particular
degree, which can be counted. This rules out, for example, statistics such as density.
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than one would expect under independent edge formation, SERGMs offer an appropriate alter-
native.
2.4.2 Reduced form models of network formation
The methods discussed in the previous subsection focused on in-sample prediction of network
edges. However, since they (mostly) predict these probabilities based on the structure of the
networks, without use of other characteristics, they both fail to make use of all the information
typically available to researchers, and also do not contain the necessary independent variation
needed for use as the first stage of a social effects model with an endogenous network (of the sort
discussed in Subsection 2.3.7). When our ultimate aim is to estimate a social effects model but we
are concerned about the network being endogenous, one solution discussed in Subsection 2.3.7 is
to estimate the edge probability using individual characteristics, including at least one covariate
that is not included in the outcome equation (an exclusion restriction), as in a standard two-
stage least squares setting. In this subsection we describe estimation of models that include
individual (node) characteristics. As long as at least one of these is a valid instrument, then this
approach to overcoming the endogeneity of network formation is possible.
A well-recognised feature of many kinds of interaction networks is the prevalence of ho-
mophily: a propensity to be linked to relatively similar individuals.73 This observation may arise
from a preference for interacting with agents who are similar to you (preference homophily), a
lower cost of interacting with such agents (cost homophily), or a higher probability of meeting
such agents (meeting homophily). However, they all have the reduced form implication that
more similar agents are more likely to be linked.74
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) provide a discussion of the conditions that must be fulfilled
by a model used for dyadic regression, i.e. a regression model of edge formation when edges are
being treated as observations and node characteristics are included in the regressors. They note
the regressors must enter the model symmetrically, so that the effect of individual characteristics
(xi, xj) on edge Gij is the same as that of (xj , xi) on Gji. Additionally the model may contain
some edge-specific covariates, such as the distance between agents, which must by definition be
symmetric wij = wji. If edges are modelled as directed, then the model takes the general form
Gij = f (λ0 + (x1i − x1j)λ1 + x2iλ2 + x3jλ3 +wijλ4 + uij) (2.32)
73Homophily may be casually described as the tendency of ‘birds of a feather to flock together’.
74In Subsection 2.4.3 below, we consider homophily in more detail, and structural models that try to separate
these causes of observed homophily.
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This specification allows a term that varies with the difference between i and j in some
characteristics, (x1i − x1j); terms varying in the characteristics of both the sender and the
receiver of the edge, x2i and x3j respectively; some edge-specific characteristics, wij ; and an
edge-specific unobservable, uij . There may be partial or even complete overlap between any of
x1, x2, and x3. Since Gij is typically binary, the function f(.) and the distribution of u are
usually chosen to make the equation amenable to probit or logit estimation. However, in some
cases other functional forms are chosen. For example, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) model
f(.) as exp(.) since they are working with email data, measuring edges by the number of emails
between the individuals, which takes only non-negative values and varies (almost) continuously.
If edges are undirected, then (x1i − x1j) must be replaced with |x1i − x1j |;75 x2 = x3 and
λ2 = λ3; and uij = uji, so that Gij necessarily equals Gji. The identification of parameters λ2
and λ3 requires variation in degree. As Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) note, if all individuals
in the data have the same number of edges, such as a dataset of only married couples, then it
is possible to ask whether people are more likely to form edges with people of the same race,
captured by λ1, but not possible to ask whether some races are more likely to have edges.
Careful attention needs to be paid to inference in this model, since there is dependence across
multiple dyads for any individual, similar to the Markov random graph assumption discussed
in the previous subsection. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) show that standard errors can be
constructed analytically using a ‘four-way error components model’. This is a type of clustering,
allowing for correlation between uij and urs if either of i or j is equal to either of r and s.
The analytic correction they propose provides an alternative to using MRQAP, described in
Subsection 2.4.1, which may also be used in this circumstance.
2.4.3 Structural models of network formation
Economic models of network formation consider nodes as motivated agents, endowed with pref-
erences, constraints, and beliefs, choosing which edges to form. The focus for applied researchers
is to estimate parameters of the agents’ objective functions. For example, to understand what
factors are important for students in deciding which other students to form friendships with.
These models allow us to think about counterfactual policy scenarios. For example, if friend-
ships affect academic outcomes, then there might be a role for policy in considering how best
to organise students into classrooms, given knowledge of their endogenous friendship formation
response. If students tend to form homophilous friendships i.e. with others who have similar
predetermined characteristics, but not to form friendships across classrooms, there may be a
case for not streaming students into classes of similar academic abilities. This would create
75Or (x1i − x1j)2 may also be used.
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more heterogeneity in the characteristics of friends than if streaming were used, which might
improve the amount of peer learning that takes place.76 We begin by discussing non-strategic
models, in which these decisions depend only on the characteristics of the agents involved in the
edge. We then discuss strategic network formation, which occurs when network features directly
enter into the costs or benefits of forming particular edges.77
Structural Homophily
As noted above, a key empirical regularity which holds across a range of network types is the
presence of homophily. This is related to the more familiar (in economics) concept of positive
assortative matching, i.e. that people with similar characteristics form edges with one another.
As we have already seen, many reduced form models include homophilic terms – captured by λ1
in Equation 2.32 – to allow the probability a tie exists to vary with similarity on various node
characteristics.78 In this subsection, we consider the economic models of network formation that
are based on homophily.
We define homophily formally as follows. Let the individuals in a particular environment
be members of one of H groups, with typical group h. Groups might be defined according to
sex, race, height, or any other characteristics. Continuous characteristics will typically need to
be discretised. We denote individual i’s membership of group h as i ∈ h. Relationships for
individuals in group h exhibit homophily if Pr(Gij = 1|i ∈ h, j ∈ h) > Pr(Gij = 1|i ∈ h, j /∈ h).
In words, a group h exhibits homophily if its members are more likely to form edges with other
members of the same group than one would expect if edges were formed uniformly at random
among the population of nodes. In general there will be multiple characteristics {H1, ...,HK}
according to which individuals can be classified, and relationships may exhibit homophily on
any number of these characteristics.
As noted earlier there are (at least) three possible sources of homophily: preference homophily,
cost homophily, and meeting homophily.
Preference homophily implies that, conditional on meeting, people in a group are more likely
to form edges with other members of the same group as they value these edges more. For
example, within a classroom boys and girls might have equal opportunities to interact, but boys
may choose to form more friendships with other boys (and mutatis mutandis for girls) if they
have more similar interests.
76Clearly this is just an example, and there are many other factors to consider, such as the effectiveness of
teachers when faced with more heterogeneous classrooms, the ability to tailor lessons to challenge high ability
students, and other outcomes that might be influenced by changing friendships.
77See also a recent survey by Graham (2015), which became available after work on this manuscript.
78In principle this probability could be falling in similarity, known as heterophily. This may be relevant, for
example in models of risk sharing with heterogeneous risk preferences and complete commitment.
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Cost homophily occurs when the cost of maintaining an edge to a dissimilar agent is greater
than the cost of maintaining an edge to a more similar agent. For example, one might have
an equal preference for all potential friends, but find it ‘cheaper’ to maintain a friendship with
individuals who live relatively nearer. Unlike preferences, which are in some sense fundamental to
the individual, costs might be manipulable by policy. To the extent that they are environmental
these can also change the value of an edge over time, e.g. a friend moving further away may
lead to the friendship being broken.
Meeting homophily occurs when people of a particular group are more likely to meet other
members of the same group. For example, if we thought of all students in a school year as
being part of a single network, then there is likely to be meeting homophily within class groups,
since students in the same class have more opportunities to interact. Again this is amenable to
manipulation by policy, for example changing seating arrangements across desks in a classroom.
However, unlike cost homophily, once individuals have met, changes in the environment should
not change the value of a friendship.
These three sources of homophily all have the reduced form implication that the coefficient
on the absolute difference in characteristics, λ1 in Equation 2.32, should be negative for any
characteristics on which individuals exhibit homophily. However, since they may have different
policy implications, there is a case for trying to distinguish which of these channels are operating
to cause the observed homophily.
Currarini et al. (2009) suggest how one can distinguish between preference and meeting
homophily under the assumption that cost homophily does not exist. They note that if group
size varies across groups, then preference homophily should lead to more friendships among the
larger group, whereas meeting homophily should not. Intuitively this is because under preference
homophily, a larger own-group means there are more people with whom one might potentially
form a profitable friendship. One could then use regression analysis to test for the presence of
preference homophily by interacting group size with absolute difference in characteristics, and
testing whether the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero.
Alternatively one might want to estimate the magnitude of the effect of changing particular
features of the environment, such as the classrooms to which individuals are assigned. In this
case one could parameterise an economic model of behaviour, and then directly estimate the
parameters of the model. Currarini et al. (2009) do this using a model of network formation that
incorporates a biased meeting process, so individuals can meet their own-type more frequently
than other types, and differences in the value of a friendship depending on whether agents are
the same type.79 They simulate the model with a number of different parameters for meeting
79Again they do not allow for cost homophily.
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probabilities and relative values of friendships, and use a minimum distance procedure to choose
the parameters that best explain the data.
As ever with structural models, whilst this approach allows one to perform counterfactual
policy experiments, the main cost is that the reasonableness and interpretation of results depend
on the accuracy with which the imposed model fits reality. Also, without time series variation
in friendships, one cannot also allow for cost heterogeneity, which might show up either in
preferences by changing the value of forming an edge, or in meeting probabilities since those
with lower meeting probabilities will typically have a greater cost to maintaining a friendship.
Finally, it is important to note that estimation of such models requires the unobserved component
of preferences to be independent of the factors influencing meeting. If the unobserved preference
for partying is correlated with choosing to live in a particular dormitory, and hence meeting
other people living here, then this will bias the parameter estimate of the probability of meeting
in this environment.
Mayer and Puller (2008) develop an enriched version of this model which allows again for
meeting and preference homophily, but they allow the bias in the meeting process to depend not
only on exogenous characteristics, but also on sharing a mutual friend. Formally, Pr(meetij =
1|Gir = Gjr = 1) > Pr(meetij = 1), where Pr(meetij) denotes the probability that nodes i and
j meet (and hence have the opportunity to form an edge). This allows for the stylised fact that
individuals who are friends often also share mutual friends, which helps the model match the
observed clustering in the data.
However, although the model fit is improved, their model cannot distinguish whether this
clustering is in fact generated by a greater probability of meeting such individuals, a greater
benefit to being friends with someone you share a friend with already, or a lower cost of main-
taining that friendship. They show how one can estimate their model using a simulated method
of moments procedure. However, this method suffers from the same constraints as those in the
model suggested by Currarini et al. (2009): the utility of the model for counterfactuals depends
on how closely it matches reality; cost homophily is neglected; and it is important the unobserved
component of preferences is independent of the meeting process.
In the next subsection we consider extensions to these models that allow network statistics,
such as sharing a common friend, to enter into individuals’ utility functions. These create
strategic interactions which can complicate estimation.
Strategic network formation
Much of the theoretical literature on networks has emphasised the strategic nature of interactions,
setting up games of network formation as well as games to be played on existing networks (as seen
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in Section 2.3 above). The empirical literature has recently begun to take a similar approach,
trying to estimate games of network formation. The key extension of such models, beyond those
already considered, is to include network covariates into the objective function of agents. This
creates two complications: first such models may have zero, one, or many equilibria, and this
must be accounted for in estimation; and second, as with ERGM models, the presence of network
covariates necessitates the calculation of intractable functions of the unknown parameters.
Before considering estimation in more detail, we discuss the modelling choices that one needs
to make. First, as with all structural modelling one must explicitly determine the nature of the
objective function that agents are trying to maximise. For example one might have individuals
with utility functions that depend on some feature of the network, who are trying to maximise
this utility.80 Second, the ‘rules of the game’: are decisions made simultaneously or sequentially?
Unilaterally or bilaterally? What do agents know, and how do they form beliefs? Given that we
typically only observe a single cross-section of data, additional assumptions about the nature of
any meeting process are necessary. Similarly, data may be reported as directed or undirected, but
whether we treat unreciprocated directed edges as measurement error or evidence of unilateral
linking is an important consideration, particularly given the consequences of such measurement
error (see Subsection 2.5.3). Finally, one needs to take a stand on the appropriate concept
of equilibrium and the strategies being played. At the weakest, one could impose only that
strategies must be rationalisable, and hence many strategy profiles are likely to be equilibria.
On the other hand, depending on the information available to agents one could impose Nash
equilibrium, or Bayes-Nash equilibrium where individuals have incomplete information and need
to form beliefs. Alternatively one could use a partly cooperative notion of equilibrium such
as pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), which models link formation as requiring
agreement from both parties involved, although dissolution remains one-sided.81
Since these models are at the frontier of research on network formation, few general results
are currently available. We therefore instead briefly discuss the approaches that have been taken
so far to write estimable models, and estimate the parameters of these models. Our aim is to
highlight some of the choices that need to be made, and their relative advantages and costs.
Christakis et al. (2010) and Mele (2013) both model network formation as a sequential game:
there is some initial network, and then a sequential process by which edge statuses may be
adjusted. Crucial, also, to their models, is that at each meeting agents only weigh the static
benefits of updating the edge status (i.e. play a myopic best response), rather than taking
80For example their utility may depend on their centrality, or the number of edges they have subject to some
cost of forming edges. It is important to note that although it is the realised network feature that typically enters
an agent’s objective function, their strategy will depend on their beliefs about how others will act.
81As in the literature on coalition formation, the issue of whether utility is transferable or not is also critical.
Typically this issue is not discussed in networks papers (Sheng (2012) is an exception to this), and it is implicitly
assumed that utility is not transferable.
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into account the effect this decision will have on both their own and others’ future decisions.
Allowing for such forward-looking behaviour has so far proved insolvable from an economic
theory perspective, and hence they rule this out.
Christakis et al. (2010) assume the initial network is empty, and allow each pair to meet
precisely once, uniformly at random, in some unknown order. Mele (2013) also allows uniform
at random meeting, but pairs may meet many times until no individual wants to change any
edge. In both cases these assumptions about the meeting process – the number of meetings,
order in which pairs meet, and probability with which each pair meets – will influence the set of
possible networks that may result. However, in the latter case, the resulting network will be an
equilibrium network, something which is not true in Christakis et al. (2010).
A different approach, taken by Sheng (2012), avoids making assumptions about the meeting
order. Instead she uses only an assumption about the relevant equilibrium concept (pairwise
stability). For the network to be pairwise stable, the utility an agent gets from each link that is
present must be greater than the utility he would get if the link were not present, and conversely
for a link which is not present at least one of the agents it would involve must not prefer it.
Sheng uses the moment inequalities this implies for estimation, but is only able to find bounds
on the probability of observing particular networks.82 Hence assumptions about meeting order
seem important for the point identification of the parameter of interest (we discuss this further
below).
De Paula et al. (2014) also avoid assumptions on the meeting order. Rather than using
individual-level data, they identify utility parameters by aggregating individuals into ‘types’,
and looking at the share of each type that is observed in equilibrium. This can be seen as an
extension of the work of Currarini et al. (2009). Individuals’ characteristics are discretised, so
that each individual can be defined as a single type. Agent characteristics might, for example, be
sex and age. Typically age is measured to the nearest month or year, so is already discretised.
However, if the number of elements in the support is large, broader discretisation might be
desirable (e.g. in the age example, measure age in ten-year bands). Then we might define one
type as (male, 25-35years) and another as (female, 15-25). De Paula et al. (2014) assume that
agents have preferences only over the types they connect to both directly and indirectly, not
who the individuals are, and that preference shocks are also defined in terms of type rather than
individuals. They further assume that there is some maximum distance such that there is no
value to a having connections beyond this distance, and there is a maximum number of direct
connections that would be desired. Under these restrictions they can set identify the set of
82Sheng (2012) is actually only able to estimate an ‘outer region’ in which these probabilities lie, rather than
a sharp set. More information is, in principle, available in the data, but making use of it would increase the
computational burden.
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parameters for which the observed outcome – distribution of network types – is an equilibrium,
without making any assumptions on equilibrium selection. They are even able to allow for non-
existence of equilibrium, in which case the identified set is empty. Estimation can be performed
using a quadratic program.
Recent work by Leung (2015) takes a fourth approach, and is able to achieve point iden-
tification without assumptions on the meeting order. Instead the game is modelled as being
simultaneous (so there is no meeting order to consider), but there is also incomplete informa-
tion. Specifically, the unobserved (by the econometrician) link-specific component of utility is
assumed to also be unobserved by other agents. Hence agents make their decisions with only par-
tial knowledge about what network will form. Estimation proceeds using a so-called ‘two-step’
estimator, analogous to that used by Bisin et al. (2011a) in a different context. First agents’
beliefs about the expected state of the network are estimated non-parametrically. The observed
conditional probability of a link in the network is used as an estimate for agents’ belief about the
probability such a link should form. This estimated network is used to replace the endogenous
observed network variables that enter the utility function. Then the parameters of the utility
function can be estimated directly in a second step. One advantage of this approach is that only
a single network is needed to be able to estimate the utility parameters, although the network
must be large.
Whether edges should be modelled as directed has consequences for identification and es-
timation, as well as the interpretation of the results, and will depend on features of the data
used. Both Christakis et al. (2010) and Mele (2013) use data on school students from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), but Christakis et al. (2010) assume
friendship formation is a bilateral decision whilst Mele (2013) assumes it is unilateral. The data
show some edges that are not reciprocated, and it is an issue for researchers how this should
be interpreted.83 Theoretically, networks based on unilateral linking are typically modelled as
being Nash equilibria of the network formation game, whilst those based on bilateral edges use
pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) as their equilibrium concept.84
Both Christakis et al. (2010) and Mele (2013) assume utility functions such that the marginal
utility of an edge depends on characteristics of the individuals involved, the difference in their
characteristics (homophily), and some network statistics. This has two crucial implications.
First, since they assume network formation occurs sequentially, they need to assume a meeting
process to ‘complete’ their models. This process acts as an equilibrium selection mechanism.
83It is sometimes argued when data contain edges that are not reciprocated that the underlying relationships
are reciprocal, but that some agents failed to state all their edges. The union of the edges is then used to form
an undirected graph, so gundirij = max(gij , gji).
84Loosely, an undirected network is pairwise stable if (i) Gij = 1 implies that neither i nor j would prefer to
break the edge, and (ii) Gij = 0 implies that if i would like to edge with j then j must strictly not want to edge
with i.
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Although they do not discuss equilibrium, Christakis et al. (2010) use the meeting process to
determine what network should be realised for a given set of covariates and parameters. Mele
(2013) makes assumptions on the structure of the utility function to ensure that at least one
Nash equilibrium exists, but potentially there are multiple equilibria. The meeting process is
then used to provide an ergodic distribution over these equilibria. In both cases functional form
assumptions and use of a meeting order are critical to identification.85
Second, both papers assume that the relevant network statistics are based on purely ‘local’
network features. By this we mean that the marginal utility to i of forming an edge with j
depends only on edges that involve either i or j. This is equivalent to the pairwise Markovian
assumption discussed in Subsection 2.4.1. Estimation of these models can therefore be performed
using the MCMC techniques described there. It also suffers from the same difficulties, viz. that
estimation is time-consuming, and often the parameter estimates are highly unstable between
runs of the estimation procedure because of the difficulty in approximating the partition function.
Hence, although in principle, it has recently become possible to estimate economic models of
strategic network formation, there is still significant scope for further work to generalise these
results and relax some of the assumptions that are used.
2.5 Empirical Issues
The discussion thus far has taken as given some, possibly multiple, networks g = {1, ..,M} of
nodes and edges. In this section we consider where this network comes from. We begin by
outlining the issues involved in defining the network of interest. We then discuss the different
methods that may be used to collect data on the network, focusing on practical considerations
for direct data collection and sampling methods. Our discussion thereafter examines in detail the
issue of measurement error in networks data. We divide issues into those where measurement
error depends on the sampling procedure, and those from other sources. Since networks are
composed of interrelated nodes and edges, random (i.e. i.i.d.) sampling of either nodes or
edges imposes some (conditionally) non-random process on the other, which depends on the
structure of the underlying network, thereby generating non-classical measurement error. We
discuss the implications of measurement error arising from both these sources – sampling and
other – on network statistics, and on parameter estimates of models that draw on these data.
Researchers working in a number of disciplines including economics, statistics, sociology and
statistical physics have suggested methods for dealing with measurement error in networks data,
which are described in detail thereafter.
85Without a meeting order, both Sheng (2012) and de Paula et al. (2014) only achieve partial identifica-
tion. Leung (2015) achieves point identification by assuming agents move simultaneously and have incomplete
information.
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2.5.1 Defining the network
A first step in network data collection is to define, based on the research question of interest,
the interaction that one would like to measure. For example, suppose one were studying the role
of social learning in the adoption of a new technology, such as a new variety of seeds. In this
situation, information sharing with other farmers cultivating the new variety could be considered
to be the most relevant interaction. The researcher would then aim to capture interactions
of this type in a network of nodes and edges. It should be noted that different behaviours
and choices will be influenced by different interactions. For example, amongst households in a
village, fertiliser use might be affected by the actions of other farmers, whilst fertility decisions
may be influenced by social norms of what the whole village chooses. Similarly, (extended)
family members are more likely to lend one money, while friends and acquaintances are often
better sources of information on new opportunities.86
Moreover, even when the interaction of interest is well-defined, e.g. risk-sharing between
households, there is an additional question of whether potential network neighbours – that is
households who are willing to make a transfer or lend to one’s own household – or realised
network neighbours – the households that one’s household actually received transfers or loans
from – are of interest. Hence the research question of interest and the context matter, and having
detailed network data is not a panacea: one must still justify why the measured network is the
most relevant one for the research question being considered.
In addition, researchers are typically also forced to define a boundary for the network, within
which all interactions are assumed to take place. Geographic boundary conditions are very
common in social networks – for instance, edges may only be considered if both nodes are in the
same village, neighbourhood or town – supported by the implicit assumption that a majority
of interactions takes place among geographically close individuals, households and firms. Such
an assumption is questionable: for example, a household’s risk sharing might depend more on
its edges to other households outside the village, since the geographic separation is likely to
reduce the correlation between the original household’s shocks and the shocks of these out-of-
village neighbours. However, if justifiable, it greatly eases the logistics and reduces the costs of
collecting primary network data.
Network data collection involves collecting information on two interrelated objects – nodes
and edges between nodes – within the pre-defined boundary. Data used in most economic
applications are typically collected as a set of observations on nodes (individuals, households,
or firms), with information on the network (or group(s)) they belong to, and perhaps with
86The classic example of this issue comes from Granovetter (1973), who shows the importance of ‘weak ties’
in providing job vacancy information.
77
information on other nodes within the network (or group) that they are linked to. As an
example, in a development context, we may have a dataset with socio-economic information on
households (nodes), the village or ethnic group they belong to (group), and potentially which
other households within the village its members talk to about specific issues (edges). Our
focus, as elsewhere in this paper, continues to be cases where detailed information on network
neighbours (i.e. edges) is available, although where multiple group memberships are known
these may also be used to implicitly define a set of neighbours, as in De Giorgi et al. (2010).
2.5.2 Methods for Data Collection
In practical terms, a range of methods can be and have been used to collect the information
needed to construct network graphs. In order to construct undirected network graphs, researchers
need information on the nodes in the network, and on the edges between nodes.87 Depending
on the interaction or relationship being studied, it may furthermore be possible to obtain infor-
mation on the directionality of edges between nodes, and on the strength of edges, allowing for
the construction of directed and weighted graphs. The methods include:
1. Direct Elicitation from nodes:
(a) Asking nodes to report all the other nodes they interact with in a specific dimension
within the specified network boundary, e.g. all individuals within the same village
that one lends money to. In this case, nodes are free to list whomever they want.
Information on the strength of edges can similarly be collected.88
(b) Asking nodes to report for every other node in the network whether they interacted
with that node (and potentially the strength of these interactions). In contrast to (a),
nodes are provided with a list of all other nodes in the network. Though this method
has the advantage of reducing recall errors, it may generate errors from respondent
fatigue in networks with a large number of nodes.
(c) Asking nodes to report their own network neighbours and their perception of edges
between other nodes in the network. This method would presumably work reasonably
well in settings where, and in interactions for which, private information issues are
not very important (e.g. kinship relations in small villages in developing countries).
Alatas et al. (2014) use this method to collect information on networks in Indonesian
hamlets.
87Some features of network graphs can be obtained without detailed information on all nodes and the edges
between nodes. Degree, for instance, can be captured by asking nodes directly about the number of edges they
have, without enquiring further about who these neighbours are.
88In practice, edge strength is usually proxied by the frequency of interaction, or the amount of time spent
together, or in the case of family relationships, by the amount of shared genetic material between individuals.
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(d) Asking nodes to report their participation in various groups or activities, and then
imposing assumptions on interactions within the groups and activities, e.g. two nodes
are linked if they are members of the same group. The presence of multiple groups
can generate a partially-overlapping peer group structure.
2. Collection from Existing Data Sources: Edges between nodes can be constructed from
information in available databases e.g. citation databases (Ductor et al., 2014), corpo-
rate board memberships (Patnam, 2013), online social networks (e.g. LinkedIn, Twitter,
Facebook).
The resulting networks often have a partially-overlapping peer group structure, with agents
that share a common environment (such as a university) belonging to multiple subgroups
(e.g. classes within the university). Network structure is then imposed by assuming that
an edge exists between nodes that share a subgroup. Examples include students in a school
sharing different classes (e.g. De Giorgi et al., 2010) or company directors belonging to
the same board of directors (e.g. Patnam, 2013) or households which, through marriage
ties of members, belong to multiple families (e.g. Angelucci et al., 2010).
Moreover, the directionality of the edge can sometimes, though not always, be inferred
from available data, e.g. data from Twitter includes information on the direction of the
edge, while the existence of an edge in LinkedIn requires both nodes to confirm the edge.
However, it is not possible to infer directionality among, for instance, students in a school
belonging to multiple classes, since we don’t even know if they actually have any relation-
ship.
In order to generate the full network graph, researchers would need to collect data on all nodes
and edges, i.e. they need to collect a census. This is typically very expensive, particularly since
a number of methods described above in Section 2.3 exploit cross-network variation to identify
parameters, meaning that many networks would need to be fully sampled.
In general, it is very rare to have data available from a census of all nodes and edges. Even
when a census of nodes is available, it is very common to observe only a subset of edges because
of censoring in the number of edges that can be reported.89 In practice, given the high costs
of direct elicitation of networks, and the potentially large size of networks from existing data
sources, researchers usually collect data on a sample of the network only, rather than on all
nodes and edges.90 Various sampling methods have been used, of which the most common are:
89This is a feature of some commonly used datasets, including the popular National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (AddHealth) dataset.
90For instance, Facebook has over 1.8 billion monthly users, while Twitter reports having around 320 million
regular users.
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1. Random Sampling: Random samples can be drawn for either nodes or edges. This is
a popular sampling strategy due to its low cost relative to censuses. Data collected from
a random sample of nodes typically contain information on socio-economic variables of
interest and some (or all) edges of the sampled nodes, although data on edges are usually
censored.91 At times, information may also be available on the identities, and in some rare
cases, on some socio-economic variables of all nodes in the network. Data on outcomes
and socio-economic characteristics of non-sampled nodes are crucial in order to be able to
implement many of the identification strategies discussed in Section 2.3 above. Moreover,
as we will see below, this information is also useful for correcting for measurement error in
the network. Recent analyses with networks data in the economics literature have featured
datasets with edges collected from random samples of nodes. Examples include data on
social networks and the diffusion of microfinance used by both Banerjee et al. (2013) and
Jackson et al. (2012); and data on voting and social networks used in Fafchamps and
Vicente (2013).
Datasets constructed through the random sampling of edges include a node only if any
one of its edges is randomly selected. Examples of such datasets include those constructed
from random samples of email communications, telephone calls or messages. In these cases
researchers often have access to the full universe of all e-mail communication, but are
obliged to work with a random sample due to computational constraints.
2. Snowball Sampling and Link Tracing: Snowball sampling is popularly used in col-
lecting data on ‘hard to reach’ populations i.e. those for whom there is a relatively small
proportion in the population, so that one would get an insufficiently large sample through
random sampling from the population e.g. sex workers. Link tracing is usually used to
collect data from vast online social networks. Under both these methods, a dataset is
constructed through the following process. Starting with an initial, possibly non-random,
sample of nodes from the population of interest, information is obtained on either all, or
a random sample of their edges. Snowball sampling collects information on all edges of
the initially sampled nodes, while link tracing collects information on a random sample
of these edges. In the subsequent step, data on edges and outcomes are collected from
any node that is reported to be linked to the initial sample of nodes. This process is then
repeated for the new nodes, and in turn for nodes linked to these nodes (i.e. second-degree
neighbours of the initially drawn nodes) and so on, until some specified node sample size is
91The network graph constructed from data where nodes are randomly sampled and where edges are included
only if both nodes are randomly sampled is known as an induced subgraph. The network constructed from data
where nodes are randomly sampled and all their edges are included, regardless of whether the incident nodes are
sampled (i.e. if i is randomly sampled, the edge ij will be included regardless of whether or not j is sampled), is
called a star subgraph.
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reached or up to a certain social distance from the initial ‘source’ nodes. It is hoped that,
after k steps of this process, the generated dataset is representative of the population i.e.
the distribution of sampled nodes no longer depends on the initial ‘convenience’ sample.
However, this typically happens only when k is large. Moreover, the rate at which the
dependence on the original sample declines is closely related to the extent of homophily,
both on observed and unobserved characteristics, in the network. In particular, stronger
homophily is associated with lower rates of decline of this dependence. Nonetheless, this
method can collect, at reasonable costs, complete information on local neighbourhoods,
which is needed to apply the methods outlined in Section 2.3 above. Examples in eco-
nomics of datasets collected by snowball sampling include that of student migrants used
in Me´ango (2014).
The sampling method used has important implications for how accurately the network graph
and its features are measured. In the next subsection we will discuss some of the common
measurement errors arising from the above methods (as well as measurement error from non-
sampling sources), their implications for model parameters, and methods for overcoming these
often substantial biases.
2.5.3 Sources of Measurement Error
An important challenge that complicates identification of parameters using overlapping peer
groups and detailed network data is the issue of measurement error. Measurement error can
arise from a number of sources including: (1) missing data due to sampling method, (2) mis-
specification of the network boundary, (3) top-coding of the number of edges, (4) miscoding and
misreporting errors, (5) spurious nodes and (6) non-response. We refer to the first three of these
as sampling-induced error, and the latter three as non-sampling error. It is important to account
for this, since as we will show in this subsection, measurement error can induce important biases
in measures of network statistics and in parameter estimates.
Measurement error issues arising from sampling are very important in the context of net-
works data, since these data comprise information on interrelated objects: nodes and edges.
All sampling methods – other than undertaking a full census – generate a (conditionally) non-
random sample of at least one of these objects, since a particular sampling distribution over one
will induce a particular (non-random) structure for sampling over the other.92 This means that
econometric and statistical methods for estimation and inference developed under classical sam-
pling theory are often not applicable to networks data, since many of the underlying assumptions
fail to hold. Consequently the use of standard techniques, without adjustments for the specific
92We consider a random sample to consist of units that are independent and identically distributed.
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features of network data, leads to errors in measures of the network, and hence biases model
parameters.
In practice, however, censuses of networks that economists wish to study are rare, and feasible
to collect only in a minority of cases (e.g. small classrooms or villages). Frequently, it is too
expensive and cumbersome to collect data on the whole network. Moreover, when data are
collected from surveys, it is common to censor the number of edges that can be reported by
nodes. Finally, to ease logistics of data collection exercises, one may erroneously limit the
boundary of the network to a specified unit, e.g. village or classroom, thereby missing nodes
and edges lying beyond this boundary. Subsection 2.5.3 outlines the consequences of missing
data due to sampling on estimates of social effects arising from outcomes of network neighbours
(such as those considered in Subsections 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4) and network statistics (as in
Subsection 2.3.5). Until recently most research into these issues was done outside economics, so
we draw on research from a range of fields, including sociology, statistical physics, and computer
science.
Measurement error arising from the other three sources – misreporting or miscoding errors,
spurious nodes, and non-response – which we label as non-sampling measurement error, can also
generate large biases in network statistics and parameters in network models. Though there is a
large literature on these types of measurement error in the econometrics and statistics (see, for
example, Chen et al. (2011) for a summary of methods for dealing with misreporting errors in
binary variables, also known as misclassification errors), these issues has been less studied in a
networks context. Subsection 2.5.3 below summarises findings from this literature.
Finally, a number of methods have been suggested to help deal with the consequences of
measurement error, whether due to sampling or otherwise. Subsection 2.5.4 outlines the various
methods that have been developed for this purpose.
Measurement Error Due to Sampling
Node-Specific Neighbourhoods Collecting only a sample of data, rather than a complete
census, can lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates in social effect models. This is
because sampling of the network leads to misspecification of nodes’ neighbours. In particular,
a pair of nodes in the sampled network may appear to be further away than they actually are.
Recall from Section 2.3 that with observational data, methods for identifying the social effects
parameters in the local average, local aggregate and hybrid local model use the exogenous charac-
teristics of direct, second- and, in some cases, third-degree neighbours as instrumental variables
for the outcomes of a node’s neighbours. Critically, these methods require us to know which
edges are definitely not present to give us the desired exclusion restrictions. Misspecification of
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nodes’ direct and indirect (i.e. second- and third-degree) neighbours may consequently result in
mismeasured and invalid instruments.
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) show that this is indeed the case for the local average
model, where the instruments are the average characteristics of nodes’ second- and third-degree
neighbours. The measurement error in the instruments is correlated with the measurement
error in the endogenous regressors, leading to bias in the social effect estimates. Simulations
in their paper suggest that these biases can be very large, with the magnitude falling as the
proportion of the network sampled increases, and as the number of networks in the sample
increases.93 Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) offer a simple solution to this problem when (i)
network information is collected via a star subgraph – i.e. where a subset of nodes is randomly
sampled (‘sampled nodes’) and all their edges are included in constructing the network graph; and
(ii) data on the outcome and exogenous characteristics are available for all nodes in the network,
or at least for the direct and second- and potentially third-degree neighbours of the ‘sampled’
nodes. In this case, all variables in the second stage regression (i.e. Equation 2.6) are correctly
measured for the ‘sampled’ nodes, since for any node, the regressors, G˜i,gYg =
∑
j∈neii,g
G˜ij,gyj,g
and G˜i,gXg =
∑
j∈neii,g
G˜ij,gxj,g, are fully observed. Including only sampled nodes in the second
stage thus avoids issues of erroneously assuming that nodes in the observed network are further
away from one another than they actually are. The influence matrix constructed with the
sampled network is, however still mismeasured, leading to measurement error in the instruments
(which use powers of this matrix), and thus in the first stage. However, this measurement error
is uncorrelated with the second stage residual, thus satisfying the IV exclusion restriction. Note
though that the measurement error in the instruments reduces their informativeness (strength),
particularly when the sampling rate is low. This is because this strategy requires the existence of
nodes that have a (finite) geodesic of at least 2 or 3 between them. At low sampling rates there
will be very few such pairs of nodes, since many sampled nodes will seem completely unconnected
as the nodes that connect them will be missing from the data.
A similar issue applies to local aggregate and hybrid models. Simulations in Liu (2013) show
that parameters of local aggregate models are severely biased and unstable when estimated with
partial samples of the true network. In this model, however, as shown in Subsection 2.3.3, a
node’s degree can be used as an instrument for neighbours’ outcomes. When the sampled data
take the form of a star subgraph, the complications arising from random sampling of nodes can
be circumvented by using the out-degree, which is not mismeasured, as an instrument for the
total outcome of edges. This allows for the consistent estimation of model parameters. This is
93A limitation of these simulations is that the authors only considered simulations with either 1 or 20 networks.
It is unclear how large such biases may be when a large number (e.g. 50) of networks is available.
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supported by simulation evidence in Liu (2013), which shows that estimates of the local aggregate
model computed using out-degrees as an additional instrument are very close to the parameters
of a pre-specified data generating process. Other possible ways around this problem include the
model-based and likelihood-based corrections outlined in Subsection 2.5.4.
Network Statistics Missing data arising from partial sampling generate non-classical mea-
surement error in measured network statistics. This is an important issue in estimating the
effects of network statistics on outcomes using regressions of the form seen in Subsection 2.3.5,
because measurement error leads to substantial bias in model parameter estimates. A number
of studies, primarily in fields outside economics, have investigated the consequences and impli-
cations of sampled network data on measures of network statistics and model parameters. The
following broad facts emerge from this literature:
1. Network statistics computed from samples containing moderate (30-50%) and even rela-
tively high (∼70%) proportions of nodes in a network can be highly biased. Sampling a
higher proportion of nodes in the network generates more accurate network statistics. We
illustrate the severity of this issue using a stylised example. Consider the network in panel
(a) of Figure 2.4, which contains 15 nodes and has an average degree of 3.067. We sample
60%, 40% and 20% of nodes and elicit information on all their edges (i.e. we elicit a star
subgraph). The resulting network graphs are plotted in panels (b), (c) and (d), with the
unshaded nodes being those that were not sampled. Average degree is calculated based
on all nodes and edges in the star subgraph, i.e. including all sampled nodes, the edges
they report, and nodes they are linked with.94 When only 20% of nodes are sampled,
the average degree of the sampled graph is 2, which is around 35% lower than the true
average degree.95 However, when a higher proportion of nodes are sampled, average degree
of the sampled graph becomes closer to that of the true graph. More generally, simulation
evidence from studies including Galaskiewicz (1991), Costenbader and Valente (2003), Lee
et al. (2006), Kim and Jeong (2007) and Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) have estimated
the magnitude of sampling induced bias in statistics such as degree (in-degree and out-
degree in the directed network case), degree centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector
centrality, transitivity (also known as local clustering), and average path length.96 They
find biases that are very large in magnitude, and the direction of the bias varies depending
94This is equivalent to taking an average of the row-sums of the (undirected) adjacency matrix constructed
from the sampled data, in which two nodes are considered to be connected if one reports an edge. This is a
common way of constructing the adjacency matrix in empirical applications. However, for data collected through
star subgraph sampling, an accurate estimate of average degree can be obtained by including only the sampled
nodes in the calculation.
95We will discuss methods that allow one to correct for this bias in Subsection 2.5.4.
96Simulations are typically conducted by taking the observed network to be the true network, and constructing
‘sampled’ networks by drawing samples of different sizes using various sampling methods.
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on the statistic. For example, the average path length may be over-estimated by 100%
when constructed from an induced subgraph with 20% of nodes in the true network. This
concern is particularly relevant for work in the economics literature: a literature review of
studies in economics by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) reports a median sampling rate
of 25% of nodes in a network. Table 2.1 below summarises findings from these papers for
various commonly used network statistics.
Figure 2.4: Sampled networks with different sampling rates
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Notes: This figure displays the full graph (panel (a)), and the star subgraphs obtained from sampling 60% (panel
(b)), 40% (panel (c)) and 20% (panel (d)) of nodes. The unshaded nodes in panels (b), (c) and (d) represent
nodes that were not sampled, and the dotted lines represent nodes and edges on which no data were collected.
Though the average degree in the original graph is 3.067, that in the sampled graphs ranges from 2.8 to 2. The
# Nodes, and # Edges indicated in the figure refer to the numbers included in the calculation of the displayed
average degree.
2. Measurement error due to sampling varies with the underlying network topology (i.e. struc-
ture). This is apparent from work by Frantz et al. (2009), who investigate the robustness
of a variety of centrality measures to missing data when data are drawn from a range of
underlying network topologies: uniform random, small world, scale-free, core-periphery
and cellular networks (see Subsection 2.7.1 for definitions). They find that the accuracy of
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centrality measures varies with the topology: small world networks, which have relatively
high clustering and ‘bridging’ edges that reduce path lengths between nodes that would
otherwise be far away from one another, are especially vulnerable to missing data. This is
not surprising since key nodes that are part of a bridge could be missed in the sample and
hence give a picture of a less connected network. By contrast, scale-free networks are less
vulnerable to missing data. Such effects are evident even in the simple stylised example in
Figure 2.5 below, where we sample the same nodes from networks with different topologies
– uniform random, and small world. Though each network has the same average degree,
and the same number of nodes is sampled in both cases, the average degree in the graph
sampled from the uniform random network is closer to the true value than that sampled
from the small world network.97
Figure 2.5: Sampling from uniform random and small world networks
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Notes: This figure displays the star subgraphs obtained from sampling 40% of nodes in a network with a uniform
random topology (panel (a)) and a small world topology (panel(b)). The unshaded nodes represent nodes that
were not sampled, and the dotted lines represent nodes and edges on which no data were collected.
3. The magnitude of error in network statistics due to sampling varies with the sampling
method. Different sampling methods result in varying magnitudes of errors in network
statistics. Lee et al. (2006) compare data sampled via induced subgraph sampling, random
sampling of nodes, random sampling of edges, and snowball sampling, from networks with
97As in (1) above, average degree is calculated from the adjacency matrix with all nodes and edges in the
sample (i.e. all the nodes and edges with firm lines).
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a power-law degree distribution.98 They show that the sampling method impacts the
magnitude and direction of bias in network statistics. For instance, random sampling of
nodes and edges leads to an over-estimation of the size of the exponent of the power-law
degree distribution.99 Conversely, snowball sampling, which is less likely to find nodes with
low degrees, underestimates this exponent. We illustrate this fact further using a simple
example that compares two node sampling methods common in data used by economists –
induced subgraph, where only edges between sampled nodes are retained; and star subgraph,
in which all edges of sampled nodes are retained regardless of whether or not the nodes
involved in the edges were sampled. Consider again the network graph considered in panel
(a) of Figure 2.4 above, and displayed again in panel (a) of Figure 2.6 below. We sample
the same set of nodes – 1, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 14 – from the full network graph. Panels (b) and
(c) of Figure 2.6 display the resulting network graphs under star and induced subgraph
sampling respectively. Though the proportion of the network sampled is the same under
both types of sampling, the resulting network structure is very different. This is reflected
in the estimated network statistics as well: the average degree for the induced subgraph is
just over a half of that for the star subgraph, which is not too different from the average
degree of the full graph.100
Figure 2.6: Sampling with star and induced subgraphs
 
 
 
 
# Nodes in sample = 15 
# Edges in sample = 46 
# Nodes in sample = 13 
# Edges in sample = 34 
# Nodes in sample = 6 
# Edges in sample = 8 
Average degree = 3.067 Average degree = 2.615 Average degree = 1.333 
(a) Full Graph (b) Star Subgraph (c) Induced Subgraph 
 
Notes: Panel (a) of the figure displays the true network graph and panels (b) and (c) display the star and
induced subgraph obtained when the darker-shaded nodes are sampled. The unshaded nodes in panels (b) and (c)
represent nodes that were not sampled, and the dotted lines represent nodes and edges on which no data were
collected. In the star subgraph, an edge is present as long as one of the two nodes involved in the edge is sampled.
This is not the case in the induced subgraph, where an edge is present only if both nodes involved in the edge are
sampled.
98Power law degree distributions are those where the fraction of nodes having k edges, P (k) is asymptotically
proportional to k−γ , where usually 2 < γ < 3. Such a distribution allows for fat tails, i.e. the proportion of
nodes with very high degrees constitutes a non-negligible proportion of all nodes.
99A larger exponent on the power law degree distribution indicates a greater number of nodes with large
degrees.
100Average degree is calculated as above, including all nodes and edges in the sample, i.e. those with firm lines
in Figure 2.6.
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4. Parameters in economic models using mismeasured network statistics are subject to sub-
stantial bias. Sampling induces non-classical measurement error in the measured statistic;
i.e., the measurement error is not independent of the true network statistic. Chandrasekhar
and Lewis (2011) suggest that sampling-induced measurement error can generate upward
bias, downward bias or even sign switching in parameter estimates. The bias is large in
magnitude: for statistics such as degree, clustering, and centrality measures, they find
that the mean bias in parameters in network level regressions ranges from over-estimation
bias of 300% for some statistics to attenuation bias of 100% for others when a quarter of
network nodes are sampled.101 As with network statistics, the bias becomes smaller in
magnitude as the proportion of the network sampled increases. The magnitude of bias
is somewhat smaller, but nonetheless substantial, for node-level regressions. Table 2.2
summarises the findings from the literature on the effects of random sampling of nodes on
parameter estimates.
5. Top-coding of edges or incorrectly specifying the boundary of the network biases network
statistics. Network data collected through surveys often place an upper limit on the number
of edges that can be reported. Moreover, limiting the network boundary to an observed
unit, e.g., a village or classroom, will miss nodes and edges beyond the boundary. Kossinets
(2006) investigates, via simulations, the implications of top-coding in reported edges and
boundary specification on network statistics such as average degree, clustering and average
path length. Both types of error cause average degree to be under-estimated, while average
path length is over-estimated. No bias arises in the estimated clustering parameter if the
consequence of the error is to simply limit the number of edges of each node.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below summarises findings on the consequences of missing data for both
estimates of network statistics and parameter estimates when using data on networks collected
through random sampling of nodes. We consider two types of graph induced by data collected via
random node sampling: induced subgraph, and star subgraph, which are as shown in Figure 2.6
above.
101Simulations typically report bias in parameters from models where the outcome variable is a linear function
of the network statistic.
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Other Types of Measurement Error
Beyond sampling-induced measurement error, networks could be mismeasured for a variety of
other reasons including:
1. Miscoding and misreporting errors: Edges could be miscoded, either because of
respondent or interviewer error: respondents may forget nodes or interview fatigue may
lead them to misreport edges. In some cases, there may be strategic reporting of edges,
e.g., respondents may report desired rather than actual edges, as in Comola and Fafchamps
(2014).
2. Spurious Nodes: Spelling mistakes in node names or multiple names for the same nodes
can lead to the presence of spurious nodes. This is a concern when edges are inferred from
existing data.
3. Non-response: Edges are missing as a result of non-response from nodes.
Wang et al. (2012) consider, in a simulation study, the consequences of these types of mea-
surement error on network statistics including degree centrality, the clustering coefficient and
eigenvector centrality. They find that degree centrality and eigenvector centrality are relatively
robust to measurement error arising from spurious nodes and miscoded edges, while clustering
coefficient is biased by mismeasured data. Though there is a large literature on these types of
measurement error in the econometrics and statistics (see, for example, Chen et al. (2011) for
a summary of methods for dealing with misreporting errors in binary variables, also known as
misclassification errors), these issues has been less studied in a networks context. An exception is
Comola and Fafchamps (2014), who propose a method for identifying and correcting misreported
edges.
2.5.4 Correcting for Measurement Error
Ex-post (i.e. once data have been collected) methods of dealing with measurement error can
be divided into three broad classes: (1) design-based corrections, (2) model-based corrections,
and (3) likelihood-based corrections. Design-based corrections apply primarily to correcting
sampling-induced measurement error, while model-based and likelihood-based corrections can
apply to both sampling-induced and non-sampling-induced measurement error. We briefly sum-
marise the underlying ideas behind each of these, discussing some advantages and drawbacks of
each.
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Design-Based Corrections
Design-based corrections rely on features of the sampling design to correct for sampling-induced
measurement error (Frank 1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1981; Thompson, 2006).102 They are based
on Horvitz-Thompson estimators, which use inverse probability-weighting to compute unbiased
estimates of population totals and means from sampled data. This method can be applied to
correct mismeasured network statistics that can be expressed as totals, such as average degree
and clustering. We illustrate how Horvitz-Thompson estimators work using a simple example.
A researcher has data on an outcome y for a sample of n units drawn from the population.
Under the particular sampling scheme used to draw this sample, each unit i in the population
U = {1, ..., N} has a probability pi of being in the sample. The researcher wants to use the
sample to compute an estimate of the sum of y in the population, τ =
∑
i∈U yi. The Horvitz-
Thompson estimator for this total can be computed by summing the y’s for the sampled units,
weighted by their probability of being in the sample. That is, τˆp =
∑
i∈U
yi
pi
. Essentially, the
estimator computes an inverse probability-weighted estimate to correct for bias arising from
unequal probability sampling. In the case of network statistics, this thus corrects for the non-
random sampling of either nodes or edges induced by the particular sampling scheme. The key
to this approach is the construction of the sample inclusion weights, pi.
Formulae for node- and edge-inclusion probabilities are available for the random node and
edge sampling schemes (see Kolaczyk (2009) for more details). Recovering sample inclusion
probabilities when using snowball sampling is typically not straightforward after the first step of
sampling. This is because every possible sample path that can be taken in subsequent sampling
steps must be considered when calculating the sample-inclusion probability, making this exercise
very computationally intensive. Estimators based on Markov chain resampling methods, how-
ever, make it feasible to estimate the sample inclusion probabilities. See Thompson (2006) for
more details.
Frank (1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) derives unbiased estimators for graph parameters such as
dyad and triad counts, degree distribution, average degree, and clustering under random sam-
pling of nodes. Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) show that parameter estimates in network
regressions using design-based corrected network statistics as regressors are consistent for three
statistics: average degree, clustering coefficient, and average graph span. Their results show that
the Horvitz-Thompson estimators can correct for sampling-induced measurement error. Numer-
ical simulations suggest that this method reduces greatly, and indeed eliminates at sufficiently
high sampling rates, the sampling induced bias in parameter estimates.
102Chapter 5 of Kolaczyk (2009) provides useful background on these methods.
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There are two drawbacks of this procedure. First, it is not possible to compute Horvitz-
Thompson estimators for network statistics that cannot be expressed as totals or averages. This
includes node level statistics, such as eigenvector centrality, many of which are statistics of
interest for economists. Second, they can’t be used to correct for measurement error arising
from reasons other than sampling (unless the probability of correct reporting is known). Model-
based and likelihood-based corrections can, by placing more structure on the measurement error
problem, offer alternative ways of dealing with measurement error in these cases.
Model-Based Corrections
Model-based corrections provide an alternative approach to correcting for measurement error.
Such corrections involve specifying a model that maps the mismeasured network to the true
network and have primarily been used to correct for measurement error arising from sampling
related reasons. Thus the model is typically a network formation model of the type seen in
Subsection 2.4.1 above. Parameters of the network formation model are estimated from the
partially observed network, and available data on the identities and characteristics of nodes and
edges; with the estimated parameters subsequently used to predict missing edges (in-sample
edge prediction). Note that it is crucial to have information on the identities and, if possible,
the characteristics (e.g. gender, ethnicity, etc.) of all nodes in the network. This is important
from a data requirements perspective. Without this information, it is not possible to use this
method to correct for measurement error.
In most economics applications, researchers would typically want to use the predicted net-
works to subsequently identify social effect parameters using models similar to those in Sec-
tion 2.3 above. Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) show that the network formation model must
satisfy certain conditions in order to allow for consistent estimation of the parameters of social
effects models such as those discussed in Section 2.3.
They study a setting where data on the network is assumed to be missing at random, and
where the identities and some characteristics of all nodes are observed. Data are assumed to be
available for multiple, possibly large networks. This is necessary since in their results the rate
of convergence of the estimated parameter to the true parameter depends on both the number
of nodes within a network, and the number of networks in the data. Their analysis shows that
consistent estimation of social effect parameters is possible with network formation models similar
to those outlined in Subsection 2.4.1 above, as long as the interdependence between the covariates
of pairs of nodes decays sufficiently fast with network distance between the nodes. This may not
be satisfied for instance, in a model where a network statistic (such as degree distribution) is
a sufficient statistic for the network formation process. In this case, Chandrasekhar and Lewis
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(2011) show that parameters of the network formation process do not converge sufficiently fast
to allow for consistent estimation of the social effect parameters in models at the node-level
(e.g. Equation 2.1), though parameters of network-level models, such as Equation 2.5 can be
consistently estimated. Their analysis also shows that network formation processes that allow
for specific network effects in edge formation (i.e. some strategic models of network formation
such as the model of Christakis et al., 2010) also satisfy conditions under which the social effect
parameter can be consistently estimated.
Likelihood-Based Corrections
Likelihood-based corrections can be applied to correct for measurement error when only a sub-
sample of nodes in a network are observed. Such methods have, however, been used to correct
specific network-based statistics such as out-degree and in-degree, but may not apply to other
statistics. Here, we discuss two likelihood-based methods to correct for measurement error: the
first method from Conti et al. (2013), corrects for sampling related measurement error when
data is available only for sampled nodes; while the second has been proposed and applied by
Comola and Fafchamps (2014) to correct for misreporting.
Conti et al. (2013) correct for non-classical measurement error in in-degree arising from ran-
dom sampling of nodes by adjusting the likelihood function to account for the measurement
error. The method involves first, specifying the process for outgoing and incoming edge nom-
inations, and as a result obtaining the outgoing and incoming edge probabilities. Specifically,
Conti et al. (2013) assume that outgoing (incoming) edge nominations from i to j are a function
of i’s (j’s) observable preferences, the similarity between i and j’s observable characteristics (to
capture homophily) and a scalar unobservable for i and j. Moreover, the process allows for
correlations between i’s observable and j’s unobservable characteristics (and vice versa). When
edges are binary, the out-degree and in-degree have binomial distributions with the success prob-
ability given by the calculated outgoing and incoming edge probabilities. Random sampling of
nodes to obtain a star subgraph generates measurement error in the in-degree, but not in the
out-degree. However, since the true in-degree is binomially distributed, and nodes are randomly
sampled, the observed in-degree has a hypergeometric distribution conditional on the true in-
degree. Knowledge of these distributions allows for the specification of the joint distribution
of the true in-degree, the true out-degree and the mismeasured in-degree. Pseudolikelihood
functions can therefore be specified allowing for parameters to be consistently estimated via
maximum likelihood methods.103
103Conti et al. (2013) also account for censoring by using a truncated distribution in the likelihood function.
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Comola and Fafchamps (2014) propose a maximum likelihood based framework to correct for
measurement error arising from misreporting by nodes of their neighbours and/or flows across
the edges. To illustrate this method, we take the case of binary edges. In survey data, where
nodes are asked to declare the presence or not of an edge with other nodes, misreporting could
mean that one of two nodes in any edge omits to report the edge; or both forget to report the edge
even if it exists, or both report an edge when it doesn’t exist or, one of the two nodes erroneously
reports an edge when it doesn’t exist. Misreporting in this case is a form of misclassification error.
Assuming that the misreporting process is such that either nodes forget to declare neighbours,
or they spuriously report neighbours, it is possible to use a maximum likelihood framework to
correct for this misreporting bias. By assuming a statistical process for edges (e.g. Comola and
Fafchamps (2014) assume that edges follow a logistic process, and are a function of observed
characteristics), and given that the mismeasured variable is binary, it is possible to write down a
likelihood function that incorporates the measurement error. Maximising this function provides
the correct parameter estimates for the edge formation process, which can then be used to correct
for misreporting.
2.6 Conclusion
Networks can play an important role both as a substitute for incomplete or missing markets
and a complement to markets, for example, by transmitting information, or even preferences.
Whether such effects exist in practice is an important empirical question, and recent work across
a range of fields in economics has tried to provide some evidence about this. However, working
with networks data creates important challenges that are not present in other contexts.
In this paper we outline econometric methods for working with network data that take
account of the peculiarities of the dependence structures present in this context. It divides the
issues into three parts: (i) estimating social effects given a conditionally exogenous observed
network; (ii) estimating the underlying network formation process, given only a single cross-
section of data; and (iii) accounting for measurement error, which in a network context can have
particularly serious consequences.
When data are available on only agents and the reference groups to which they belong, re-
searchers have for some time worried about how social effects might be identified. However,
when detailed data on nodes and their individual links are present, identification of social effects
(taking the network as conditionally exogenous) is generic, and estimation is relatively straight-
forward. Two broader conceptual issues exist in this case: First, theory is often silent on the
precise form that peer effects should take when they exist. Since Manski (1993), many people
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have focused on the ‘local average’ framework, often without discussion of the implications for
economic behaviour, but social effects might instead take a local aggregate, or indeed local max-
imum/minimum form where the best child in a classroom provides a good example to all others,
or the worst disrupts the lesson. Until a non-parametric way of allowing for social effects is
developed, researchers need to use theory to guide the empirical specification they use. Second,
researchers typically treat the observed network as the network which mediates the social effect,
and where many networks are observed the union of these is taken. Given what we know about
measurement error in networks, this behaviour will generally create important biases in results,
if the relevant network is a network defined by a different kind of relationship, or is actually
some subset of the union taken. Here again it is important that some justification is given for
why the network used should be the appropriate one.
In addition to these conceptual issue, the key econometric challenge in identifying social
effects is allowing for network endogeneity. In recent years there have been attempts to account
directly for network endogeneity. A natural first direction for this work has been to use exclusion
restrictions to provide an instrument for the network structure. As ever, this requires us to
be able to credibly argue that there is some variable that indirectly affects the outcome of
interest, through its effect on the network structure, but has no direct effect. Whether this
seems reasonable will depend on the circumstance, but an important issue here is that the
network formation process must have a unique equilibrium for these methods to be valid.
This leads naturally to a discussion of network formation models that can allow for depen-
dence between links. Drawing from work in a number of fields, this paper brings together the
main estimation methods and assumptions, describing them in a common language. Although
other fields have modelled network formation for some time, and developed methods to estimate
parameters, they are often unsuitable when we treat the data as observations of decisions made
by optimising agents. There is still much scope in this area to develop more general methods
and results which do not rely on strong assumptions about the structure of utility functions or
meeting processes in order to achieve identification.
Finally, the paper discussed data collection and measurement error. Since networks comprise
of interrelated nodes and edges, a particular sampling scheme over one of these objects will imply
a structure for sampling over the other. Hence one must think carefully in this context about
how data are collected, and not simply rely on the usual intuitions that random sampling (which
is not even well-defined until we specify whether it is nodes or edges over which we define the
sampling) will allow us to treat the sample as the population. When collecting census data is
not feasible, it will in general be necessary to make corrections for the induced measurement
error, in order to get unbiased parameter estimates. Whilst there are methods for correcting
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some network statistics for some forms of sampling, again there are few general results, and
consequently much scope for research.
Much work has been done to develop methods for working with networks data, both in
economics and in other fields. Applied researchers can therefore take some comfort in knowing
that many of the challenges they face using these data are ones that have been considered
before, and for which there are typically at least partial solutions already available. Whilst the
limitations of currently available techniques mean that empirical results should be interpreted
with some caution, attempting to account for social effects is likely to be less restrictive than
simply imposing that they cannot exist.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Definitions
Here we provide an index of definitions for the different network representations and summary
statistics used.
• Adjacency Matrix: This is an N×N matrix, G, whose ijth element, Gij , represents the
relationship between node i and node j in the network. In the case of a binary network,
the elements Gij take the value 1 if i and j are linked, and 0 if they are not linked; while
in a weighted network, Gij = w(i, j), where w(i, j) is some measure of the strength of the
relationship between i and j. Typically, the leading diagonal of G is normalised to 0.
• Influence Matrix: This is a row-stochastic (or ‘right stochastic’) adjacency matrix, G˜
whose elements are generally defined as G˜ij = Gij/
∑
j Gij if two agents are linked and 0
otherwise.
• Degree: A node’s degree, di, is the number of edges of the node in an undirected graph.
The degree of node i in the network with a binary adjacency matrix, G, can be calculated
by summing the elements of the ith row of this matrix.104 In a directed graph, a node’s
in-degree is the number of edges from other nodes to that node, and it’s out-degree is
the number of edges from that node to other nodes in the network. For node i, the former
can be calculated by summing the elements of the ith column of the binary adjacency
matrix for the network, while the latter is obtained by summing the ith row of this matrix.
• Average degree: The average degree for a network graph is the average number of edges
that nodes in the network have.
• Density: The relative fraction of edges that are present in a network. It is calculated as
the average degree divided by N − 1, where N is the number of nodes in the network.
• Shortest path length (geodesic): A path in a network g between nodes i and j is a
sequence of edges, i1i2, i2i3, ..., iR−1iR, such that irir+1 ∈ g, for each r ∈ {1, ..., R} with
i1 = i and iR = j and such that each node in the sequence i1, ..., iR is distinct. The
shortest path length or geodesic between i and j is the path between i and j that contains
the fewest edges. The average geodesic of a network is the average geodesic for every pair
of nodes in the network. For nodes for whom no path exists, it is common to either exclude
them from the calculation of the average geodesic (i.e. to calculate the average geodesic
104Similarly, for a weighted graph, summing the elements for row i in the adjacency matrix yields the weighted
degree.
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from the connected part of the network) or to define the geodesic for these nodes to be
some large number (usually greater than the largest geodesic in the network).
• Diameter: The diameter of a graph is the largest geodesic in the connected part of the
network, where by connected, we refer to nodes for whom a path exists to get from one
node to the other.
• Component: A connected component, or component, in an undirected network is a
subgraph of a network such that every pair of nodes in the subgraph is connected via some
path, and there exists no edge from the subgraph to the rest of the network.
• Bridge: The edge ij is considered to be a bridge in the network g if removing the edge ij
results in an increase in the number of components in g.
• Complete Network: A network in which all possible edges are present.
• Degree Centrality: This is the node’s degree divided by N−1, where N is total number
of nodes in the network. It measures how well a node is connected in terms of direct
neighbours. Nodes with a large degree have a high degree centrality.
• Betweenness centrality: This is a measure of centrality based on how well situated a
node is in terms of the paths it lies on. The importance of node i in connecting nodes j
and k can be calculated as the ratio of the number of geodesics between j and k that i lies
on to the total number of geodesics between j and k. Averaging this ratio across all pairs
of nodes yields the betweenness centrality of node i.
• Eigenvector centrality: A relative measure of centrality, the centrality of node i is
the sum of the centrality of its neighbours. It can be calculated by solving the following
equation in matrix terms, λCe(G) = GCe(G), where Ce(G) is an eigenvector of G, and
λ is the corresponding eigenvalue.
• Bonacich Centrality: Another measure of centrality that defines a node’s centrality as a
function of their neighbours’ centrality. It is defined as b(Gg, β) = (Ig − βGg)−1.(αGgι).
• Dyad count: A dyad is a pair of nodes. In an undirected network, the dyad count is the
number of edges in the network.
• Triad count: A triad is a triple of nodes such that a path connecting all 3 nodes exists.
The triad count of an undirected network is the number of such triples in the network.
• Clustering coefficient: For an undirected network, this measures the proportion of fully
connected triples of nodes out of all potential triples in which at least two edges are present.
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• Support: An edge ij ∈ Eg is supported if there exists an agent k 6= i, j such that ik ∈ Eg
and jk ∈ Eg.
• Expansiveness: For subsets of connected nodes in the network, the ratio of the number
of edges connecting the subset to the rest of the network to the number of nodes in the
subset.
• Sparseness: A property of the network related with the length of all minimal cycles
connecting triples of nodes in the network. For any integer, q ≥ 0, a network is q-sparse if
all minimal cycles connecting any triples of nodes (i, j, k) such that ij ∈ Eg and jk ∈ Eg
have length ≤ q + 2. See Bloch et al. (2008) for more details.
• Graph span: The graph span is a measure that mimics the average path length. It is
defined as
spang =
log(Ng)− log(dg)
log(d˜g)− log(dg)
+ 1
where Ng is the number of nodes in network g, dg is the average degree of network g and
d˜g is the average number of second-degree neighbours in the network.
Network Topologies
• Bipartite network: A network whose set of nodes can be divided into two sets, U and
V , such that every edge connects a node in U to one in V .
• Uniform random network: A graph where edges between nodes form randomly.
• Scale-free network: A network whose degree distribution follows a power law, i.e. where
the fraction of nodes having k edges, P (k) is asymptotically proportional to k−γ . Such
a distribution allows for fat tails, i.e. the proportion of nodes with very high degrees
constitutes a non-negligible proportion of all nodes.
• Core-periphery network: A network that can be partitioned into a set of nodes that
is completely connected (‘core’), and another set of agents (‘periphery’) who are linked
primarily with nodes in the ‘core’.
• Cellular network: Networks containing many sets of completely connected nodes (or
‘cliques’), with few edges connecting the different cliques.
• Small world network: A network where most nodes are not directly linked to one
another, but where geodesics between nodes are small, i.e. a node can reach every other
node in the network by passing through a small number of nodes.
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• k-star: A component with k nodes and k − 1 links such that there is one ‘hub’ node who
has a direct link to each of the (k − 1) other (‘periphery’) nodes.
• Cliques: A clique is any induced subgraph of a network (i.e. subset of nodes and all edges
between them) such that every node in the subgraph is directly connected to every other
node in the subgraph.
• Induced Subgraph: The network graph constructed from data where nodes are randomly
sampled and where edges are included only if both nodes are randomly sampled are known
as induced subgraph.
• Star Subgraph: The network constructed from data where nodes are randomly sampled
and all their edges are included, regardless of whether the incident nodes are sampled (i.e.
if i is randomly sampled, the edge ij will be included regardless of whether or not j is
sampled), is called a star subgraph.
• Network Motif: Any subgraph of the network which has a particular structure. For
example, the reciprocated link motif is defined as any pair of nodes, {i, j}, such that both
of the possible directed links between them, {ij, ji}, are present in the subgraph. Another
example is the k-star motif, which is defined as any k nodes such that one of the nodes is
linked to all (k-1) other nodes, and the other nodes are not linked to each other.
• Isomorphic Networks: Two networks are isomorphic iff we can move from one to the
other only by permuting the node labels. For example, all six directed networks composed
of three nodes and one edge are isomorphic. Isomorphism implies that all network statistics
are also identical, since these statistics are measured at a network level so are not affected
by node labels.
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2.7.2 Quadratic Assignment Procedure
The Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) was developed originally by Mantel (1967) and
Hubert and Schultz (1976).105 It tests for correlation between a pair of network variables by
calculating the correlation in the data, and comparing this to the range of estimates computed
from the same calculation after permutation of the rows and columns of the adjacency matrix
G. For example, suppose we have two vectors y(G) = {yi(Gg)}i∈Ng and x(G) = {xi(Gg)}i∈Ng
which are functions of the network. We first calculate ρˆ0,Y X , the correlation between y and
x observed in the data. In order to respect the dependencies between edges that involve the
same node, we then jointly permute the rows and columns of the argument of y. This amounts
to effectively relabelling the nodes, so that we calculate a new estimate ρˆw,Y X : the correlation
between y(Gw) and x(G), where Gw is the permuted adjacency matrix. It is generally not the
same as permuting the elements of the vectors y. This is repeated W times, to give a range of
estimates {ρˆw,Y X}w=1,...,W . Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, we can perform, for
example, a two-sided test at the 10% level, by considering whether ρˆ0,Y X lies between the 5th
and 95th percentiles of {ρˆw,Y X}w=1,...,W . If it does not, we can reject the null at the 10% level.
Ideally one would like to use all the possible permutations available, but typically this number
is too large. Hence a random sample of permutations is typically used. This is done by drawing
the from the set of nodes of the network, {1, ..., N}, without replacement. The order in which
the indices are drawn is defined as the new, permuted ordering, for calculating y(Gw).
Krackhardt (1988) extended QAP to a multivariate setting. Now we have variables
{y(G), x1(G), ..., xK(G)} and are interested in testing whether there is a statistically significant
correlation between y and the K other variables. To test for a relationship between y and x1,
Krackhardt suggests we first regress y and x1, separately, on (x2...xK) to give residuals y
∗
1 and
x∗1. Then one can perform QAP on y
∗
1 and x
∗
1, as in the bivariate setting, where ρˆ0,Y ∗X∗1 is an
estimate of the partial correlation between y and x1 conditioning on the other (x2...xK). This
process can be repeated for all K covariates.
105See Hubert (1987) for a review of developments of this method.
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Chapter 3
Informal Insurance and
Endogenous Poverty Traps
1
3.1 Introduction
An old literature going back to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) suggests that the failure of poor
economies to develop comes from an inability to coordinate, where multiple simultaneous in-
vestments could be profitable, but alone none of these investments will be. However, there
are many investments which are profitable even without others’ investment, and yet do not
take place. For example, in rural villages the purchase of small capital goods such as livestock
is typically highly profitable, and yet we see little investment by most households (Bandiera
et al., forthcoming; Banerjee et al., 2015b; and also De Mel et al., 2008 in the context of small
businesses).
One obvious explanation for the lack of investment is that households are poor, and so
neither have the resources to invest nor access to formal credit. However, households regularly
borrow from (and lend to) friends and neighbours, using this to smooth consumption (Townsend,
1994; Udry, 1994). The puzzle, then, is why households are able to borrow informally for
consumption but not for high return investments? It cannot be explained by a lack of resources
(incomes and assets): whilst individual households in these ‘risk-sharing networks’ have few
resources, collectively they have the resources needed for investment. So why don’t households
pool resources to allow some households to engage in investment?
1With thanks to Orazio Attanasio, Richard Blundell, A´ureo de Paula, and Imran Rasul for their invaluable
support and advice. Thanks also to Marco Bassetto, Martin Cripps, Mariacristina De Nardi, Costas Meghir,
Nicola Pavoni, Bryony Reich, seminar participants at Bocconi, Bristol, Geneva, Gothenburg, Manchester, Stock-
holm School of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, UCL, University
of Southern California, and Warwick, and conference participants at European Econometric Society Winter
Meeting.
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This paper offers a new explanation, and empirical evidence, for this puzzle. The key idea is
a that investment reduces the capacity of investing households to provide informal consumption
smoothing. To see this, note that borrowing and lending for consumption smoothing – ‘informal
insurance’ – is sustained by reciprocity: a household lends today because it wants the possibility
of borrowing in the future, when it has a low income. Rather than writing formal contracts,
borrowing occurs informally, with lenders motivated by loss of future access to borrowing if
they do not lend when their incomes are relatively high. What makes borrowing for investment
different is that an investing household will on average be better off in the future. Having
investment income as well as labour income will reduce its need to borrow for consumption
smoothing in future periods.2 This reduced need for borrowing limits the amount it can be asked
to lend — ask for too much and the household would rather just lose access to future insurance.
The reduced capacity to provide other households with consumption smoothing prevents the
other households from lending for investment.
In this paper I first develop a formal theoretical model that captures this mechanism, and
then provide empirical evidence from a large scale randomised controlled trial (RCT). The model
combines the key elements discussed above: informal insurance with limited commitment and
lumpy (indivisible) investment. I show that the mechanism described, trading off insurance and
investment, can lead to a network-level poverty trap i.e. the long run equilibrium level of income
in the network will depend on the initial conditions. I also develop additional comparative
static predictions specific to the frictions – limited commitment and lumpy investment – in my
model. I then provide empirical evidence of the relevance of this mechanism. Using data from a
large scale, long term randomised control trial in Bangladesh, I find evidence that networks in
Bangladesh are indeed in a network-level poverty trap. I verify comparative static predictions of
the model, in terms of both income inequality and network size. This provides additional support
for my proposed mechanism, and allows me to rule out alternative competing hypothesis as the
source of the network-level poverty trap.
More precisely, I develop a model which captures four important characteristics of households
in village economies: (i) households are risk-averse and have volatile incomes; (ii) they are able
to engage in consumption smoothing by making inter-household transfers; (iii) households have
limited commitment in their risk-sharing arrangement i.e. at any point in time, the expected
value of continuing any risk sharing must be at least as good as the value of walking away forever
(‘autarky’); (iv) households have the opportunity each period to invest in a ‘lumpy’ (indivisi-
ble) asset. The first three characteristics lead to models of risk sharing with (dynamic) limited
commitment, as studied by Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (2002). The fourth character-
2I discuss later conditions on the variance of investment returns. In my empirical context this will be lower
than the variance of labour income, and the correlation between income from these sources is low.
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istic has also been studied in a number of development contexts (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993;
Fafchamps and Pender, 1997; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). My innovation is to combine
these standard features and show that there are important interactions betweenthem, which can
provide an explanation for the long-standing puzzle of underinvestment.
Analysis of the model provides three main findings. First, a poverty trap naturally arises in
this model: the long run equilibrium income distribution depends on the initial level of capital
invested. The ‘depth’ of this trap – the amount of income the network needs to escape the
trap – is greater if commitment is limited, when no household can afford to invest in autarky.
Second, investment has an inverted-U shape in income inequality. Third, investment becomes
easier as network sizes increase. The latter two comparative static predictions are specific to
the mechanism of my model, and are testable, so can be used to distinguish my explanation of
a network-based poverty trap from alternative hypotheses such as coordination failure.
Formally, a network poverty trap exists if there is some level of aggregate income, such that
equilibrium investment is different for networks whose maximum possible income is above or
below this ‘threshold’. Networks below the threshold will never have enough income to make
even the first investment, and so remain persistently poor. Above the threshold, it will be
possible for networks to initiate some investment. This raises future income, ensuring further
investments are possible, and allowing all households to eventually invest. However, with only
a ‘small push’ that provides some initial capital, the economy can be set on a path of further
investment and income growth. Unlike so-called ‘big push’ models (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943,
Murphy et al., 1989), here it is not necessary for all households to be simultaneously coordinated
in investment, nor is coordination alone – without the provision of assets – sufficient to generate
further investment.
When no household has enough income to want to invest if in autarky, limited commitment
reduces investment. Limited commitment makes resource pooling more difficult, hence investing
households will only be able to credibly promise smaller transfers. A larger share of investment
must therefore come out of their own pocket. This effect is important in explaining the puzzle
with which I began. With full commitment, only networks with too few resources for investment
would be in the poverty trap. Empirically many networks have resources that they do not use for
investment, despite the high returns. Limited commitment risk sharing provides the necessary
friction to explain why investment may not occur in these cases.
Under full commitment, the distribution of income would have no bearing on investment: all
that matters is aggregate income. With limited commitment, households who receive temporarily
high incomes might be better off leaving the initial insurance arrangement. This leads to a
renegotiation of the arrangement, which might involve allowing them to invest. As inequality
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rises, it changes which households are better off from leaving the arrangement, unless it is
renegotiated. I show that the changes in who is better off from leaving lead to rising inequality
having an inverted-U shaped effect on investment.
Increasing network size will increase the amount of investment. This occurs for two reasons.
First, aggregate income rises, providing more resources potentially available for investment.
Second, as the risk-sharing pool grows, the quality of insurance is improved, increasing the
opportunity cost of autarky. This is in contrast to models with coordination failure, where
investment becomes more difficult as network size rises.
I verify these three findings using data from a large scale, long term randomised control
trial (RCT) in Bangladesh. These data cover 27,000 households across 1,400 villages in the
poorest districts of rural Bangladesh. They were collected as part of an asset transfer program
by microfinance organisation BRAC. The intervention randomised villages into either treated or
control status, and then provided assets (typically cows) to the poorest households in treated
villages. These transfers were worth more than 50% of median income for the households that
received them. Asset transfers took place after data collection in 2007, and follow-up surveys were
carried out in 2009 and 2011. The program was evaluated by Bandiera et al. (forthcoming), who
show that the program has large and sustained effects on both earnings and asset accumulation.
Four features of the data make them suitable for my context. First, the data are from one of
the largest scale RCTs in a developing country, encompassing a large cross-section of networks,
from more than 1,400 villages. This is important since my model predictions are at the network
level. Second, in a subsample of my data, the data record the exact links used for risk-sharing
transfers. I exploit this to construct a good proxy for the appropriate risk-sharing network
in the full dataset, which recent work suggests it is important to measure well when studying
risk sharing (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). Third, the program provided large injections of lumpy
capital (cows), with significant variation in the number of transfers across villages. This provides
the exogenous variation in aggregate income necessary for my test of a network-level poverty
trap. Finally, the data cover a long time scale, with a follow-up survey four years after the initial
capital injection. This provides a large enough window to study how the initial injection affects
additional investment, which is key to understanding whether a network has left the poverty
trap.
The main empirical finding are as follows. First, aggregate investment in cows by risk-sharing
networks between 2009 and 2011 is zero on average if the network received less than $3, 500 (PPP
2007) of capital from the program, 7% of median network income. This threshold is determined
using a formal statistical test for a structural break with unknown break point i.e. a test for
a change in the slope of additional investment with respect to the capital provided when the
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location of the slope change being unknown. Above this level, aggregate investment is increasing
(and linear) in the aggregate amount of capital provided by the program. Second, I show that
investment has an inverted-U shape in income inequality, with a third of networks having ‘too
much’ inequality in terms of the effect on investment. Third, I show that investment is increasing
in network size, and provide tentative evidence that this is caused by a shift in the location of the
threshold. On average five additional households, a 10% increase in network size, are needed for
one additional investment to be possible. These qualitative patterns are precisely as predicted
by the model, and together they cannot be rationalised by any existing alternative mechanism.
This paper contributes to three distinct strands of literature. First, it contributes to the large
literature on poverty traps. Whilst poverty traps are an old idea, empirical work has failed to
find convincing evidence for any of the specific mechanisms that have been proposed.3 The novel
aspect of my model is that by introducing risk sharing, the poverty trap occurs at the network
level, and by introducing limited commitment, risk-sharing networks with enough resources to
invest might still choose not to. I use standard tools – non-convexity in production, of which
lumpiness is a particular example, and a financial friction (limited commitment) – to generate
the poverty trap (see for example Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; and
Ghatak, 2015). However, by embedding these in a risk-sharing framework, the poverty trap
in my model occurs at the network level. I provide empirical evidence that we do indeed see
a trap at this level, and my results are not consistent with a story of individual level traps.
My mechanism is distinct from the group level poverty traps of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and
Murphy et al. (1989), which are purely due to coordination failure. I provide evidence that allows
me to rule out poverty trap models that rely on increasing returns to coordinated investment,
including due to externalities, fixed costs, or learning.
Second, I contribute to the literature on risk sharing with frictions (Kocherlakota, 1996;
Ligon et al., 2002; among others). In particular, there is a growing literature examining how
endogenously incomplete insurance affects and is affected by opportunities in other markets (At-
tanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000; Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011; A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda, 2009;
A´braha´m and Laczo´, 2014; Morten, 2015). Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) highlight an important
trade-off between using insurance and using (continuous) investment to provide consumption
smoothing. A similar trade-off is present in my model, but the ‘lumpiness’ of investment in
3The main approach to testing for a poverty trap is to measure whether the elasticity of tomorrow’s income
with respect to today’s income, via some channel, is greater than one. For example, the ‘nutrition’ poverty trap
suggests that increased income would improve individual’s nutrition, which increases their capacity to work and
allows them to earn more. The test is then whether the product of the elasticity of nutrition with respect to
income and elasticity of income with respect to nutrition is greater than one. Subramanian and Deaton (1996)
estimate an elasticity of nutrition with repect to income of no more than .5, while Strauss (1986) estimates
an elasiticity of income with respect to nutrition of .33: the product of these is far less than one. Estimated
elasticities for other channels are also low. From Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2013) and Rosenzweig and Zhang
(2009), the elasticity of child’s income with respect to schooling would need to be greater than 33 to generate a
demographic/education poverty trap.
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my context (mirrored by many development applications) changes the nature of the decision-
making, and creates the possibility of a poverty trap. Morten (2015) also considers a model with
risk sharing and a binary decision, but where the decision only directly affects payoffs today.
By contrast, in this paper investment has permanent effects on the distribution of income, al-
lowing me to study questions of longer term development and growth. It also opens the door
for the study of other long term discrete investment decisions, such as irrigation (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1993; Fafchamps and Pender, 1997), education (Angelucci et al., 2015), and per-
manent migration (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016), in the context of risk sharing with limited
commitment.
Third, I contribute directly to the recent and growing work on asset transfer programs
(Bandiera et al., forthcoming; Banerjee et al., 2015b; De Mel et al., 2008; Morduch et al.,
2015). These studies find that in many cases, across a range of countries and contexts, asset
transfer programs are very successful in increasing incomes. My paper provides a possible ex-
planation for why such one-off transfers of assets appear to have larger effects on income growth
than smaller, but longer term, cash transfer programs such as Progresa (Ikegami et al., 2016).
Small increases in income will still be partly smoothed away, rather than providing the basis
needed for additional investment. It also suggests a route for increasing the impact of these
interventions: targeting at a network rather than a household level. By providing enough re-
sources at an aggregate level, these programs can provide the ‘small push’ that networks need
to get out of the poverty trap. My results highlight how a budget neutral redistribution of asset
transfers across networks can increase additional investment. Restructuring the existing policy
in this way could have increased additional investment four years after the program by 44%,
relative to using household-level targeting.
The next section develops the model formally, and provides the theoretical results. Section 3.3
describes the data and context for my empirical work. Section 3.4 tests the key predictions of
the model, and provides additional supportive evidence for the mechanism proposed. The final
section concludes.
3.2 A Model of Insurance, Investment, and a Poverty
Trap
Consider an infinite-horizon economy composed of N households. Households have increasing
concave utility functions defined on consumption that satisfy the Inada conditions. They also
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have a common geometric discount rate, β.4 Each period t, households receive endowment
income yt = {y1t , . . . , yNt } drawn from some (continuous) joint distribution Y. Individual incomes
are bounded away from 0, and aggregate income Yt ..=
∑N
i=1 y
i
t is bounded above by Y
max.
Income draws are assumed to be iid over time, but may be correlated across households within
a period. I define sit
..= yit/Yt as household i’s share of aggregate endowment income in period t.
To ease notation, hereafter I suppress the dependence of variables on t.
The households belong to a single network, and they may choose to engage in risk sharing.
Since households are risk-averse, and endowment incomes are risky, there is scope for mutually
beneficial risk sharing. In particular, an informal agreement in which households with good
income shocks in any period make transfers to those with bad income shocks will improve the
expected discounted utility for all households. I model this risk sharing as net transfers, τ i, made
by households i = 2, . . . , N to household 1.5 Household consumption will then be ci = yi − τ i,
and τ1 ≡∑Ni=2 τ i, where I suppress the dependence of all these objects on the shock y to ease
notation.
An impediment to risk sharing is the presence of dynamic limited commitment (Kocherlakota,
1996; Ligon et al., 2002). Households may, in any period, choose to walk away from the arrange-
ment, keeping all of their income that period and then being excluded from the arrangement
thereafter. This will limit the amount of risk sharing that can take place.
Thus far, the model is an N household, continuous shocks version of the standard model of
risk sharing with dynamic limited commitment. To this problem I introduce the possibility that
households may engage in lumpy investment. Precisely, each period a household may choose
whether or not to invest in a binary investment, κ. This has a one-off cost d, and pays a
guaranteed return of R in all future periods.6 Investment is an absorbing state, and households
may hold at most one investment.7 Additionally, investments must be held by the household
that does the investment, although transfers may be made out of investment income. This rules
4For work considering risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences, see for example Mazzocco and Saini (2012).
For work considering poverty traps with non-geometric discounting, see Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and
Bernheim et al. (2015).
5In principle, each household could choose how much income to transfer to each other household. Since my
interest is only on the total risk sharing that takes place, and not on the precise structure of transfers that are
used, I model all transfers as going to or from household 1. For each household there is then a single decision
about the net transfers to make (or receive). For work studying how network structure and risk sharing interact,
see Ambrus et al. (2014) and Ambrus et al. (2015).
6There are two implicit assumptions here. First, the return does not vary with the number of investments
that occur. This rules out both general equilibrium effects, where we might expect to see the return decline as the
number of investments increases, and fixed costs, where we might expect to see the return increase. I will show
later that in my empirical setting, these are both reasonable. Second, there is assumed to be no risk in the return
on investment. This is done to distinguish my mechanism from an alternative mechanism, where a high return
activity is also higher risk, so underinvestment occurs because of a lack of insurance (see for example Karlan
et al., 2014). It is also appropriate to my context: as I document below, in my empirical setting, investment
income will be less risky than non-investment income.
7The former is a simplifying assumption, which could be relaxed at the cost of adding more moving parts
to the model. The latter could also be relaxed: all that is needed is some upper bound on the total number of
investments a household can hold. This is reasonable in my context, where investments are in livestock: Shaban
(1987) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) describe how moral hazard issues can limit the ability to hire labour
from outside the family to manage livestock.
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out cooperatives and other joint investment structures.8 Now an uninvested household must
choose each period what net transfers to make, τ i, and whether to invest, ∆κi.
Barring risk sharing and investment, no alternative forms of smoothing are permitted. This
rules out external borrowing: whilst a household may engage in implicit borrowing from other
households in the risk-sharing network, the network as a whole cannot borrow from the wider
world. I will show that limited commitment problems make borrowing within the network
difficult, even amongst households that interact regularly, so one would expect this problem
to be even more severe for lenders from outside the community. I also rule out saving, so
that investment is the only vehicle for transfering resources over time.9 If private savings were
introduced, they would provide an alternative means of transferring resources over time. In the
model, a household would give or receive transfers, and then decide what share of resources (if
any) to save. However, in the next period, the planner wants again to smooth consumption, and
will look at the total cash-on-hand (income plus savings) that a household has in determining
transfers. Hence a household that saves would effectively be ‘taxed’ on this saving, as it would
be considered in the same way as any other income when the next period begins. This idea of
a ‘network tax’ discouraging saving has been documented by Dupas and Robinson (2013), who
show that poor households appear to have negative nominal returns to saving, and Jakiela and
Ozier (2016), who show that households are willing to pay to prevent information about good
income shocks being revealed.10
3.2.1 Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment without Investment
I first consider the limited commitment problem when all households have already invested. In
this case there is no investment decision to make, and the problem has the same form as the
many household version of Ligon et al. (2002), but with continuous income shocks. A solution to
the model will provide a mapping from the complete history of income shocks, to the transfers
that a household makes or receives today.
To find this solution, I first use the standard technique of writing the sequential problem
i.e the choice of transfers in a given period conditional on the complete history of shocks, in
a recursive formulation. Following Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu et al. (1990), this
simplifies the problem by encoding the dependence on the entire history into a single state
variable, ‘promised utility’, ω, which summarises the relevant information.
8For a model with joint ownership of investment, see Thomas and Worrall (2016).
9For work studying limited commitment risk sharing with divisible saving, see for example Ligon et al. (2000)
and A´braha´m and Laczo´ (2014).
10Allowing for hidden savings would complicate this argument slightly, but as long as investment cannot be
hidden – which is likely in many contexts, such as when the investments are livestock – any systematic hiding of
savings for investment purposes would be detectable and punishable once investment takes place.
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I then take the usual approach (as in Ligon et al., 2002) of formulating the problem as a
planner’s problem. Without loss of generality, I assume household 1 is the hypothetical planner.
Its role will be to choose the transfers that each household should make at each possible history,
and provide promises of utility, in a way that meets certain constraints (described below).11
At any point in time, the planner’s problem will then be to maximise its own utility, denoted
by the value function V (y;ω(y),1). This value function depends on the realised incomes, y; the
utility levels the planner promised to provide given the incomes, ω(y) = {ω2(y), . . . , ωN (y)};
and the stock of investment, κ, which here is equal to 1. The choices the planner makes are what
transfers to ask each household to make today, τ (y) = {τ2(y), . . . , τN (y)}; what promises of
expected utility to make for tomorrow, ω¯′(y) = {ω¯′2(y), . . . , ω¯′N (y)}; and how to deliver these
promises, ω′(y,y′) = {ω′2(y,y′), . . . , ω′N (y,y′)} ∀y′. The notation ′ denotes that a variable
relates to tomorrow.
So the planner’s problem can be written as:
max
{τ i(y),ω¯′i(y),{ω′i(y,y′)}y′}Ni=2
u
(
y1 +R+
N∑
i=2
τ i(y)
)
+ βV¯ (ω¯′(y),1) (3.1)
where
V¯ (ω¯′(y),1) =
∫
V (t;ω′(y, t),1) dFY′(t) (3.2)
denotes the expected continuation value for the planner when he has promised an expected
utility of ω¯′(y) given current state y, subject to three sets of constraints. Promised expected
utility is defined as:
ω¯′i(y) =
∫
ω′i(y, t) dFY′(t) (3.3)
The first set of constraints, with multipliers λi(y), are the promise keeping constraints:
[λi(y)] u(yi +R− τ i(y)) + βω¯′i(y) ≥ ωi(y) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N} (3.4)
These require that, at every possible realisation of income, y, the planner actually provides
(at least) the promised utility that he agreed to provide. The second set of constraints, with
11This will find an equilibrium set of contingent transfers (transfers that depend on the realised history) that is
subgame perfect: no household would like to unilaterally deviate from the arrangement in any realised state of the
world. However, a ‘decentralised’ approach, where one directly solved the repeated game representation, would
generically have many possible equilibria, from which my approach will select a single one. For work studying
the decentralisation problem, see Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2009).
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multipliers φi(y), are the limited commitment constraints:
[φ1(y)] u
(
y1 +R+
N∑
i=2
τ i(y)
)
+ βV¯ (ω¯′(y),1) ≥ Ω(y1, 1) (3.5)
[φi(y)] u(yi +R− τ i(y)) + βω¯′i(y) ≥ Ω(yi, 1) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N} (3.6)
which require that each household (including the planner) gets at least as much expected dis-
counted utility from the insurance arrangement as it would get if it walked away and took its
outside option, Ω(·). The outside option is a function of current income and current investment
status, and for an invested household is calculated as the utility of consuming all its income today,
and then the discounted expected utility given that it never again has insurance.12 Formally:
Ω(yi, 1) ..= u(yi +R) +
β
1− β
∫
u(y′ +R) dF (y′) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (3.7)
The third set of constraints, with multiplier βνi(y) is that for each household i ∈ {2, . . . , N} the
planner must find some promise of utility for every possible income realisation, such that the
average utility provided across all states is equal to the promised expected utility:
[βνi(y)] ω¯′i(y) =
∫
ω′i(y, t) dFY′(t) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N} (3.8)
The setup thus far is just the natural extension of Ligon et al. (2002) to the case with
continuous shocks, plus the introduction of the “intermediate” variable, ω¯i, which denotes the
promised expected utility to household i. If I were to substitute the expression for V¯ (·) from
Equation 3.2 in to the problem, and similarly for ω¯′ from Equation 3.8, the choice variables
would be only transfers today and utility promises in each future state. This is as in Ligon et al.
(2002), and the solution could be derived by using the first order conditions and by applying
envelope theorem to this problem.
An alternative approach, which I pursue, is to note that the problem is separable: ω′i(y′)
appears only in the definitions of V¯ and ω¯′i. Hence one can divide the problem into an “inner”
part, which solves the allocation of utility across future states of the world given promised
levels of expected utility, and an “outer” part which finds optimal transfers today and expected
utility promises for tomorrow, given the shock today and that expected utility will be provided
efficiently. This split is simply an application of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality.
12This is the most extreme punishment that can be imposed on the household, without assuming there are also
exogenous costs of relationship loss. It can therefore support the maximum amount of risk sharing. Weaker pun-
ishment strategies would provide additional, Pareto-dominated equilibria. I focus on a Pareto efficient insurance
arrangement.
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The inner problem studies how a given level of promised expected utility, ω¯′, should be
provided. Let U(ω¯′,1) denote the value function for a planner who has to provide promised
expected utility ω¯′, and can choose how this is delivered by selecting the utility to be delivered
in each state of the world, ω′(y′, ω¯′). V (t; ω˜′,1) denotes the continuation value of promising to
deliver ω˜′ given the state is t.
Then the inner problem is:
U(ω¯′,1) = max
{ω′i(y′;ω¯′)}i,y′
∫
V (t;ω′(t; ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) (3.9)
=
∫
max
{ω′i(y′;ω¯′)}i,y′
V (t;ω′(t; ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) (3.10)
s.t.
[ν˜i] ω¯′i =
∫
ω′i(t; ω¯′) dFY′(t) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N} (3.11)
Appendix 3.7.1 provides a (heuristic) proof that one can move from 3.9 to 3.10.
Now the expected continuation value, U , is defined as the integral over the continuation
value in each possible realisation of the shock, y′, where the planner can choose what utility
to promise at each possible shock, subject only to these promised utilities integrating to the
promised expected utility, ω¯′.
The first order conditions and envelope condition for this problem are:
[FOC(ω′i(y′; ω¯′))]
∂V (t;ω′(y′; ω¯′),1)
∂ω′i(y′; ω¯′)
= ν˜i (3.12)
[ET(ω¯′i)]
∂U(ω¯′,1)
∂ω¯′i
= ν˜i (3.13)
Combining these, one gets that:
∂U(ω¯′,1)
∂ω¯′i
=
∂V (y′;ω′(y′; ω¯′),1)
∂ω′i(y′; ω¯′)
(3.14)
Then the “outer” problem is to choose transfers, τ (y), and promised expected utilities, ω¯′(y),
given that this promised expected utility will be delivered efficiently as in the inner problem.
This alternative approach is just a rewriting of the original problem, and so gives an identical
solution. However, as will be seen, this separation of the problem will allow the problem to be
solved even when discrete choices and discrete state variables are introduced.13
13Although there is in principle already the discrete state variable of investment included here, with all house-
holds already invested it can never change.
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For now, with this rewriting, the full problem is to maximise:
max
{τ i(y),ω¯′i(y)}Ni=2
u
(
y1 +R+
N∑
i=2
τ i(y)
)
+ βU(ω¯′(y),1) (3.15)
with respect to only transfers and promised expected utilities, subject to the constraints in
Equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, and with U(·) defined as in Equation 3.10.
Taking first order conditions, using the envelope theorem for ωi(y), this gives for i ∈
{2, . . . , N}:
[FOC(τ i(y))]
du(c1(y))/ dτ i(y)
du(ci(y))/ dτ i(y)
=
λi(y) + φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
(3.16)
[FOC(ω¯′i(y))]
∂U(ω¯′(y),1)
∂ω¯′i(y)
= −λ
i(y) + φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
(3.17)
[ET(ωi(y))]
∂V (y;ω(y),1)
∂ωi(y)
= −λi(y) (3.18)
Hence:
∂U(ω¯′(y),1)
∂ω¯′i(y)
= −
−∂V (y;ω(y),1)∂ωi(y) φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
= − du(c
1(y))/dτ i(y)
du(ci(y))/dτ i(y)
(3.19)
From the envelope theorem (Equation 3.18) it can be seen that the value function is decreasing
in the promised utility ωi(y) to each household i. When none of the limited commitment
constraints bind, φ1(y) = φi(y) = 0, the slope of the value function (the ratio of marginal
utilities for i and 1) remains constant, and so the ratio of marginal utilities remain unchanged
from the previous period. When a household’s limited commitment constraint binds, the ratio
of marginal utilities in that period and all future periods (until another constraint binds), is
increasesd so that it receives an increased share of consumption.
3.2.2 Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment with Investment
Next I consider the case where k < N investments have already been made, k =
∑N
i=1 κ
i.
Now there is a meaningful investment decision for the planner, which is the chief innovation of
the model. Precisely, the planner now has to choose the optimal number (and allocation) of
investments ∆k(y) ∈ {1, . . . , N −k}, as well as transfers and utility promises.14 I first note that
there is a weakly dominant allocation rule for assigning investments.
14In a full commitment setting it would not matter which households ‘held’ the investments, since the planner
could always require them to make arbitrary transfers. With limited commitment this is no longer the case: if
the planner requires too high a transfer, the household may prefer autarky.
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Lemma 3.1. There exists a unique weakly dominant investment allocation rule. Let ω˜i(y) ..=
max{ωi(y),Ω(yi, 0)}. Then if ∆k(y) investments are to occur, assign the investments to the
∆k(y) uninvested households with the highest values of ω˜i(y).
Proof. See Subsection 3.7.2.
The planner’s problem can therefore be simplified to choose only what transfers to make
and how many investments to do, taking as given which households will be asked to do the
investments. This reduces significantly the dimensionality of the choice problem, from (N − k)!
possible values for the discrete choice, to only N − k values.
I next simplify the problem further, making use of additional separability in the structure
of the problem. The planner’s decision can be separated into first choosing what transfers to
make given a decision on the number of investments, and then choosing the optimal number
of investments. This follows from an application of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality. So the
planner’s value function, given the shock, y, the promised utility at that shock, ω(y), and the
existing distribution of investments, κ, is:
V (y;ω(y),κ) = max
∆k
{V∆k(y;ω(y),κ)} (3.20)
where V∆k(y;ω(y),κ) is the conditional value function when the planner requires ∆k investments
to occur (and be assigned as above), and chooses transfers optimally.
Before defining the planner’s problem for the conditional value function, I define the expected
continuation value, U , when investment is possible:
U(ω¯′,κ) =
∫
max
{∆k(y′;ω¯′),{ω′i(y′;ω¯′)}i}y′
V∆k (t;ω
′(t; ω¯′),κ′(t; ω¯′)) dFY′(t) (3.21)
s.t. ω¯′ =
∫
ω′(t, ω¯′) dFY′(t), ∆k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − k}
Now the benefit of writing the problem in terms of promised expected utilities can be seen. The
expected value function is clearly differentiable with respect to ω¯′i ∀i, with the derivative equal
to the value of the multiplier on the integral constraint for promised utilities.
That the expected value function should remain differentiable is not obvious. The discrete
choice, ∆k, introduces kinks into the value function defined in Equation 3.20. At the point
where two conditional value functions cross (in ωi(y) space), their slopes will be different. As
the upper envelope of these conditional value functions, the overall value function will not be
differentiable at these crossing points. With the standard approach to writing the problem, in
terms of the promised utility at every state, it is not clear that the expected value function will
be differentiable with respect to these promised utilities. However, with this redefinition of the
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problem, it is immediate that the value function will be differentiable with respect to promised
expected utility.
The intuition for why this redefinition can be used to solve the problem of kinks in the value
function comes from Prescott and Townsend (1984b, 1984a).15 They model the allocation of
resources in settings with moral hazard. Moral hazard introduces non-convexity into the set
of feasible allocations, similar to the problem caused by kinks in my model. They show that,
with a continuum of agents, they can solve the problem by introducing ‘extrinsic uncertainty’:
randomness which has no bearing on economic fundamentals, but is nevertheless used in the
allocation of resources conditional on all observables. More simply, they introduce lotteries
which mean that, in some states (realised incomes in my model), observationally equivalent
agents might receive different levels of resources. This ‘convexifies’ the problem, smoothing out
any kinks. It works because the share of agents receiving a particular bundle of resources can
be adjusted continuously, even when the bundles differ discretely.
In my context such extrinsic uncertainty is not needed. Randomness in the distribution of
income shocks can be used instead to ‘smooth out’ the kinks. This is what Equation 3.21 is doing:
by first choosing ∆k(y′; ω¯′) and ω′i(y′; ω¯′) ∀i,y′, and then integrating over the continuum of
income shocks, the upper envelope function U(·) is made convex in promised expected utility.16
Having rewritten the expected continuation value in this way, I can now set up the plan-
ner’s problem with investment. The planner’s value function, V (y;ω(y),κ), is defined as in
Equation 3.20 as the maximum over a set of conditional value functions, each for a different
fixed number of investments. Given also the definition of the expected continuation value from
Equation 3.21, these conditional value functions, V∆k(y;ω(y),κ), are given by:
V∆k(y;ω(y),κ) = max
{τ i(y),ω¯′i(y)}Ni=2
u
(
y1 + κ1R−∆κ1(y)d+
N∑
i=2
τ i(y)
)
+βU(ω¯′(y),κ′(y)) (3.22)
s.t.
[λi(y)] u(yi + κiR−∆κi(y)d− τ i(y)) + βω¯′i(y) ≥ ωi(y) (3.23)
[φ1(y)] u
(
y1 + κ1R−∆κ1(y)d+
N∑
i=2
τ i(y)
)
+ βU(ω¯′(y),κ′(y)) ≥ Ω1(y1, κ1) (3.24)
[φi(y)] u(siY + κiR−∆κi(y)d− τ i(y)) + βω¯′i(y) ≥ Ωi(yi, κi) (3.25)
15See also Phelan and Townsend (1991).
16A formal justification of this approach is provided by Lemma A1 and Lemma A2 of Pavoni and Violante
(2007).
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where i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Ω(yi, κi) ..= u(yi + κiR−∆κiaut(yi)d) + β
∫
Ω(y′, κi + ∆κiaut(y
i)) dF (y′) (3.26)
is the best outside option for household i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and the investment state is updated as:
κ′i = κi + ∆κi where κ′i,∆κi ∈ {0, 1} (3.27)
The main differences between these conditional value functions and the case without investment
are that (i) some households will potentially now invest, adding the −∆κi(y)d terms to household
utility; (ii) the investment state κ must be updated when investment occurs; and (iii) the outside
option for household i now allows for the option of future investment, if the household has not
already invested.
As before this gives first order conditions for i ∈ {2, . . . , N}, now (implicitly) conditional on
both the income shock (as before), and also the investment decision, ∆k:
[FOC(τ i(y))]
du(c1(y))/ dτ i(y)
du(ci(y))/ dτ i(y)
=
λi(y) + φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
(3.28)
[FOC(ω¯′i(y))]
∂U(ω¯′(y),κ′)
∂ω¯′i(y)
= −λ
i(y) + φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
(3.29)
[ET(ωi(y))]
∂V (y;ω(y),κ)
∂ωi(y)
= −λi(y) (3.30)
Hence:
∂U(ω¯′(y),κ′(y))
∂ω¯′i(y)
= −
−∂V (y;ω(y),κ′(y))∂ωi(y) + φi(y)
1 + φ1(y)
= − du(c
1(y))/ dτ i(y)
du(ci(y))/ dτ i(y)
(3.31)
The first order conditions and envelope theorem result take the same form as without the
investment decision. Hence the conditional value function is decreasing in promised utility, and
the ratio of marginal utilities updated when a limited commitment constraint binds. This fully
characterises the insurace transfers, given some exogenous investment decision. I next study the
investment decision, and how it is influenced by various features of the model.
3.2.3 Poverty Trap
The first result from the model is that it naturally gives rise to the possibility of a poverty trap:
a situation in which the long run equilibrium of the economy depends on its initial state. I
will build this result in two steps. First, I suppose that households are able to commit i.e. the
limited commitment friction is removed. In this case there will be a network-level poverty trap
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where some communities will be too poor to be able to ever invest. The structure of this trap
will be analagous to a household-level trap: the only thing preventing investment is a lack of
resources. However, this is insufficient to explain the observation that networks which have the
resources choose not to invest. I then reintroduce limited commitment, and show conditions
under which this can ‘deepen’ the poverty trap. Now networks which have sufficient resources to
invest under full commitment may not invest, because the lack of commitment prevents resource
pooling. This is the key mechanism driving the model.
Full Commitment
Under full commitment there exists a sequence of aggregate income thresholds Ŷ FC∆k , one between
each possible level of investment and the level above it, such that if Ŷ FC∆k < Y < Ŷ
FC
∆k+1 then it
will be optimal to make ∆k investments this period. This leads to the possibility of a poverty
trap: if an economy never receives a large enough level of aggregate income to reach the lowest
threshold, i.e. Y max < Ŷ FC1 then it will forever remain with the current income distribution
(absent external shocks), whilst if an external shock is provided to produce a ‘small push’ then
further investment will be able to occur over time.17
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique threshold Ŷ FC∆k = Ŷ
FC
∆k (κ, N) such that with full com-
mitment:
1. ∀Y < Ŷ FC∆k , the optimal number of investments is no greater than ∆k − 1;
2. at Y = Ŷ FC∆k , V∆k−1(·) = V∆k(·) ≥ V∆k′(·) ∀∆k′ i.e. the planner is indifferent between
making ∆k−1 and ∆k investments and does not strictly prefer any other level of investment
to these; and
3. ∀Y > Ŷ FC∆k , the optimal number of investments is no fewer than ∆k.
There are N−k such thresholds, with Ŷ FC∆k−1 ≤ Ŷ FC∆k , each implicitly defined by Γ∆k(Ŷ FC∆k ;κ, N) ≡
0 where Γ∆k(·) ..= V∆k−1(·)− V∆k(·).
Proof. See Subsection 3.7.3.
Proposition 3.1 states that for an N -household economy in which k =
∑
i κ
i
k investments
have already been made, there are N −k income thresholds, whose level depends on the number
of existing investments and the network size, under the assumption that households can commit
fully. Intuitively, when aggregate income is very low, it will be optimal to consume it all today,
potentially after some redistribution. At higher levels of aggregate income, the utility cost of
17In contrast with ‘big push’ models (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953; Murphy et al., 1989), here no
coordination is needed between agents: an initial push that is large enough to allow one additional investment to
occur will then automatically spillover, allowing further investments.
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reducing total consumption by d today (the cost of an investment) is sufficiently low compared
with the expected improvement in future expected utility, so it will become optimal to make one
investment. At yet higher levels of aggregate income, additional investments become worthwhile.
Network size scales down the per household cost (and return) of each investment.
This threshold result leads naturally to the possibility of a poverty trap, where the long run
distribution of income depends on its initial state. When an economy has only a small number
of initial investments (low level of capital), the highest possible aggregate income may be lower
than Ŷ FC1 (·), the level needed to make the first additional investment worthwhile. However, at
a higher level of initial capital stock the maximum level of aggregate income is higher, allowing
further investments to take place in some states of the world.
Lemma 3.2. The threshold level of income needed to make ∆k additional investments, Ŷ FC∆k , is
decreasing in the existing level of capital k, i.e. DkŶ
FC
∆k < 0, where Dk is the finite difference
operator (the discrete analogue of the derivative) with respect to k.
Proof. See Subsection 3.7.4.
Under full commitment the poverty trap result has very stark predictions: there are only
two possible long run equilibria, κ = 0 or 1.18 This is because under full commitment only
the level of aggregate income matters for whether investment takes place. Suppose there exists
a state of the world in which, from a base of zero capital, making at least one investment is
optimal for the planner. Then making an investment in the same state of the world, when the
same combinations of endowment incomes are realised but when some investments have already
occurred, must also be optimal (by Lemma 3.2). Hence either the economy will remain with
zero capital or will converge to a state in which all households are invested.
Limited Commitment
I next consider how the above results are changed by limited commitment. I first show that
limited commitment can change the ‘depth’ of the poverty trap: the threshold level of income
needed such that doing some investment becomes optimal in equilibrium. To do this I consider
how the investment threshold under autarky compares to that with full commitment. The results
under limited commitment will fall somewhere between these, depending on the extent of limited
commitment. I then show that with limited commitment, a wider range of equilibrium levels of
18κ = 0 is the poverty trap long run equilibrium, while κ = 1 is the ‘good’ long run equilibrium. If there were
decreasing returns to investment at the aggregate level, the good equilibrium might be less extreme, with only
some households ever investing, but there would be the same initial threshold needed to break out of the poverty
trap equilibrium.
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investment are possible.19 This is important since in practice one observes intermediate levels
of investment, which would never be a long run equilibrium with full commitment.
Under autarky, there will be an income threshold yˆ such that if an (uninvested) individual
household’s income exceeds yˆ it will invest, else it will not, and all non-investment income will
be consumed.20
The first result is that, if all households have incomes below the level needed to invest in
autarky i.e. yi < yaut, then the number of investments will necessarily (weakly) fall. To see
this, note that limited commitment reduces the ability to make transfers today in expectation
of receiving transfers in the future. Hence equilibrium outcomes under limited commitment are
always between the full commitment and autarky outcomes. By assumption no household wants
to invest in autarky, so if any investment were taking place under full commitment, under limited
commitment it can only be weakly lower.
An analagous result can be seen when in autarky some subset of households would have
chosen to invest. If under full commitment they were required to instead make transfers and
not invest, then limited commitment moves them back towards their autarky choice. They are
willing to leave the insurance arrangement, and if the cost (in terms of promised future utility)
of asking them to not invest and make transfers instead is high enough, then they will again
invest.
To see how the individual and aggregate thresholds compare, the threshold for a single
investment to occur under full commitment, note that a move from autarky to full commitment
insurance has two effects. First, it effectively scales the cost and return of the investment, as
these can now be shared across households. Under full commitment, household j pays only
αjd per investment, where αj = α(λj , λ˜−j) is household j’s share of aggregate consumption.
In the limit as N → ∞, holding the distribution of individual income constant αj → 0 so
collectively investment becomes infinitely divisible, and the problems of ‘lumpiness’ go away.
Doing at least one investment (collectively) therefore becomes increasingly attractive relative to
zero investments, reducing the threshold level of income needed for a single investment to occur.
Second, it reduces the variance of future consumption. Part of the value of the investment
is that it is not perfectly correlated with households’ endowment income, so provides some
partial insurance.21 Consequently, insurance from other households will reduce the demand
19Adding heterogeneity in investment returns to the model would also allow intermediate equilibria, where only
some households were invested. However, as I show in the next subsection, limited commitment has implications
for how the distribution of income and risk-sharing network size should matter for investment, which would not
hold in a full commitment model with heterogeneity. I will show that these implications are borne out in the
data, so that limited commitment is an important reason why such intermediate cases may be observed, although
heterogeneity is certainly also present.
20To see that such a threshold exists, the same lines of reasoning used in the full commitment case can be
replicated. The threshold is implicitly defined as u(yˆ) + βE [Ω(y′, 0)] = u(yˆ − d) + βE [Ω(y′, 1)].
21In fact I model the return from investment as non-stochastic and hence entirely independent of the endowment
income process, but this is not necessary.
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for investment relative to current consumption. This effect will increase the threshold level
of aggregate income needed for an investment to occur. Hence the overall effect of limited
commitment may be to increase or decrease investment relative to full commitment insurance:
determining the effect in a particular context will be an empirical question. Some intuition can
be gained by considering properies of the cross-sectional income distribution.
To see how the relative magnitudes of these effects depend on the distribution of income,
consider two polar cases: the case where all risk is aggregate (household incomes are perfectly
positively correlated) and the case where all risk is idiosyncratic (aggregate income is fixed). In
the former case, ‘full commitment insurance’ actually provides no insurance at all. However,
it does allow households to use transfers to share the costs and returns of investment, so only
the first of the above effects exists here. If individual households’ incomes are not already high
enough to make investment worthwhile, then pooling income may allow households to invest.
In this case it is clear that as soon as limited commitment is introduced, the households are
effectively in autarky. Without any idiosyncratic variation in income, there is no value to an
invested household in remaining in the arrangement. Hence there is an immediate unravelling,
with no households being willing to make transfers that support another household’s investment,
since they know that repayment is not credible.
Conversely, when aggregate income is fixed, and all variation is idiosyncratic, and hence in-
surable, the insurance arrangement has its maximum value. However, it is now possible that
the availability of insurance can ‘crowd out’ investment: households with relatively high income
shocks would invest in autarky, but with insurance they are required to instead make trans-
fers. If the fixed level of aggregate income is below Ŷ1, then with full commitment insurance
no investments will ever take place. In this case limited commitment weakens the insurance
arrangement, which might allow more investment to take place. Households who receive rela-
tively good shocks might not be able to commit to providing full smoothing to those who were
unlucky: instead they may also invest. Since insurance is here at its most valuable, this is the
case where households are most willing to forgo investment to ensure continued access to the
insurance arrangement. At intermediate levels of correlation, the effect of the LC constraint is
in between these extreme cases.
As well as changing the level of the lowest threshold, Ŷ1, limited commitment can change the
distance between the thresholds. This is important, as it can create long run equilibria where
the economy has an intermediate level of capital, rather than the all or nothing result seen under
full commitment.
To see this, consider the situation where one household has invested. Under full commitment,
I showed that the threshold level of income needed to do one additional investment has now fallen.
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Under limited commitment there is an additional effect: relative to the case where no-one has
invested, the household with an investment has an improved outside option. This endogenously
restricts the set of possible equilibrium transfers. Since household consumption will no longer
be a constant share of aggregate consumption, and since owning an investment increases the
consumption share for a household, there will no longer necessarily be increasing differences
in the planner’s utility when another household invests. The limited commitment analogue of
Lemma 3.2 may therefore not hold: an increase in the level of capital will not necessarily reduce
the income thresholds for investment. Instead there are now parameters which can support
‘intermediate’ equilibria, where the long run share of households who are invested is strictly
between zero and one.22
3.2.4 Comparative Statics
I now consider two additional testable predictions of the model: the effect of changes in the
distributions of income, and in the size of the risk-sharing network. These predictions arise
specifically from the interaction of lumpy investment with limited commitment, and would not
be present either with full commitment, or with a single alternative source of insurance market
incompleteness (e.g. hidden effort, hidden income).
How Does Inequality in Initial Income Affect Investment?
In the presence of limited commitment, income inequality affects the decision to invest. The
intuition of this result is straightforward: increased income inequality affects the set of limited
commitment constraints which are binding, by changing the outside options for households. As
shown above, limited commitment has a direct impact on investment decisions.
More concretely, consider a redistribution of endowment income from a (poorer) uninvested
household, whose limited commitment constraint does not bind, towards a (richer) uninvested
household whose constraint is binding. The increase in income for the richer household improves
that household’s outside option, making the limited commitment constraint for that household
more binding. If the arrangement previously required the household to invest, this will remain
unchanged, whilst if the household was not previously asked to invest, the planner may now find
this an optimal way to provide utility to the household.
If the redistribution had been from a poorer to richer household where both households
had binding limited commitment constraints, the same argument would hold for the richer
household, but now the reverse may occur for the poorer household: since the planner need to
22Hence although all households are ex ante identical, there are long run equilibria where they necessarily have
different levels of expected utility. Matsuyama (2002, 2004, 2011) provides other examples of models which have
this ‘symmetry-breaking’ property.
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transfer less utility to this household, it may no longer provide the household with investment
as a way to transfer some of this utility. Depending on which household is at the margin of
investment, an increase in inequality can therefore increase or decrease total investment. For a
given level of aggregate income, a small increase in inequality (starting from a very equal initial
distribution) will lead to some LC constraints starting to bind. As this inequality increases and
these constraints become increasingly binding, this increases the number of investments that
occur. Eventually, further increases in income inequality lead to a reduction in investments, as
they are effectively redistributions from one constrained household to another, reducing the need
to provide the poorer of these households with an investment. Hence there will be an ‘inverted-U’
shape effect of inequality, where initial increase in inequality will increase investment, but too
much concentration in just a few hands will again reduce the level of investment.
Proposition 3.2. Consider an initial distribution of income, s. Let s′ be an alternative, more
unequal distribution, such s′ is a mean preserving spread of s. For relatively equal distribution,
s, investment will be weakly greater under s′. For relatively unequal distribution, s, investment
will be weakly lower under s′.
Proof. See Subsection 3.7.5.
How Does Network Size Affect Investment?
Given a fixed distribution for individual income, increasing network size has two complementary
effects on investment. First, it raises expected aggregate income. Second, it reduces the variance
of average income (assuming that incomes are not perfectly correlated) and increases the variance
of aggregate income. Even if the mean of aggregate income were fixed, a mean preserving spread
of aggregate income would increase investment, since there would be more extreme high income
shocks. Under full commitment these periods provide a large incentive to invest to smooth
income across time. Under limited commitment there is an additional effect that, with a lower
variance for mean income, the value of the insurance arrangement is improved, so autarky is
relatively less attractive. This makes it easier to sustain investment.
Proposition 3.3. An increase in the number of households reduces the threshold level of aggre-
gate income needed for investment by improving the value of the insurance arrangement. It also
increases the likelihood of aggregate income exceeding even the initial threshold.
Proof. See Subsection 3.7.6.
This prediction would not be true if moral hazard or hidden information were the friction
driving incomplete insurance. It is also the opposite of what one would see in a model where the
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network (or some share of it) needs to coordinate for investment to be profitable: then larger
group sizes would make coordination more difficult.
3.3 Data from a Randomised Control Trial in Bangladesh
3.3.1 Data Source
I use data from a large scale, long term randomised control trial in rural Bangladesh, collected
in partnership with microfinance organisation BRAC. The data cover 27,000 households across
1,409 villages, in the poorest 13 districts of rural Bangladesh.
The villages were selected as follows. From each district, one or two subdistricts (upazilas)
were randomly sampled. From each of these, two BRAC branch offices were randomly selected
for the program, one to be treated, the other as a control (for more details see Bandiera et al.,
forthcoming). All villages within 8km of a sampled branch office were then included in the final
sample, giving the total of 1,409 villages, with a median of 86 households.
A census of households in each village took place in 2007. This asked questions on de-
mographics of household members, and their education and employment statuses, as well as
collecting detailed information on household assets. This was used both to construct a sampling
frame for the further surveys, and for targeting the program.
A sample of households was then selected from each village. A participatory wealth ranking
in the census divided households into one of four wealth categories. All households in the lowest
wealth grouping – which includes all households eligible for the program – were sampled, along
with a 10% random sample of all remaining households. This gives a sample of 7,111 eligible
households, 13,704 ‘ineligible poor’ households (in the bottom two wealth ranks), and 6,162
‘non-poor’ households. Sampled households were given a baseline survey in 2007, with follow up
surveys in 2009 and 2011. In these surveys detailed data were collected on household income,
investment, and risk sharing.
Table 3.1 provides some key descriptives about these households, grouping them into the
above categories. Households comprise around four members, but poorer households are smaller
as they are more likely to not have a working age man present. This is particularly true in
eligible households, where it was used in program targeting (see below for details). Eligible
households are very poor, with almost half below the poverty line, and hardly any already own
cows. Ineligible poor households, and then non-poor households, do indeed have higher incomes,
consumption, and assets (cows), providing evidence that the participatory wealth ranking pro-
vides a good measure of relative material standard of living.
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Four features of the data make them suitable for my context. First, the data cover a large
cross-section of networks, encompassing more than 1,400 villages. This is important since the
model predictions are at the network level. Second, in a subsample of the data, exact links
used for risk-sharing transfers are measured. This makes it possible to construct a good proxy
for the appropriate risk-sharing network in the full dataset, addressing concerns that the whole
village is not the level at which risk sharing takes place. Third, the program provided large
injections of lumpy capital, with significant variation in the number of transfers across villages
(see Figure 3.1). This provides the exogenous variation in aggregate income necessary for my test
of a network-level poverty trap. Fourth, households were surveyed again two and four years after
the transfers were made. This allows study of how the initial transfers affect later investment
decisions, which are necessarily long term.
3.3.2 Program Structure
The intervention carried out by BRAC was an asset transfer program. Using information from
the census survey, household eligibility for the program was determined. Eligibility depended
on a number of demographic and financial criteria. A household was automatically ineligible
for the program if any of the following were true: (i) it was already borrowing from an NGO
providing microfinance; (ii) it was receiving assistance from a government antipoverty program;
or (iii) it has no adult women present.23 If none of these exclusion criteria were met, a household
was deemed eligible if at least three of the following inclusion criteria were satisfied: (i) total
household land was less than 10 decimals (400 square metres); (ii) there is no adult male income
earner in the household; (iii) adult women in the household work outside the home; (iv) school-
aged children have to work; (iv) the household has no productive assets.
After the baseline survey, eligible households in treated villages were given a choice of asset
bundles.24 All bundles were worth approximately the same amount, $515 in 2007 PPP. 91% of
treated households choose a bundle with cows, 97% with cows or goats. In the following analysis
I treat all treated households as though they actually received cows, but my results are robust
to treating those who did not choose livestock as though they received no transfers. Along with
assets, treated households also receive additional training from BRAC officers over the following
two years. By the 2009 survey, all elements of the program had ceased, except that treated
households now had the additional capital they had been provided with. After the 2011 survey,
eligible households in control villages also received asset transfers.
23The last criterion exists because the asset transfers were targeted at women.
24At the time of the asset transfers, eligibility was reassessed and 14% of households that were deemed eligible
at the census no longer met the eligibility criteria. However, there is significant variation in the share of households
no longer deemed eligible across branches, suggesting that implementation of reassessment varied across branches.
To avoid the concern that this introduces unwanted variation, in what follows I continue to use the initial eligibility
status.
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One limitation of the program structure, for the purpose of this study, is that while entire
villages are either treated or control, variation in the intensity of treatment – the value of
transfers to a risk-sharing network, which is proportional number of households in the network
who receives transfers – is endogenous, since it depends on characteristics of the households. The
ideal experiment for my context would have been to directly randomise villages into G groups,
where group 1 has zero households receiving asset transfers, group 2 has 1 household receiving
transfers, and so on. Then the marginal effect of having g+1 households treated rather than only
g households could be estimated by comparing outcomes for households or networks in groups
g + 1 and g. In Subsection 3.4.1 I discuss two different approaches I take to handle this, one
exploiting the available randomisation and the other using the non-linearity of the relationship
being tested for.
3.3.3 Defining Risk-Sharing Networks
The predictions of the model concern behaviour at the risk-sharing network level. Early work
on informal risk sharing assumed that the relevant group in which risk sharing takes place is the
village (Townsend, 1994). Implicitly this assumes there are frictions preventing risk sharing with
households outside the village, and that within the village all households belong to a common
risk-sharing pool. Recent evidence suggests that in some context risk-sharing networks might
be smaller than the village. Using data from Indian villages, Mazzocco and Saini (2012) and
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) both find that caste groups within a village are the appropriate
risk-sharing network i.e. there are important frictions preventing risk sharing across caste lines
within a village.
To determine the appropriate group for risk sharing, I use a subsample of 35 villages in which,
rather than the stratified random sampling scheme used elsewhere, a census of all households was
taken at all waves. Households were asked whether they suffered a ‘crisis’ in the last year. If they
did, they were asked how they coped with it, and where transfers or informal loans were used
for coping, they were asked who the transfers or loans were from. Additionally all households
were asked who (if anyone) they borrowed food from or lent food to. I combine these various
dimensions of household links into a single dimension, which I term ‘sharing risk’. I then study
what grouping can be constructed in the full sample, that provides a good proxy for being a
risk-sharing partner of an eligible household, since my interest is in constructing the risk-sharing
network for these households.
Table 3.8 provides evidence on this question. The first point of note is that almost all of
eligibles’ risk sharing (94%) is done with other households in the same village. Second these links
are highly concentrated among other households in the lowest two wealth classes. In particular,
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70% of eligibles risk-sharing links are with other households from the bottom two wealth classes,
compared with only 55% that would be expected under random linking. This motivates me to
focus on the poorest two wealth classes as the relevant group for risk sharing.
To further test this definition of the risk-sharing network, I perform Townsend tests (Townsend,
1994) under the different groupings. These involve regressions of the following form:
∆ log chgt = β0 + β1∆ log yhgt + β∆zhgt (3.32)
+ δ0Dhg + δ1Dhg∆ log yhgt + δ∆Dhgzhgt + γgt + εhgt
where ∆ log chgt is the change in log expenditure for household h in risk-sharing group g at
time t; ∆ log yhgt is the change in log income; ∆zhgt are changes in demographic charateristics;
Dhg = 1 if household h is not an eligible household; and γgt are group dummies. The idea
of the test is that, if eligible households in group g are able to fully smooth consumption,
their expenditure should not respond to changes in their household income, i.e. β1 = 0, once
changes in demographics and group-level shocks, γgt, which cannot be smoothed, are accounted
for. Including the interactions with Dhg allows ineligible households (poor and non-poor) to
potentially be in the same risk-sharing group as the eligible households but without imposing
that they respond to shocks in the same way. This ensures that the results of the test are not
confounded by changes in sample composition: β1 always measures the response of eligibles’
expenditure to their income. The appropriate risk-sharing network for eligibles will then be
the grouping such that, including fewer households gives a larger β1, but including additional
households does not further reduce β1. If all of eligibles’ risk sharing is with the bottom two
wealth classes, then excluding ineligible poor households should make risk sharing appear worse,
since part of the aggregate shock is being excluded. Conversely, including the whole village
should not improve measured risk sharing, because the additional households are irrelevant.
To estimate this I use data on expenditure and income for all households in control villages
in the main sample over the three waves of data collection. Both the observations and variables
used in this test are separate from the previous approach, so this provides independent evidence
about the appropriate group. Equation 3.32 is estimated for the different definitions of group
previously considered. Table 3.9 shows the results of this test. Consistent with the earlier result,
it can be seen that including ineligible poor households into the risk-sharing network for the
eligibles improved measured consumption smoothing (p-value=.026). However, including the
rest of the village does not further improve smoothing (p-value=.403), justifying their exclusion
from the risk-sharing network.
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To the extent that using wealth groupings is an imperfect proxy for the true risk-sharing
network, it will introduce some noise into my later work. As a robustness check, in my empirical
test for a poverty trap I will show that qualitatively similar results would be found if the entire
village were used, or only eligible households are used.
3.3.4 Final Sample Descriptives
My final sample, focusing on the bottom two wealth classes, includes 20,815 households across
1,409 villages, although as a robustness check I show results including all households. Table 3.2
provides some key descriptives about the (poor) risk-sharing networks. Note that these means
and aggregates (and all further ones) are constructed using sample weights to provide statistics
representative of the underlying population.
Aggregate income is $53, 600 for the median risk-sharing network, which has 50 households,
while the median asset transfer is worth 4% of this. There is also variation in income inequality
and network size, allowing me to test the additional predictions of the model.
3.3.5 Verifying Model Assumptions
I first verify that the context matches the modelling framework in five dimensions: (1) households
have variable incomes; (2) household savings are small relative to income; (3) households engage
in risk sharing; (4) households have potentially productive lumpy investments available; (5)
risk-sharing networks have the resources needed to be able to invest.
1. Households have variable incomes. Using only the time series variation for households in
the poor risk-sharing networks in control villages, the median coefficient of variation is .35
(mean is .41).
2. Household savings are small relative to income. At baseline, the median household in
the villages covered by my data has cash savings totalling .5% of their income. Including
also jewellery and ceremonial clothing, this rises to 3.6%, and including other household
assets (including consumer durables) it reaches 11.8% of income. Savings, even including
jewellery, are therefore an order of magnitude smaller than income shocks, and so have
limited scope for providing consumption smoothing.
3. Households engage in risk sharing. As described above, households were asked whether
they suffered a crisis, and if so how they coped with it. They may report multiple methods.
Potential crises include crop loss, serious illness or death of household member, and damage
to house due to natural disaster. To avoid confounding with the asset transfer program,
I consider only households in all control villages, and I pool their responses over the
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three waves. In each wave, about half of all households report suffering some kind of
crisis. Of those who report suffering a crisis, 38% receive loans or transfers from other
households to provide smoothing. 50% of households also use their own savings to provide
some smoothing, although as noted these savings are small relative to the size of shocks
households face. 36% of households also report reducing consumption during a crisis.
Taken together, these results indicate that households use risk-sharing transfers as an
important channel of consumption smoothing, but consumption smoothing is incomplete.
4. Households have potentially productive lumpy investments available. Bandiera et al. (forth-
coming) document that for these data that the mean internal rate of return on cows is 22%.
In 2007 USD PPP terms, a cow costs around $257. This is 18% of median household in-
come in a village, and 29% of median household income among the households eligible for
the program.
5. Risk-sharing networks have the resources needed to be able to invest. Figure 3.2 shows
the distribution of aggregate wealth holdings across risk-sharing networks, as defined in
Subsection 3.3.3. Wealth is broken down into a number of categories, and the cost of a
cow is marked on the figure. This gets to heart of the puzzle this paper seeks to explain:
more than 75% of risk-sharing networks have available to them enough cash, let alone other
assets, needed to be able to invest in cows. Yet despite this, and the high returns, these
savings are not pooled across households to purchase cows.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
First I provide evidence of a network-level poverty trap. Second, I test the additional comparative
static predictions of the model, to provide supportive evidence of limited commitment. Third, I
consider three leading alternative explanations for a network-level poverty trap, and show that
their predictions are not borne out in my empirical context.
3.4.1 Evidence for a Network-Level Poverty Trap
The prediction of the model is that there should exist some aggregate income threshold such that
(i) below the threshold the network is in a poverty trap and we see no investment, (ii) above the
threshold we see investment taking place, with investment increasing in the value of transfers.
To test this, I use exogenous variation in the amount of capital (and hence, implicitly, income)
provided at the network level by the asset transfer program. As described above, the program
provided the same value of assets to all eligible households in treated villages. However, there
is variation in the number of eligible households within a village. Hence the comparison I make
133
is between risk-sharing networks with the same number of eligible households across treatment
and control villages.
Non-parametric Relationship Between Investment and Capital Injection
To investigate the prediction of a network-level poverty trap, I begin by testing non-parametrically
the reduced form effect. I study how investment by the network between 2009 and 2011, ∆kv,2011,
varies with the value of the capital injection provided by the program, ∆kv,2009 (both measured
in 2007 USD PPP).25 Precisely I estimate the following local mean regression:
∆kv,2011 = m(∆kv,2009) + v,2011 (3.33)
separately for treated and control networks, where m(·) is unknown and estimated using a
Nadaraya-Watson kernel-weighted local mean estimator.
Figure 3.3 plots the conditional mean, and 95% confidence interval. It can be seen that
investment in further cow ownership is close to zero and does not vary with the value of the capital
injection up to a value of around $4,000. When more than this level of capital was provided by
the program, there appears to be an increasing (and approximately linear) relationship between
the capital provided and the amount of additional investment takes place. This is precisely the
relationship predicted by the model.
As discussed earlier, the ideal design for my context would be to have experimental variation
in the intensity of treatment, as measured by the number of households that receive transfers.
Since the number of transfers to a village is endogenous, conditional on being in a village that
is treated, there are two approaches I take to provide support for this result, each dealing with
a different potential worry.
To test whether the observed relationship is due to the program, or just due to underlying
heterogeneity, I plot the same relationship for the control sample. Figure 3.7 plots additional
investment between 2009 and 2011 against the value of the capital injection that would have
been provided had the risk-sharing networks been in treated villages. It is clear from this that
in the absence of actual asset transfers, investment is zero on average, and does not vary with
the placebo value of capital injection.
To check for robustness of the relationship to definitions of the risk-sharing network, I re-
estimate the relationship for the treated sample, using different levels of aggregation. Figure 3.8
estimates the relationship in Equation 3.33 where all households in the village are assumed
to belong to the risk-sharing network, rather than only those in the lower two wealth classes.
25Since the program provided some consumption support and training between 2009, I do not try to disentangle
what occurs between 2007 and 2009. Instead I study the additional investment that takes place after 2009, by
when the program is no longer active and no additional support is being provided.
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Three points are of note. First, the general shape of the relationship remains the same, and the
apparent threshold is at the same location. Second, the entire graph has been translated upwards
by $1,000. This implies the richer households in these villages were doing some investment, but
this is not responsive to the amount of capital injected, consistent with them not being part of
the risk-sharing network. Third, the confidence intervals are now wider. If the richer households
are not part of the risk-sharing network of the eligible households, then including them should
just add noise to the estimated effects, as can be seen.
At the other extreme, Figure 3.9 estimates the relationship supposing that eligible households
are part of a common risk-sharing network that excludes all other households. Again the same
shape of relationship is visible, with a similar apparent location for the threshold. However, the
slope of the relationship above the threshold is much flatter, so that at $7,000 capital injection,
the total additional investment is now $1,000. In Figure 3.3, investment at this level of capital
injection was $4,000, indicating that other households were also investing at these higher levels
of capital injection, but not investing at low levels. This apparent spillover – with additional
investment by ineligible poor households depending on the number of eligible households –
is direct evidence that consideration of the risk-sharing network is important when studying
the impact of this type of program. It also helps rule out explanations based on household-
level poverty traps: if these were the only explanation for the initial lack of investment, then
households which don’t benefit from the program should not be responding.26
Testing Formally for a Threshold Effect
The non-parametric results suggest that, among the treated networks, there exists a threshold
value of aggregate capital injection needed to spur additional investments by the risk-sharing
network. To test this relationship formally, I estimate for the treated sample a regression of the
form:
∆kv,2011 = α1 + δ1∆kv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 < ∆k∗} (3.34)
+ δ2∆kv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 ≥ ∆k∗}+ γ1Xv,2009 + γ1Xv,2007 + v,2011
where again ∆kv,2011 is the increase in cow investment by the network as a whole (v) between
2009 and 2011, ∆kv,2009 is the value of the asset transfers provided to the network by the
program, ∆k∗ is a proposed threshold value of asset transfers, and X is a vector of controls.
Note that since the asset transfer by the program takes place in 2007, ∆kv,2011 does not include
26In Subsection 3.4.3 I rule out other alternative explanations, including the possibility that other households’
investment can be explained by general equilibrium effects.
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the initial injection. All monetary values are in 2007 USD at purchasing power parity exchange
rates.
This specification captures the idea that there is some threshold level of asset transfers, ∆k∗,
needed to push a network out of the poverty trap. Below this threshold there should be no
additional investment, α1 = 0 and δ1 = 0, and above this threshold we should see additional
investment increasing in the value of capital injection, δ2 > 0. Whilst the model does not
predict the functional form for how additional investment varies with the capital injection, the
estimated non-parametric relationship, Figure 3.3, suggests that at least over the support of my
data, linearity does not seem unduly restrictive.
Since the threshold, ∆k∗, is unknown, I use an iterative regression procedure designed to
test for a structural break (a change in the slope of the relationship) with unknown break point.
This involves running a sequence of such regressions over a prespecified range of possible values
for ∆k∗, and then testing for significance of the test statistic against an adjusted distribution,
to account for the repeated testing.
I use two different statistics, both the Quandt Likelihood Ratio test (see Quandt, 1960;
Andrews, 1993) and the Hansen test (Hansen, 1999). The former selects as the threshold location
the point which maximises the absolute value of the t-statistic on δ2. The latter uses a criterion
based on the residual sum of squares, so accounts more directly for the relative explanatory
power of the regression as a whole.
Precisely, for the Quandt Likelihood Ratio test I calculate for each possible threshold the
F-statistic for the comparison between the model with and without the threshold. I then select
from among these regressions, the one with the highest F-statistic. The corresponding threshold
in that regression is then taken as the estimated location of the threshold. To test whether
this threshold value is ‘significant’, I compare the F-statistic to the limiting distribution for this
statistic under the null (Andrews, 1993), thus correcting for the multiple testing.
Table 3.3 shows the results of this test using different control variables, X. In all cases the
most likely location for a threshold is at $3, 500 of asset transfers, equal to 6.5% of income
for the median network, and close to the level suggested by visual inspection of Figure 3.3.27
This is equivalent to treating 14% of households in the median network. Figure 3.4 shows non-
parametrically the relationship between the value of capital provided to the network by the
the program (in 2007), and the additional investment by the network between 2009 and 2011,
splitting the non-parametric plot at $3, 500. This makes the relationship clear to see.
27The discrepancy between the visual estimate and the formal method is caused simply by the non-parametric
smoothing: by using observations below the threshold when estimating the local mean above the threshold, the
figure makes the threshold look later and less sharp than it is.
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Testing whether this potential threshold is itself statistically significant, I can reject at the
5% level the hypothesis that there is no threshold effect. This is true with additional controls,
but when district fixed effects are included the qualitative patterns remain unchanged but the
estimates become noisier. Studying the regression results, one can see that below the threshold
the level of investment is close to zero, and above the threshold it is increasing, consistent with
the model predictions.28
For the Hansen test, I estimate the same regression specifications as for Columns (1) and (3)
in Table 3.3 above. For each possible threshold I calculate the residual sum of squares (RSS). I
select among the regressions the one (or set) with the lowest RSS. The corresponding threshold in
that regression is the estimated location for the threshold using this method. To test whether the
threshold is significant, I test construct the Hansen statistic. This is, at any possible threshold,
the difference between the RSS at that threshold and the minimum RSS from all thresholds
considered, divided by the minimum RSS and multiplied by the sample size. This is necessarily
equal to zero at the proposed threshold. If it is below .05 at any other tested threshold, then
that threshold cannot be rejected as a possible location for the threshold.
Figure 3.10 shows the value of the likelihood ratio statistic from running the Hansen test for
possible thresholds between $2,000 and $5,000, at intervals of $100.29 From this it is clear that
the most likely location of the threshold is between $3,700 and $4,100, or 6.9-7.6% of income
in the median network, close to the estimate of $3,500 from using the Quandt Likelihood Ratio
approach. Henceforth I use $3,500 as the estimate of the threshold location, but my results are
qualitatively robust to choosing instead a point in [$3,700, $4,100].
Impact of Capital Injection on Investment
Having identified the location of the threshold, I then estimate the following regression on the
sample including both treated and control variables:
∆kv,2011 = α0 + α1Tv + β1∆kv,2009 + δ1Tv∆kv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 < 3500} (3.35)
+ δ2∆Tvkv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 ≥ 3500}+ γ1Xv,2009 + γ2Xv,2007 + v,2011
where Tv is an indicator for village treatment status, and all other variables are as before. Now
the specification makes use of the exogeneity due to randomisation of villages: the coefficients α1,
δ1, δ2, are identified from the difference between the treated and control risk-sharing networks.
28Note however that since this regression is chosen using the iterative procedure described above, it would not
be correct to use the standard errors provided directly for inference.
29Note that since the variation in the aggregate value of the capital injection comes only from variation in the
number of treated households, there are only data points at intervals of $515 (the value of the asset transfer to
one household). I show the test using intervals of $100 just to make clear the region of possible values that this
test cannot reject.
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I use again three possible aggregations of households: the risk-sharing networks I constructed,
the entire village, and only the eligible households. It is important to note that the standard
errors estimated here do not account for the prior estimation of the threshold location.
Table 3.4 shows the results of this estimation. The results, now using the randomisation for
identification, are similar to what was seen non-parametrically: additional investment, ∆kv,2011,
is flat with respect to the capital injection below the threshold $3,500 (δ1 = 0), and increasing
after the threshold (δ2 > 0). The threshold is robust to the different definitions of risk-sharing
network.
The estimated coefficient δ2 suggests that, after the first $3,500 worth of asset transfers to
a risk-sharing network, every additional $500 generates a further $750 in investment, although
the confidence intervals are large.30 Amongst the eligible households the effect of an additional
$500 after the threshold is between $40 and $280 of additional investment.
3.4.2 Evidence for Limited Commitment
Having provided evidence of a network-level poverty trap, I next show support for the limited
commitment channel developed in the model. To do this I test the two comparative static
predictions I developed from the model: (i) investment has an inverted-U shape in income
inequality; and (ii) investment is increasing in network size.
Income Inequality
Although the program does affect income inequality, it does so in a way that simultaneously
also changes the level of income and the value of risk sharing, since other households’ income
distributions have changed. Hence I will not be able to use the program to directly provide
evidence for the inequality effect, because the program does not vary inequality independently
of other relevant variables.
Instead I show how investment varies with income inequality in the control sample, using
the variation available in the cross-section. An important limitation of this approach is the
possibility that income inequality is endogenous. Two factors help mitigate this worry.
First, my prediction is on realised income inequality in a period, rather than underlying
difference in expected incomes. All poor households are all engaged in very similar activities:
80% of hours worked by women are spent either in casual wage labour or rearing livestock,
and 80% of hours worked by men are in casual wage labour, rearing livestock, or driving a
rickshaw. Hence the income distributions from which households are drawing are likely to be
30Given how much more precise the estimates are among the eligible only group, this suggests that even the
‘all poor’ group I construct as a proxy for the risk-sharing network might be too large, containing some irrelevant
households and making the estimates less precise.
138
similar, conditional on number of working age household members and whether they engage in
livestock rearing or rickshaw driving. One approach then is to condition on these variables at
the household level, and then construct inequality in residual income. At the network level,
differences in (residual) income inequality should then be reflective only of the realisation of
income shocks that period.
Second, to the extent that there are unobserved systematic factors which drive both realised
income inequality and investment, to confound my test they would need to also act in a non-linear
way. Since the relationship for which I am testing is an inverted-U shape, any unobserved variable
which generates a monotone relationship between inequality and investment would not remove
the relationship I am testing for. Whilst this would prevent me from treating the estimated
parameters as causal, my intention is only to test the shape of the relationship, not to use the
parameter estimates directly.
To investigate the prediction of an inverted-U relationship, I begin by semi-parametrically es-
timating the relationship between aggregate investment, ∆kv,2011, and inequality Iv,2009, among
risk-sharing networks in control villages, controlling linearly for variables X. I estimate the
following specification:
∆kv,2011 = m(Iv,2009) + γ1Xv,2009 + γ2Xv,2007 + v,2011 (3.36)
using Robinson’s (1988) partially linear estimator, where X contains the value of income, savings,
and livestock, and network size (number of households – this is only included once since it does
not vary over time).31 All monetary values are in 2007 USD at purchasing power parity exchange
rates.
Since the theory does not provide a precise measure of inequality for this test, I use two
standard measures of inequality, and show that the inverted-U relationship is robust to either
of these definitions. The measures I use are the interquartile range – the difference between
the 75th and 25th percentiles – and standard deviation of the income distribution. These two
measures have differing advantages: the interquartile range will be more robust to outliers,
but the standard deviation will be better able to capture inequality at the top of the income
distribution. To improve robustness to outliers, I first winsorise the income data, replacing any
values below the first percentile (or above the 99th percentile) with the value at the first (99th)
percentile.
31Precisely, first ∆kv,2011, and each element of Xv,2009 and Xv,2007, are each non-parametrically regressed
on Iv,2009. For eah variable Z ∈ {∆kv,2011,Xv,2009,Xv,2007} a residual ηz = Z − ̂mz(Iv,2009) is calculated.
Then regression of η∆k on the ηX variables recovers estimates of γ1,γ2. Finally, non-parametric regression of
∆kv,2011 − γˆ1Xv,2009 − γˆ2Xv,2007 on Iv,2009 provides an estimate of the local mean.
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Figure 3.5 shows this relationship graphically for the interquartile range, with the best fitting
quadratic overlaid. An inverted-U shape is clearly visible. Figure 3.11 shows the relationship
again, now using standard deviation as the measure. Again the inverted-U shape is clear, and
the relationship looks close to quadratic. One-third of networks had realised income inequality
that is past the peak level for investment.
Since the relationship looks well-approximated by a quadratic, I next estimate the following
specification, still using only risk-sharing networks in control villages, and with variables as
before:
∆kv,2011 = α0 + β1Iv,2009 + β2I
2
v,2009 + γ1Xv,2009 + γ2Xv,2007 + εv,2011 (3.37)
This estimates parametrically a quadratic relationship between inequality and investment.
Table 3.5, Columns (1)-(3) show that for both measures of inequality, and across all speci-
fications, the coefficient on the linear term is positive and the coefficient on the quadratic term
is negative, consistent with the predicted inverted-U shape. Column (4) replaces the inequality
measure with inequality in residualised income. Household income is first regressed on household
size and number of cows, goats, and chickens, to control for permanent differences in household
incomes. Inequality is then calculated using the residuals from these regressions. Residualisa-
tion changes the magnitudes of the coefficients, but again the same shape emerges: a positive
coefficient on the linear term, and a negative one on the quadratic term.
Finding robust evidence of this inverted-U shape relationship justifies the choice of limited
commitment as the relevant friction in my model. Alternative frictions used in the literature on
risk sharing, such as hidden action and hidden income, wouldn’t give generate this prediction.
Network Size
I next test the prediction that investment is increasing in network size. The program does not
provide variation in network size, so I cannot use it directly to provide exogenous variation
here. Instead I perform two tests, one using the control villages and the other using the treated
villages.
First, using only the control villages, I study the relationship between investment, ∆kv,2011,
and network size, Nv. I begin by estimating the relationship between these non-parametrically,
using kernel-weighted local mean regression:
∆kv,2011 = m(Nv) + v,2011 (3.38)
Figure 3.12 plots the relationship: it is increasing and approximately linear.
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I therefore estimate linearly the relationship between between investment, ∆kv,2011, and
network size, Nv, controlling for the value of income, savings, and livestock, and a quadratic in
income inequality. All monetary values are in 2007 USD at purchasing power parity exchange
rates. This estimation equation is given by:
∆kv,2011 = α0 + β1Nv + γ1Xv,2009 + γ2Xv,2007 + εv,2011 (3.39)
Table 3.6, Column (1) shows the unconditional relationship between network size and investment,
providing a parametric estimate of the relationship seen in Figure 3.12. Columns (2) and (3)
again add controls and then also district fixed effects. Throughout the relationship remains
positive and weakly significant. For an additional five households in the risk-sharing network (a
10pp increase in network size), there is a $250 increase in investment, which is the value of one
cow.
This provides some evidence against a group-level poverty trap driven by coordination fail-
ure: larger group sizes might be expected to find cooperation more difficult, in which case the
relationship should be negative (Murphy et al., 1989).
A second way to test this relationship, now using the treated sample, is to note that the
prediction of the model is that the threshold level of income needed for investment to be possible
should be declining in network size. To test this, I re-estimate the local mean regression from
Equation 3.33, which showed how additional investment varies with the value of the capital
injection provided, but splitting networks into above and below median.
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated local mean for each group. Here one can see visually that
the point at which investment begins increasing is at a lower level of asset transfers for larger
networks than it is for smaller ones, as suggested by the model. However, no formal way to
test the difference in the thresholds has yet been developed, so this should be considered merely
indicative.
3.4.3 Evidence for Alternative Explanations
I consider two alternative explanations. First, I investigate whether the network-level poverty
trap could be generated by some form of increasing returns to cows at the network level. Second,
I study whether asset transfers caused a non-linear effect via some other channel. Specifically I
consider general equilibrium and aspirations.
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Increasing Returns
The classic model of a group-level poverty trap is the ‘big push model’ of Rosenstein-Rodan
(1943) (later formalised by Murphy et al., 1989). The key mechanism underlying it is that the
return to investment is increasing in the number of other agents who engage in investment.
Whilst the original model is motivated by concerns about industrial structure, and generates
the poverty trap through demand, which are not relevant in a village economy, network-level
increasing returns might still exist for a number of other reasons.32 One possibility is group
level fixed costs. For example, the price of milk may be higher (or even just more stable) in
nearby markets than within the village, but there is a fixed cost of travel so that it is only
productive if enough milk is being taken. Another explanation might be that there is learning
across households: the more households that engage in livestock rearing, the more sources of
information and advice there are, helping to better look after the cows. Such non-linear effects
of social learning about investment are documented by Bandiera and Rasul (2006).
These mechanisms are distinct from my model. In my model households are unable to invest
due to constraints, namely the inability to commit to future transfers, but the returns from
investment are independent of the number of investments. A direct test of these increasing-
returns based alternatives, is to see whether the return on cows is increasing in the number of
households that received cows.
To test this, I estimate non-parametrically, again using a kernel weighted local mean smoother,
the mean return on a cow against the number of eligible.33 Since the value of capital provided
to an eligible household is fixed, the aggregate capital injection maps linearly to the number
households that receive cows.
From Figure 3.13 it can be seen that the mean return on cows appears to be declining in the
number of cows transfered, at low number of transfers, and then to be flat and stable. These
results are inconsistent with a story of increasing returns, ruling out the possibility that the
observed poverty trap could be driven by network level increasing returns.
32The motivation for the original model is that production using ‘modern’ techniques involves fixed costs (e.g.
administration of factories) but has a higher productivity than ‘traditional’ production. The existence of a fixed
cost means that investment in modern production methods is only profitable if demand for output is high enough.
Decisions about whether to invest are made sector-by-sector within the economy. If a sector invests, it becomes
more productive and pays its workers more (the sector is made up of competitve firms, so that wage equals
marginal return). However, the workers spend their income equally across all sectors. So a single sector investing
may not generate enough additional demand for its own output to cover the fixed cost of investment. Only if
a large enough share of sectors coordinate and invest simultaneously, will the increase in aggregate demand be
enough to justify the investment. Hence a poverty trap may exist if sectors cannot coordinate on investment.
33Increasing returns mean that the return on the marginal cow is higher than on the previous cow, in which
case the mean return should also be rising.
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Prices and Aspirations
If real returns to cows are unchanged, an alternative explanation for the increase in investment
might be that some other channel is activated once a sufficiently large number of households
receive transfers. This could generate a threshold effect.
The first possibility is that general equilibrium effects might occur in some non-linear way.
An immediate piece of evidence that suggests this is unlikely to be the case is that the threshold
relationship documented is in terms of the aggregate number of households/value of capital
provided, consistent with the model. General equilibrium effects, by contrast, should depend
instead on the share of households treated. Figure 3.15 shows the non-parametric estimate of
Equation 3.33 but where the independent variable of interest is the share of poor households who
are treated. Plotted against the share treated, there does not appear to be any clear relationship.
This provides additional evidence against a model of aggregate demand spillovers, as in Murphy
et al. (1989).
An alternative way to test for general equilibrium effects is to estimate how prices vary with
the value of the capital injection. Whilst this is more direct test, it requires us to know in what
markets to look, and to have good measures of prices in those markets. Three possible prices
of interest are the price of milk, which is the output price for cow owners; the price of cows,
which is the cost of additional investment; and the wage, which is both the source of income for
investment and the opportunity cost of time spent looking after cows.34
To test empirically whether either of these effects can explain the non-linearity in investment,
I estimate the following specification using the full sample (treated and control villages):
∆Channelv,2009 = α0 + α1T + β1∆kv,2009 + δ1Tv∆kv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 < 3500} (3.40)
+ δ2Tv∆kv,2009.1{∆kv,2009 ≥ 3500}+ γ1Xv,2009 + v,2009
where ∆Channelv,2009 measures the change, between 2007 and 2009, in the price being considered
and other variables are as before.
The results are shown in Table 3.7 Columns (1)-(3). The results show no effect of the program
on the price of milk in 2009; a reduction in the value of cows on average, but with no threshold
effect; and an increase in the average wage, again with no threshold effect. Hence none of these
markets appear to be the channel through which any general equilibrium effects could be driving
the threshold in aggregate investment.
34Bandiera et al. (forthcoming) note that many individuals appear to be underemployed, having many days a
year on which they cannot find work, due to the seasonality of labour demand. In this case, the wage may not
be a good measure of the opportunity cost of time, as individuals are constrained in the amount of labour they
can supply, due to insufficient demand.
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A second possible source of non-linearity might be driven by changes in aspirations. The
worry would be that there is a non-linear increase in the demand for cows as the number of
neighbours owning cows rises. This could happen because households perceptions of the return
on cows increases in the prevalence of ownership, or because households receive direct utility
from cow ownership – beyond the financial returns – and this rises when ownership becomes
more prevalent, as in a model of ‘Keeping up with the Joneses’.
Table 3.7 Columns (4) shows the results of estimating Equation 3.40 with the change, between
2007 and 2009, in the share of ineligible poor households without livestock in 2009 who aspire to
own livestock as the dependent variable.35 Although the program raises aspirations on average,
there is again no evidence of any threshold effect.
3.5 Conclusion
Poor households often do not undertake profitable investments, even when they belong to net-
works which could pool resources to invest. This paper provides a novel explanation for this
puzzle: informal risk sharing can crowd out investment. To show this, I extend the classic model
of risk sharing with limited commitment (Ligon et al., 2002) to also allow for lumpy investment.
I show that with this addition, the model generates a poverty trap at the level of the risk-sharing
network: unless aggregate income is above some threshold, the network will never be able to
invest. The key insight is that once a household invests, it has less need for insurance and is
more willing to walk away from the risk-sharing arrangement. This limits the investor’s ability
to credibly promise future transfers, so its risk-sharing partners demand transfers today, limiting
investment. Hence, in the absence of institutions enforcing joint property rights, a network can
be in a poverty trap despite having the resources to be able to collectively invest.
To provide evidence for this mechanism I used data from a long term, large scale randomised
control trial in Bangladesh. The program randomised 1,400 villages into treatment or control
status, and provided assets to the poorest households in half of these villages. I exploit variation
in the aggregate level of transfers provided to risk-sharing networks to show evidence for a
network-level poverty trap. Precisely, I showed empirically a threshold level of aggregate capital
provision needed for the program to generate further investment: networks that received more
than $3, 500 were ‘pushed’ out of the trap. I also showed empirical evidence for additional
predictions of the model, that are not implied by leading alternative models of poverty traps.
My findings have important implications for policy. The asset transfer program from which
my data were drawn has now been expanded to more than half a million households in Bangladesh,
35Eligible households in treated villages are automatically excluded from the sample because they own cows
in 2009. I exclude them from the sample in control villages to avoid composition bias.
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and similar programs have begun in 33 countries worldwide. This expansion is motivated by
the consistent and robust results that these programs create sustained income growth (Bandiera
et al., forthcoming). My results explain why we see these large and long run effects, and crucially
also how these programs can be further improved. If the program targeting took into account
not only household characteristics, but also network characteristics and the size of the aggregate
transfer being provided, more networks could be pushed out of the poverty trap, and set on a
path of sustained growth.
An important direction for future research is to quantify the trade-off faced by designers
of such programs between reducing poverty and growing incomes. Using the reduced form
estimates of the effect of asset transfers, a budget-neutral redistribution of asset transfers in
my data could generate additional investment of 44%. However, this would be achieved by
reducing transfers to inframarginal networks, which are far from the poverty trap threshold, and
providing them instead to marginal networks just below the threshold. Whilst this increases
the number of networks pushed out of the trap, it also increases inequality across networks,
reducing consumption in those which lose transfers. Directly estimating the parameters of the
model would allow the study of the welfare gains from alternative targeting policies, taking
account of this trade-off, and maximising the gains from these promising new interventions.
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Table 3.2: Risk-sharing network characteristics
Sample: All villages, baseline
Mean Std Dev Median
(1) (2) (3)
Income distribution (USD):
Aggregate 57,700 39,300 53,600
Standard deviation 721 371 643
Interquartile range 811 425 739
Value of capital injection 2,740 2200 2060
Number of households in:
Village 87.8 16.5 86
Risk sharing network 51.7 20.1 50
Total observations 1,409 1,409 1,409
Notes: All statistics are constructed using baseline (pre-program) data for all villages, both treated and
control, across the full sample. Observations are at the risk sharing network level. Within a village, a
risk sharing network is the set of low wealth households: those in the lowest two (three) wealth classes,
when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a Participatory
Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are used
throughout to aggregate household data to the risk sharing network level. All asset values are in 2007
USD terms, converted to dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD =
18.46TK in 2007. The value of the capital injection is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible
household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible households in the risk sharing network.
The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting the value of the assets in
Bangladeshi Taka (9500TK) to 2007 USD terms.
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Table 3.5: How does investment vary with income inequality
Dependent Variable: Increase in Total Cow Assets between 2009-11 (2007 USD PPP)
Sample: Control villages
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at district level
Unconditional With
Controls
And
District FE
Resid. Inc.
Ineq.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Interquartile Range
IQR of 2009 Income Distribution 8.32** 8.27** 6.48* .270**
(3.35) (2.80) (3.05) (.123)
(IQR of 2009 Income Distribution)2 -.003** -.003*** -.002** -.0001**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.0000)
Observations (Clusters) 696 (13) 696 (13) 696 (13) 696 (13)
Panel B. Standard Deviation
SD of 2009 Income Distribution 4.99 7.12*** 6.09** .382**
(3.22) (2.66) (2.60) (.136)
(SD of 2009 Income Distribution)2 -.002* -.002** -.002** -.0001**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.0000)
Observations (Clusters) 696 (13) 696 (13) 696 (13) 696 (13)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the village
level. Constructed using data on low wealth households in control villages across the full sample. Observations
at the risk sharing network level. Within a village, a risk sharing network is the set of low wealth households:
those in the lowest two (three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes
are determined using a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling
scheme, so weights are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk sharing network level. All financial
variables are in 2007 USD terms. Where necessary, they are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh
central bank CPI measure of inflation. They are then converted to dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. The outcome measures the increase in the value of cow
assets between 2009 and 2011. Panel A uses as the variable of interest the interquartile range of income: the
difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the cross-sectional income distribution in the network in 2009.
Panel B uses as the variable of interest the standard deviation of the cross-sectional income distribution in the
network in 2009. In both Panels, Columns (1) shows the unconditional regression of additional investment on
income inequality and income inequality squared. Column (2) includes as controls total income, total saving, and
the value of cows, all in 2009 and 2007, and also network size. Column (3) includes additionally district fixed
effects. Column (4) includes the same controls as Column (3), but replaces the inequality measure with inequality
in residualised income, where household income is first regressed on household size and number of cows, goats,
and chickens, to control for permanent differences in household incomes, and inequality is then calculated using
the residuals from these regressions.
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Table 3.6: How does investment vary with network size
Dependent Variable: Increase in Total Cow Assets between 2009-11 (2007 USD PPP)
Sample: Control villages
Standard errors clustered at district level
Unconditional With District FE With Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Network size 52.9* 55.4** 44.8*
(27.1) (20.8) (24.1)
Observations (Clusters) 696 (13) 696 (13) 696 (13)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
Constructed using data on low wealth households in control villages across the full sample. Observations at the risk
sharing network level. Within a village, a risk sharing network is the set of low wealth households: those in the
lowest two (three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined
using a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights
are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk sharing network level. All financial variables are in
2007 USD terms. Where necessary, they are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI
measure of inflation. They are then converted to dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates,
where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. The outcome measures the increase in the value of cow assets between 2009
and 2011. The interquartile range of income for a network is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles
of the cross-sectional income distribution in 2009. Columns (1) shows the unconditional regression of additional
investment on network size. Column (2) includes as controls total income, total saving, and the value of cows, all
in 2009 and 2007, and the interquartile range (IQR) and IQR squared in 2009. Column (3) includes additionally
district fixed effects.
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Figure 3.1: Frequency distribution of aggregate value of capital injection provided
by the program
Notes: Constructed using data on households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at the
risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital injection
is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible
households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting
the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of
assets. Since the density on this part of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset
transfers), I trim these networks (2% of the sample).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of aggregate assets across risk-sharing networks, broken
down by type
Notes. All statistics are constructed using baseline (pre-program) data for all villages, both treated and control,
across the full sample. Observations are at the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing
network is the set of households in the lowest two (three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible
wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected
using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are used throughout to aggregate household data to the
risk-sharing network level. All asset values are in 2007 USD terms, converted to dollars using purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Cash savings include savings held at home,
in any bank, with any NGO or microfinance institution, and with any savings guard. Non-cash savings include
the value of jewellery and ceremonial sarees. Nonbusiness assets include electrical devices (radios, televisions,
refrigerators), personal vehicles (bicycles, motorbikes), and furniture. Business assets include animals, farm
infrastructure and machinery, and productive vehicles (rickshaw, van, cart).
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Figure 3.3: Impact of capital injection on further investment
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital injection
is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible
households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting
the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in
the value of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in
Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation,
and then converted to USD PPP. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the
density on this part of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these
networks (2% of the sample). The graph shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov
kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of capital injection on further investment,
either side of threshold
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital injection
is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible
households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting
the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in
the value of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in
Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation,
and then converted to USD PPP. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the
density on this part of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these
networks (2% of the sample). The figure shows non-parametrically the relationship between the increase in the
aggregate value of cows in a risk-sharing network between two years and four years after transfers were made,
and the value of capital provided to the network by the program. This is plotted either side of the estimated
threshold of $3, 500. This threshold was selected by linear regressions of investment on capital injection, at
a sequence of possible values for the threshold. The most likely value for the threshold is then the proposed
value in the regression which had the largest F-statistic for a change in the slope. I use the Quandt Likelihood
Ratio test, as described in Section 3.4, to test for significance of the threshold. The non-parametric relationship
shown is a kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer
region provides the 95% confidence interval. The best linear fit is plotted either side of the threshold, with slope
coefficient noted and standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%
level, when treated as a standalone regression.
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Figure 3.5: Investment is an inverted-U in income inequality,
as measured by interquartile range
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in control villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The interquartile range of income
for a network is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the cross-sectional income distribution in
2009. It is converted to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD
= 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between 2009
and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated
to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP.
Residualised increase in cow ownership is the residuals from first regressing increase in cow ownership on total
income, total saving, and the value of cows in 2009 and 2007. The kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using
an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $140. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.6: Higher investment threshold for smaller network size
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital injection
is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible
households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting
the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP)
exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in
the value of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in
Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation,
and then converted to USD PPP. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the
density on this part of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these
networks (2% of the sample). Network size is measured as the number of households in the network. The data
are split into above and below median network size. The kernel-weighted local means are then plotted separately
for each case, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800.
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3.7 Theoretical Appendix
3.7.1 Proof that one can take the maximum inside the integral
To show that the definitions of U(ω¯′,1) in Equations 3.9 and 3.10 are equivalent, I first note
that:
V (t;ω′(t; ω¯′),1) ≤ sup
w′(·,ω¯)
V (t; w′(t, ω¯′),1) ∀t, ω¯′,ω′(t; ω¯′) (3.41)
Integrating both sides:
∫
V (t;ω′(t; ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ≤
∫
sup
w′(·,ω¯)
V (t; w′(t, ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ∀ω¯′,ω′(t; ω¯′) (3.42)
Then:
sup
w′(·,ω¯)
∫
V (t; w′(t; ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ≤
∫
sup
w′(·,ω¯)
V (t; w′(t, ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ∀ω¯′ (3.43)
Note also that on the LHS of Equation 3.43, choice of w′(·, ω¯) is essentially choice of the integrand
V (·; w′(·; ω¯′),1) to maximise the value of the integral. The choice of V that was made on the
RHS is still available, although in principle some other choice could be better. Hence:
sup
w′(·,ω¯)
∫
V (t; w′(t; ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ≥
∫
sup
w′(·,ω¯)
V (t; w′(t, ω¯′),1) dFY′(t) ∀ω¯′ (3.44)
Combining Equations 3.43 and 3.44 it must be that the two sides are equal, so taking the
integral of the maximum, as in Equation 3.10, gives the same result as taking the maximum of
the integral, Equation 3.9.
3.7.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1: Weakly dominant investment allocation rule
Suppose this rule were not weakly dominant. Then for some income shock y, and some desired
number of investments, ∆k(y,κ), there exists an alternative investment allocation strategy which
is strictly better than the one proposed i.e. there exists a pair of households i, j such that
ω˜i(y,κ) > ω˜j(y,κ), ∆κi = 0, ∆κj = 1.
To show this cannot be the case, first note that households draw from a common income
distribution, so the probability of any income draw is as likely for i and j. I define y˜i(κ) implicitly
as ω˜i(y,κ) = Ωi(y˜i, 1), the value of income such that the household’s limited commitment
constraint when invested just binds. In effect this is the maximum income draw the household
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could get, if assigned an investment, before its promised utility would need to be increased to keep
it in the risk-sharing arrangement. Since Ω(yi, 1) is increasing in yi, y˜i is increasing in ω˜i(y,κ).
Then ω˜i(y,κ) > ω˜j(y,κ) implies that y˜i > y˜j . Hence there exists a region of individual income
shock, [y˜j , y˜i] such that an income of this size to household i would not increase the utility it
is promised, but a shock of this size to j would increase the utility it is promised. There is no
income shock that could occur in the next period that would increase the promised utility to
i, that wouldn’t increase the promised utility to j at least as much if j received that income
shock. Then, since providing utility is costly to the planner, this allocation rule is more costly
than instead allocating the investment to i.
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1: Threshold income level for investment
The proof of Proposition 3.1 involves three steps. I first show that when the planner is choosing
∆k(y,κ) optimally, ∂V∆k∂Y > 0. Next I show that
∂V∆k
∂Y >
∂V∆k−1
∂Y > 0, so that V∆k−1 and V∆k
cross at most once. Finally I show that V∆k−1 and V∆k do cross at least once, and hence there
is a unique Ŷ∆k s.t. Γ∆k(Ŷ∆k) ≡ V∆k−1(Ŷ∆k)− V∆k(Ŷ∆k) = 0.
Conditional value functions are increasing in Y
I want to show that ∂V∆k∂Y > 0. Taking the derivative of the conditional value function V∆k wrt
Y , and applying the envelope theorem, I get:
∂V∆k
∂Y
= t1
du(c1)
dc1
+
N∑
i=2
tiλi
du(ci)
dci
=
du(c1)
dc1
where for notational convenience I define t1 =
(
1−∑Ni=2 ti), and the second equality comes
from use of the FOCs wrt τ i. Hence from the properties of u(·), ∂V∆k∂Y > 0.
Slopes of conditional value functions are increasing in ∆k
By the budget constraint, aggregate consumption C =
∑N
j=1 c
j is total income less spending on
investment: C = Y + kR−∆kd. From the first order conditions wrt τ i, ci is strictly increasing
in c1, so all households’ consumptions must be strictly increasing in aggregate consumption.
Hence, since aggregate consumption is strictly decreasing in ∆k, the number of investments,
c1∆k < c
1
∆k−1. Then by concavity of u(·), ∂V∆k−1∂Y − ∂V∆k∂Y = u′(c1∆k−1) − u′(c1∆k) < 0. As
the conditional value function when there are ∆k investments is always strictly steeper than
the value function associated with ∆k − 1 investments, and the value functions are continuous
(again inherited from properties of u(·)) they can cross at most once.
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Conditional value functions cross at least once
To see that the conditional value functions do have at least one crossing, I show the limits of
their difference as aggregate income falls and rises.
As aggregate income falls towards ∆kd, the cost of making ∆k investments, the value of
making ∆k−1 investments today remains positive. However the value of making ∆k investments
goes to negative infinity as there are no resources left for consumption (since u(·) satisfies the
Inada conditions). Hence the difference in value becomes infinite:
lim
Y→d
V∆k−1 − V∆k =∞
Conversely, as aggregate income this period rises towards infinity, the difference in utility
today between investing and not investing goes to zero. Hence the difference in the conditional
value functions is just the difference in the value between having k + ∆k − 1 or having k + ∆k
investments (collectively), where k ≡ |κk| is the number of existing investments. Since the value
is increasing in the number of investments, the difference in values is negative.
lim
Y→∞
V∆k−1 − V∆k = βE [V (ω′,κk+∆k−1)− V (ω′,κk+∆k)] < 0
Hence since the conditional value functions are continuous in Y, they must cross. Then,
since I showed earlier that ∂V∆k∂Y >
∂V∆k−1
∂Y > 0, there can be at most one crossing of the value
functions.
3.7.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2: The Thresholds are Decreasing in Capital
I first show that under full commitment, the value function V∆k(κk) has increasing differences
in (∆k, k):
V∆k+1(κk)− V∆k+1(κk−1) > V∆k(κk)− V∆k(κk−1)
To see this I expand the conditional value functions
V∆k+1(κk)− V∆k+1(κk−1) = u(c1∆k+1,k)− u(c1∆k+1,k−1) + βE [V (κk+∆k+1)− V (κk)]
and
V∆k(κk)− V∆k(κk−1) = u(c1∆k+1,k)− u(c1∆k+1,k−1) + βE [V (κ)− V (κk+∆k−1)]
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Hence the double difference, [V∆k+1(κk)− V∆k+1(κk−1)]− [V∆k(κk)− V∆k(κk−1)] gives
[u(c1∆k+1,k)− u(c1∆k+1,k−1)]− [u(c1∆k,k)− u(c1∆k,k−1)] + βE [V (k + ∆k + 1)− V (k + ∆k − 1)]
Letting C ..= [Y +kR−∆kd] denote aggregate consumption, I note that household consumption
is proportion to aggregate consumption. The increase in aggregate consumption when initial
capital increases from k − 1 to k is independent of the number of investments made today, i.e.
C∆k+1,k−C∆k+1,k−1 = C∆k,k−C∆k,k−1 = R. Then the difference in consumption is the same in
both the first and second set of square brackets above, but by concavity of the utility function u(·)
the gain in utility from this increase is higher at lower levels of consumption i.e. when investment
is higher. Hence u(c1∆k+1,k)− u(c1∆k+1,k−1) > u(c1∆k,k)− u(c1∆k,k−1) > 0, so the first two terms
are (together) strictly positive. Since value functions are increasing in the level of capital, the
final term is also strictly positive, so the value function exhibits increasing differences in (∆k, k).
Then, since investment and capital are positive integers, ∆k, k ∈ Z+, the set of possible values
for (∆k, k) form a lattice.36 Finally, as V∆k(κk) has increasing differences in (∆k, k), and the
set of possible (∆k, k) form a lattice, V∆k(κk) is supermodular in (∆k, k). Hence by application
of Topkis’ Theorem (Topkis, 1978), the optimal choice of ∆k is non-decreasing in k at any given
income. This implies the threshold level of income needed for ∆k investments to be optimal,
Ŷ∆k, is weakly lower as k increases i.e. DkŶ
FC
∆k < 0.
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2: Investment is an Inverted-U in Income Inequality
The proof is in two parts. First I show that, starting with a completely equal income distribution,
in which no-one wants to invest in autarky, increasing income inequality leads to increased
investment.37 Next I show that if inequality rises too much, this leads to declining investment.
The key to the proof is to note that there exists a threshold level of income ˜˜y such that if
individual income yi > ˜˜y, then it will be optimal for the planner to allow i to invest (when there
is limited commitment), even though this would be suboptimal with full commitment. To see
why such a threshold exists, note that for an uninvested household whose limited commitment
constraint binds, the planner needs to provide Ω(yi, 0) in the cheapest way. To meet this utility
promise the planner can provide transfers today, or expected promised utility for the future.
Providing investment is one way of providing utility in the future, because it raises the house-
hold’s outside option, so increases the amount of utility the household can expect to receive. It
also reduces the cost of providing this future utility, by increasing future income. Let ˜˜y(y−i,κ)
36A lattice is a partially-ordered set where for any pair of elements in the set, the least upper bound and
greatest lower bound of the elements are also in the set. For more details see Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
37Since incomes are equal, in autarky either all households do or don’t want to invest. If all households already
can invest, then there is no poverty trap. This circumstance is not relevant to my empirical context.
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be defined implicitly as
Ω(˜˜y, 0) = u(˜˜y − τ i0(y,κ)) + βω¯i0(y,κ) = u(˜˜y − d− τ i1(y,κ)) + βω¯i0(y,κ)
where subscripts 0 and 1 denote the optimal decisions when investment is forced not to/forced
to take place for i. As earlier, the marginal utility of consumption today is greater under
investment than non-investment, so there is a single crossing point ˜˜y(y−i,κ) moving from the
planner optimally choosing non-investment to optimally choosing investment as income for i
rises, holding others’ incomes constant.
Consider how this threshold changes as the income for some other household, yj , is reduced.
By reducing another household’s income, the planner desires more transfers to take place to that
household, but these come not only from i but also other households. Hence ˜˜y rises more slowly
than yj falls.
Next I consider what the existence of this threshold means for income inequality. Starting
with an equal income distribution, consider performing a mean preserving spread, decreasing
yj by δy, and increasing yi by the same amount. Since ˜˜y rises more slowly than yi, at some
point yi = ˜˜y, so that the planner now allows household i to invest. Hence investment is initially
increasing in income inequality.
Now consider repeating this for other households. More of the households that have higher
incomes may initially be taken over the investment threshold. But, doing this raises the thresh-
old, which may reduce the effect of inequality on increasing investment. Eventually the lower
bound on household income will mean that mean preserving spreads would be between house-
holds who are above the threshold, pushing some of them back below the threshold. In the limit
where only one household has (almost) all the income, the total number of investments will fall
back to only one.
3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3.3: Investment is Increasing in Network Size
Increasing network size both lowers the threshold level of aggregate income needed for invest-
ment (Ŷ1), and increases the the probability that aggregate income in the network exceeds this
threshold.
To see the first effect, I write individual income yi as the sum of common and idiosyncratic
components, η and i. Then aggregate income is Y = Nη +
∑
i 
i, and mean income is y¯ =
Y/N = η +N−1
∑
i 
i. The variance of mean income is σ2η +N
−1σ2 , which is declining in N .
38
38Note that the decomposition of individual income into common and idiosyncratic components makes use
of the symmetry of individuals. Without this there might be some more complex correlation structure across
incomes. The only essential point here is that as N increases, the variance of mean income declines. This would
still be true as long as the income of ‘new’ households added to the network is not perfectly correlated with the
sum of income of all existing households.
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With full commitment, a household’s consumption is a fixed share, αj , of mean income, so
the variance of consumption is proportional to the variance of mean income. Since the planner is
risk-averse, reducing the variance of his consumption improves his utility i.e. DNV > 0, where
DN is the finite difference operator (the discrete analogue of the derivative) with respect to N .
Also due to risk aversion, this effect is larger when consumption is lower, i.e. under V∆k rather
than V∆k−1. Hence DNΓ = DNV∆k−1 −DNV∆1 < 0. Then by the implicit function theorem,
since we already saw ∂Γ/∂Y < 0, sgn(DN Ŷ1) = sgn(DNΓ) < 0. This means that the threshold
level of aggregate income needed is declining as the number of households increases.
With limited commitment, a household’s consumption share is not fixed, as it is adjusted
when any households’ limited commitment constraint binds. To see that consumption still
becomes less volatile as group size increases, consider combining two groups of size N which
receive the same common shock. The planner could always decide to make no transfers across
the two groups, as though they remained separate. However, in general it will be beneficial
to make some cross group transfers, as this will allow additional smoothing i.e. as group size
increases, consumption will vary less for given income realisations. Combined with the above
result that aggregate income will vary less, this again implies that Ŷ1 will decline with N .
The second effect is immediate from the definition of aggregate income. Since Y = Nη +∑
i , increases in N will shift upward the distribution of income, thus (weakly) increasing the
probability that aggregate income is above the threshold.39
39This occurs only ‘weakly’ because if initially all the density for Y is far below the threshold, then shifting
up the threshold will bring Y max closer to Ŷ1, but if it does not cross the threshold then the probability of
investment remains zero. Similarly, if N is large enough, all the density may be above the threshold (depending
on the distribution of income shocks), in which case again there is no change in the probability.
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3.8 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.8: Share of eligible’s links to other categories of household
Sample: Census sample (35 villages), baseline
Actual Random linking
(1) (2)
Share in of links in:
Whole village .94 .91
Low wealth .70 .55
Other eligibles .12 .06
Total links 578 590
Total households 197 197
Links per household 2.98 3.04
Notes: These statistics are constructed using baseline (pre-program) data for all households
in a 35 village subsample of the data. In these villages, the sample includes a census of all
households, allowing the characteristics of a household’s ‘neighbours’ to be observed. A pair
of households are linked (‘neighbours’) if either reports (a) going to the other household for
assistance in a crisis; (b) going to the other household to borrow food; or (c) receiving transfers
from the other. Wealth classes are determined using a Participatory Rural Assessment, which
aggregates classifies households into four or five wealth classes. Additional criteria are used
to determine which households in the poorest wealth class are eligible for treatment. ‘Village’
includes all households within the village; ‘low wealth’ includes all households in the bottom
two wealth classes (bottom three when five wealth ranks were used); ‘other eligibles’ includes
only households who are also eligible for the program. Column 1 shows the share of all links
from eligible households to households in these other ‘wealth class’ categories. Column 2 shows
the share of all links from eligible households that would go to households in these other ‘wealth
class’ categories if links were formed randomly. ‘Total links’ shows the total number of links
observed (Col 1), or the number that would be observed under random linking (Col 2).
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Table 3.10: Methods used by households to cope with crises
Methods of smoothing if household experienced crisis
Sample: Low wealth control households, 0-2-4 year
(1) Hh member ill (2) Crop Loss
Reduce consumption .37 .33
Use savings .47 .41
Borrowing/Transfers .39 .51
Borrowing .25 .30
Transfers .16 .23
Observations 4,767 4,594
Notes: Constructed using data from all three waves (2007, 2009, 2011) for low wealth
households in control villages who report experiencing a crisis. Observations are at the
household level. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so
weights are used throughout to make the sample representative of the population. All
poor households are those in the lowest two (three) wealth classes, when there are four
(five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a Participatory Ru-
ral Assessment. Households were asked whether or not they suffered a crisis. Having a
household member ill and suffering crop loss are the two biggest sources of crisis. House-
holds who report having such crises are asked how they coped with the crisis. Multiple
coping stratgies are permitted.
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Figure 3.7: Placebo test – impact of future capital injection on investment
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in control villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The potential value of the capital
injection is the value of the assets that would have been transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) if
they had been in a treated village, multiplied by the number of eligible households in the risk-sharing network.
The potential value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting the value of the assets in
Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where
1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between
2009 and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first
deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD
PPP. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the density on this part of the
support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these networks (2% of the
sample). The figure shows non-parametrically the relationship between the increase in the aggregate value of
cows in a risk-sharing network between two years and four years after transfers would have been made, and the
value of capital that would have been provided to the network by the program had the network been in a treatment
village. Investment is consistently flat at zero. The kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov
kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.8: Impact of capital injection on investment – whole village
Notes: Constructed using data on all households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at the
village level. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are used throughout
to aggregate household data to the village level. The value of the capital injection is the value of the assets
transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible households in the village.
The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting the value of the assets in Bangladeshi
Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD =
18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between 2009 and
2011 owned by all households in the village. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms
using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP. A thin tail of
villages receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the density on this part of the support is low (fewer
than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these villages (2% of the sample). The graph shows
the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer region
provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.9: Impact of capital injection on investment – only eligible households
Notes: Constructed using data on only eligible households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations
at aggregated across eligible households to the village level. The value of the capital injection is the value of the
assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible households in
the village. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting the value of the assets in
Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where
1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between
2009 and 2011 owned by all eligible households in the village. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated
to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP. A
thin tail of villages receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the density on this part of the support is low
(fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these villages (2% of the sample). The graph
shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer
region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.10: Hansen Test for threshold location
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital injection
is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number of eligible
households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by converting
the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity
(PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. I sequentially run the specification in Equation 3.34
at different values of the threshold, varying the threshold between $2000 and $5000, at intervals of $100. The
figure shows, for each assumed threshold value of capital injection, the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. This
statistic is the difference in residual sum of squares (RSS) from the assumed threshold regression, relative to the
RSS from the regression for which the lowest RSS was achieved, divided by that minimum RSS, and multiplied
by the sample size. Any possible thresholds for which the LR is below .05 cannot be rejected as possible values
for the threshold. The graph show the range of LR statistics both for the unconditional case and when additional
controls (lagged income and asset variables, and network size), and district level fixed effects are included. In
both cases it is clear that a threshold value of $3, 700− $4, 100 is by far the most likely, and all other thresholds
can be rejected.
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Figure 3.11: Investment is an inverted-U in income inequality,
as measured by standard deviation
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in control villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using
a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights
are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The standard deviation of
income for a network is the standard deviation of the cross-sectional income distribution in 2009. It is converted
to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007.
Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all
households in the risk-sharing network. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using
the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP. Residualised increase
in cow ownership is the residuals from first regressing increase in cow ownership on total income, total saving,
and the value of cows, all in 2009 and 2007, and also network size. The kernel-weighted local mean, estimated
using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $100. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.12: Investment is increasing in network size
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in control villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using a
Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights are
used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The network size is measured by
the number of households in the network. Increase in cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value
of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all households in the risk-sharing network. The values in Bangladeshi
Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then
converted to USD PPP. Residualised increase in cow ownership is the residuals from first regressing increase in
cow ownership on total income, total saving, and the value of cows, all in 2009 and 2007, and also network size.
The kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 10. The outer region
provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.13: Average return on cows is declining in number of transfer recipients
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample in 2009. Ob-
servations at the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households
in the lowest two (three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are
determined using a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling
scheme, so weights are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. Average
income per cow is the mean income per cow across cow-owning households in the network in 2009. The values
in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure of infla-
tion, and then converted to USD PPP, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD =
18.46TK in 2007. A thin tail of networks have more than 15 eligible households. Since the density on this part
of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any number of eligible households), I trim these networks (2%
of the sample). The graph shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with
bandwidth 1.8. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.14: Program doesn’t affect the price of milk
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using
a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights
are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The value of the capital
injection is the value of the assets transfered to an eligible household (515 USD PPP) multiplied by the number
of eligible households in the risk-sharing network. The value of transfer to an eligible household is calculated by
converting the value of the assets in Bangladeshi Taka (9, 500TK) to 2007 USD terms, using purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. Price of milk is constructed by taking the
ratio of household expenditure on milk with household consumption of milk in 2009. Household level prices are
winsorised, replacing prices below the 1st (above the 99th) percentile with the price at the 1st (99th) percentile.
These are then averaged over households in the entire village, to give an estimated price of milk in each village.
These prices in Bangladeshi Taka are next deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh central bank CPI measure
of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP. A thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets.
Since the density on this part of the support is low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers),
I trim these networks (2% of the sample). The graph shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800. The outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.15: No impact on further investment from share of households treated
Notes: Constructed using data on all poor households in treated villages across the full sample. Observations at
the risk-sharing network level. Within a village, a risk-sharing network is the set of households in the lowest two
(three) wealth classes, when there are four (five) possible wealth classes. Wealth classes are determined using
a Participatory Rural Assessment. Data were collected using a stratified random sampling scheme, so weights
are used throughout to aggregate household data to the risk-sharing network level. The share of poor households
receiving transfers is the proportion of households in the poorest wealth class who receive transfers. Increase in
cow ownership is measured as the increase in the value of cows between 2009 and 2011 owned by all households in
the risk-sharing network. The values in Bangladeshi Taka are first deflated to 2007 terms using the Bangladesh
central bank CPI measure of inflation, and then converted to USD PPP, where 1 USD = 18.46TK in 2007. A
thin tail of networks receive more than $8, 000 worth of assets. Since the density on this part of the support is
low (fewer than five networks for any value of asset transfers), I trim these networks (2% of the sample). The
graph shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth $800. The
outer region provides the 95% confidence interval.
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Chapter 4
Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: The
Formation of Heterogeneous
Communities
1
4.1 Introduction
Ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity are associated with a variety of politico-economic
problems, including low growth, low provision of public goods, and conflict. Yet the effects
of diversity are not uniform: some heterogenous populations manage to avoid societal conflict
and are economically successful. In some cases, diversity can even have positive effects on
growth, productivity, and innovation.2 Seeking to explain this puzzle, recent work finds that
social cohesion plays an important role in how well a population ‘deals’ with its heterogeneity.
For example, more segregated populations are found to have lower quality of governance, lower
trust between citizens, and worse education and employment outcomes, compared to similarly
heterogenous populations that are better integrated.3
1This chapter is cco-authored with Bryony Reich. We are extremely grateful to Alberto Alesina, Sanjeev
Goyal, and Imran Rasul. For very helpful comments we would like to thank Ana Babus, Tim Besley, Antonio
Cabrales, Partha Dasgupta, Christian Dustmann, Andrea Galeotti, Raffaella Giacomini, Sriya Iyer, Matthew
Jackson, Terri Kneeland, Edward Lazear, Friederike Mengel, Paul Milgrom, Jonathan Newton, Marco van der
Leij, Chris Parmeter, Ilya Segal, Jorgen Weibull, and Peyton Young, as well as audiences at ASREC Washington
DC, Barcelona Summer Forum, Cambridge, CTN Warwick, Oxford, PET Lisbon, SAET Paris, and Stanford.
Advani gratefully acknowledges financial support from the ERC (GA313234). Reich gratefully acknowledges
financial support from the NET Institute (www.NETinst.org) and the UK Economic and Social Research Council
(grant number ES/K001396/1).
2Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Ashraf and Galor
(2013), and Rasul and Rogger (2015), amongst others.
3See for example Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) and Cutler and Glaeser (1997). Firm and team studies
suggest that environments that bring together heterogeneous skills and ideas, at the same time as fostering
cooperation, are associated with positive effects of diversity on innovation and productivity. At the national level
Ashraf and Galor (2013) show a hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and growth, consistent with
their hypothesis that diversity is beneficial for innovation and production but can also be costly when it reduces
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Despite its clear importance, relatively little is known about what determines whether a
heterogenous population ends up in a cooperative or divisive situation. In this chapter we
propose a model that allows us to study this question. We ask, first, what social structures can
arise when society is composed of heterogeneous groups, and second, what features influence
which social structure arises in a particular environment. Understanding this is crucial in an
increasingly mobile world in which immigration and social cohesion are frequently at the forefront
of political agendas.4
In our model, individuals from two distinct groups living side-by-side, make choices over
activities to engage in, and who in the community to interact with. We will use the example
of natives and immigrants, although other interpretations are possible. Some activities, such as
language choice, are ‘cultural actions’, in the sense that each group will start with an ex ante
preferred language, and there is a cost to switching to any other choice. Other activities are
‘non-cultural’: there is no group-specific reason why one activity is more costly to engage in than
another.5 For example, there may be no group-specific reason why one sport should be more
costly to engage in than another.6 Interaction provides opportunities for economic exchange,
and so individuals can benefit from forming social ties with others in the population. Since
interaction requires some degree of commonality of actions, we assume that the benefit of a link
is increasing in the number of shared activities, with a fixed (per-link) cost of formation. The
fundamental trade-off is that an individual prefers to maintain his cultural practices but doing so
can hinder opportunities for interaction and exchange with those who adopt different practices.7
We find that only three classes of social structure are possible in (Nash) equilibrium: assim-
ilation, segregation, and multiculturalism. In assimilation equilibria, all individuals engage in
the same activities (cultural and non-cultural), and interact with everyone. In segregation equi-
libria, all individuals play their type-specific cultural activities, and form social ties only with
those of the same type. In multicultural equilibria, individuals play their type-specific cultural
activities, but all coordinate on common non-cultural activities, and this allows individuals to
cooperation and increases disarray within a society. See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2013)
for further discussion and references.
4Europe provides an example of a variety of policies designed to integrate immigrants and perhaps also
influence voters. For example, in France, in 2010, the senate voted 246 − 1 to ban the full Islamic veil, with
the French President arguing it was not consistent with French identity. In the UK, in 2013, the government
announced plans to increase English language requirements to ensure migrants were ‘able to integrate into British
society’.
5In the model presented in the main body of the chapter an individual chooses only two actions, a cultural
action and a non-cultural action. In Subsection 4.6.2 we allow for multiple cultural and non-cultural actions.
6Of course some groups have ties to particular sports and so which activities are non-cultural and cultural
will depend on the groups. A word of caution: a result of this chapter is that non-cultural activities can in
equilibrium become associated with a particular group. Thus many of the examples that spring to mind that
associate sport or other activities with a particular group may in fact be an equilibrium outcome and not a result
of some ex ante preferences.
7In an example of this, Algan et al. (2013) find an economically significant trade-off faced by Arabic parents
in France between attachment to their own culture (in their study, the desire to pass on an Arabic name) with the
future economic performance of their children in the form of work-related penalties to having an Arabic name.
This is an important trade-off and is present in varying forms in Kuran and Sandholm (2008), Lazear (1999),
Bisin et al. (2011b), Carvalho (2013b), and Carvalho (2013a), amongst others.
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form ties with all others, regardless of type. The existence of shared non-cultural practices allows
interaction between disparate groups who maintain distinct cultures.
What kind of environments sustain these three outcomes? The key pattern we identify is
that social structure in heterogeneous populations changes discretely in the share of the minor-
ity. When the minority (immigrant) group is small relative to the majority, assimilation occurs.
Intuitively, restricting social interaction within such a small group is not desirable and an immi-
grant does better by paying the cost of switching culture and being absorbed into a much larger
group. Multiculturalism and segregation are equilibria only once the share of the minority group
in the population exceeds particular (different) thresholds. Above a certain threshold, there is a
large enough ‘critical mass’ of immigrants that if the group maintains its distinct culture then,
for any immigrant, the cost of switching culture outweighs the benefits of increased interaction.
This threshold result is due to complementarities: maintaining a distinct minority culture is only
‘worth it’ if others do so, therefore either no one maintains minority culture or a large group of
immigrants does.8
The location of these thresholds, above which segregation and multiculturalism are equilibria,
depends on three parameters: (i) cultural distance; (ii) the importance of culture in everyday
life; and (iii) the cost of forming a social tie. When the cultural distance between immigrants
and natives is larger, the cost of switching cultural actions is relatively higher. This reduces
the threshold immigrant share at which multiculturalism and segregation – equilibria where
immigrants retain their own culture – become possible. In contrast, a higher importance of
culture in daily life makes having a common culture more important for interaction, and so it
is harder to sustain multiculturalism (the threshold on multiculturalism rises). To illustrate, if
social interaction involving alcohol is ubiquitous, and an immigrant’s culture prohibits alcohol,
then this makes it difficult for the immigrant to both maintain his cultural practices and integrate
with natives, and thus he is forced to choose. Finally, higher costs of forming a link lower the
threshold on segregation. Intuitively, since the costs of assimilation come from switching culture,
while the benefits come from improved interaction with natives, a higher cost of link formation
lowers the relative benefits of assimilation and makes segregation easier to sustain.
We test two key predictions of our model – that a threshold should exist in community be-
haviour, and that the location of this threshold should depend on cultural distance – using census
data on immigrant populations in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century. Dur-
ing this period large numbers of immigrants arrived in America, radically altering the national
make-up of the country. This is exactly the kind of situation our framework seeks to understand.
Indeed, the three distinct forms of social structure we find are evident in scholarly discussion
8As we discuss below, the importance of thresholds as a natural feature of community behaviour is increasingly
being recognised, for example in Card et al. (2008) and Chay and Munshi (2013).
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of communities in the United States following mass migration (Gordon, 1964). Early scholars
argued that a single culture would prevail: the so-called ‘melting pot’. As it became clear that
not all communities assimilated, but some instead ‘retained distinctive economic, polical and
cultural patterns long after arriving in the United States’, segregation became a major concern
(Bisin and Verdier, 2000). However, there was also discussion of a ‘third way’ – ‘the salad bowl’
– where immigrants could become ‘American’ and integrate whilst maintaining some cultural
distinction. This period in history has the added benefit of furnishing us with data on a large
number of heterogeneous communities with varying immigrant group sizes, vital to any analysis.
If our framework captures the key forces driving community formation, then we should expect
behaviour in heterogeneous populations to exhibit the threshold patterns predicted by (and
central to) the model. These predictions also allow us to separate our model from explanations
based on selection, which do not suggest the discontinuities between group size and community
outcomes that are critical to our model. We test our predictions on the decision of immigrants
to acquire the English language or not (a cultural action), and on the decision to in-marry (a
partial measure of interaction). We find sharp and significant thresholds in behaviour when
an immigrant group forms around one-third of the community: above this threshold English
acquisition in the immigrant group falls by almost a half, from 90% to 50%, and in-marriage
rises by a third from 55% to 75%. Using data on linguistic distance between the language of the
immigrant group and English, we additionally show that, as predicted, when cultural (linguistic)
distance is higher, the estimated threshold for segregation and multicultural outcomes is lower.
The literature examining choice of culture highlights the variety of outcomes that can arise
in heterogenous populations. In seminal work in economics on cultural transmission, Bisin and
Verdier (2000) examine the persistence of different traits in a mixed community even in the long
run.9 Iannaccone (1992), Berman (2000), and Carvalho (2013b) study the stability of costly
and restrictive cultural practices within religious groups in heterogenous societies.10 Kuran and
Sandholm (2008) examine the convergence of cultural practices when diverse groups interact.
The question we ask in this chapter is different. We want to understand selection between various
outcomes.11 That is, when does one of these social structures emerge rather than another?
9See also Bisin et al. (2004) for empirical work on this topic. A key finding in Bisin and Verdier (2000),
that smaller groups may exert more effort in passing on their culture to their children, sounds at odds with our
finding that smaller groups are more likely to assimilate. This is not the case. When groups continue to maintain
different practices in equilibrium we find that smaller groups must put in more ‘effort’ in the form of maintaining
higher diversity of practices in order to sustain segregation. See the model of action choice along more than two
dimensions in Subsection 4.6.2. Bisin and Verdier (2000) also point out that effort does not necessarily relate
monotonically to outcomes: a small group could put in lots of effort to pass on their culture but it may still die
out, depending on the cost function.
10Berman (2000) and Iannaccone (1992) model religion as a club good with ‘extreme’ cultural practices as
a means of taxing other goods to increase contribution to the religious good. This is slightly different to the
framework presented in this chapter and the other papers cited, which draw on the Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
model of identity.
11We are reassured that our framework permits, as equilibria, outcomes consistent with those that are studied
in detail in these papers.
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It is important to highlight the two features of the theoretical framework that make it rich
enough to produce the different social structures. The first is the novel introduction of non-
cultural actions, which play an important role in uniting or dividing communities. Adoption of
a common non-cultural action is necessary for the existence of multicultural equilibria. At the
other end of the spectrum, rather than bridging the gap between groups, non-cultural actions
can also be used to divide them. We find a subclass of segregation equilibria in which immigrants
not only retain distinct cultural practices but also create ‘new diversity’ by adopting deliberately
different non-cultural activities from natives. Such polarisation of non-cultural practices occurs
in order to maintain segregation by raising the cost of interacting with the other group. This
extreme form of segregation occurs when culture is relatively unimportant in everyday life.
The second feature of the framework to highlight, is the interaction between choice of be-
haviour and choice of interaction. In pioneering work, Lazear (1999) studies the choice of whether
or not to adopt the same language or culture.12 In Lazear (1999) and Carvalho (2013a), agents
choose a cultural practice, but take interaction as given. A second literature models link forma-
tion in order to study the important concept of homophily - the tendency for similar individuals
to be linked. In this case individuals choose interaction but take behaviour as given (Cur-
rarini et al., 2009; Bramoulle´ et al., 2012; Currarini and Vega-Redondo, 2011). We take a novel
approach which, importantly, addresses both these choices (choice of practices and choice of
interaction) within a single tractable framework.13 Our alternative approach allows payoffs from
links formed to depend not only on ex ante heterogeneity but also on the action choices of both
partners.14 This results in a broader range of social structures and comparative statics.
Our theoretical approach contributes to a literature on network formation where individuals
play coordination games across links, in particular Jackson and Watts (2002) and Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2005). They show that in homogenous populations, under equilibrium refine-
ment, total integration and social conformism always prevail. We show that this is not true
for heterogenous populations in which different individuals have preferences for coordinating on
different activities. Our analysis of network formation in heterogeneous populations enables us
to study the important question of why different social structures prevail and when.
Card et al. (2008) and Chay and Munshi (2013), like us, test empirically for the presence of
a threshold in community behaviour that depends on the size of the minority population, where
the location of this threshold is a priori unknown. Card et al. (2008) look at local migration
12See also Eguia (2013) who examines this from the perspective of discrimination.
13In a different framework, Bisin and Verdier (2000) highlight the importance of choice of social interaction
and make segregation effort a choice. However, they do not analyse resulting levels of segregation since their
focus is whether diverse cultural traits persist. Also Carvalho (2013b) examines a choice of segregation in the
decision to veil or not.
14Or, to put it the other way around, payoffs from actions taken to depend not only on ex ante heterogeneity
but also on who one linked with and their choice of action.
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and Chay and Munshi (2013) at local migration and voting behaviour. In contrast, our interest
is in social interaction and convergence (or not) of behaviours within the community. Together
with Card et al. (2008) and Chay and Munshi (2013), our findings highlight the importance
of looking for these kind of threshold patterns when considering community-related behaviour.
Our findings are also in line with recent work on the US by Abramitzky et al. (2014), Fouka
(2014), and Fulford et al. (2015), which suggests that environmental features were significant in
determining how culture evolved in 19th and early 20th century United States.
In Section 4.2 we present the basic model. Section 4.3 characterises the Nash equilibria and
provides comparative statics. Section 4.4 provides empirical evidence from communities in the
United States in the age of mass migration supporting the predictions of the model. The final
section discusses implications for government policy and welfare and concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
First we present the framework for choice of action, then introduce social interaction, and finally
we summarise the payoffs.
4.2.1 Culture
A population (or community) consists of a set of individuals i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each individual
i is endowed with a type, k ∈ {M,m}, which is common knowledge. We refer to the majority
M types as ‘natives’, and the minority m as ‘immigrants’ (although many other interpretations
are clearly possible). There are nM ∈ N individuals of type M and nm ∈ N individuals of type
m, where nM , nm ≥ 2, n = nM + nm, and we assume nM ≥ nm.15
To illustrate the model with an example, consider the population to be a neighbourhood. An
immigrant group has moved into the neighbourhood from a different country and has come with
different cultural practices to the native group. We denote the cultural practices associated with
the native group by the action xM and the cultural practices associated with immigrant group
by the action xm.16 Cultural practices could be activities, such as type of food eaten or language
spoken, or behaviours, for example concerning education, gender, or marriage. Since cultural
practices are, in themselves, simply activities and behaviours, this leads to an observation: when
immigrants move to a new country they can, if they wish, adopt the cultural practices of the
native group (or vice versa). We refer to this as switching culture. While it is possible to switch
15We use the terms ‘native group’ and ‘immigrant group’ as an illustration. Of course we need not always
consider the native group as the majority group, for example Aboriginal populations of Australia and Native
American populations of the United States.
16We model the practices that define a group’s culture by a single action. We enrich this model of culture
by allowing for multiple dimensions of culture in Subsection 4.6.2. We do the same for non-cultural actions
(introduced below). The main results remain.
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culture, there is a cost c from doing so. This is how we define culture: an individual chooses
an action xi from the set {xM , xm}, where it is possible to adopt the action associated with the
other group, but at a cost.17
Berry (1997) describes cultural changes that occur when groups with different practices share
the same environment as ranging ‘from relatively superficial changes in what is eaten and worn,
to deeper ones involving language shifts, religious conversions, and fundamental alterations to
value systems’. Regarding religion, Iannaccone (1992) highlights that ‘people can and often do
change religions or levels of participation over time’. The cost to switching culture can arise for
a variety of reasons. There may be fixed costs involved, such as learning a new language, or
participating in unfamiliar activities. Alternatively cultural practices may be considered valuable
in their own right.18 Culture can be so deeply entrenched that individuals find it psychologically
costly to adhere to behaviours or attitudes that differ from the culture one has grown up with.19
We reduce these different possibilities to a single cost, c, in line with previous work on culture
choice (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bisin and Verdier, 2000). The magnitude of c is interpreted
as a measure of cultural distance.
It is rather extreme to assume that all activities going on in this neighbourhood are necessar-
ily associated with type or culture. We therefore also consider non-cultural practices: activities
which can facilitate social interaction, but where there is no differential cost by group member-
ship. Non-cultural actions are modeled by an individual i’s choice of action yi ∈ {yA, yB} for
which there is no associated type-specific cost.20 For example, while religion often prescribes or
prohibits certain activities, religions rarely proscribe what sports should be played or what music
can be listened to. In some cases sports provide a common ground that all groups can share.
However, we may also see communities divided by such activities, such as in Northern Ireland,
where Catholic and Protestant communities typically play different sports. A result that we
will highlight later is that activities which ex ante have nothing to do with type and culture,
such as sports, can in equilibrium become associated with a particular group. Thus many of the
examples that spring to mind that associate sport or other activities with a particular group
may in fact be an equilibrium outcome and not a result of some ex ante preferences.
17The modeling of culture and a cultural group presented here is consistent with the introduction of identity
into economic modeling by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Note that in our framework an individual chooses one
action or the other. For some practices such as language, however, an individual might continue to speak his
group’s language, but also learn the language of the other group. The results will hold provided that the relative
benefit of learning the native language increases the more members of the immigrant group there are that learn
it. This would be the case, for example, if interaction and exchange among individuals and groups occurs more
and more often in the native language as more immigrant group members learn it.
18Algan et al. (2013) estimate that the utility an Arabic parent in France gets from passing an Arabic name
to their child is equivalent to a 3% rise in lifetime income of the child. See also Bisin and Verdier (2000) and
Kuran and Sandholm (2008) for examples.
19See Berry (1997) for a review and further references on psychological and sociocultural costs. This framework
does not incorporate group penalties, but such an assumption could be incorporated.
20Of course there may be multiple activities and behaviours associated with religion and multiple non-cultural
activities. We extend the cultural and non-cultural activities that can be chosen by the population to multiple
dimensions in Subsection 4.6.2.
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To summarise the modeling of culture, each individual has a given type, M or m. Each
individual i of type k ∈ {M,m} chooses a pair of actions (xi, yi), where xi ∈ {xM , xm}, yi ∈
{yA, yB}. There is no type-specific cost associated with the non-cultural action yi whilst the
cost of cultural action xi is
ck(xi) =
 0 if xi = x
k
c if xi 6= xk
4.2.2 Social Interaction
Were this the end of the model, individuals would never choose to pay the cost and switch
culture. However, there is another issue at stake. Social interaction within the population
is valuable, providing opportunities for economic exchange of varying types. Social ties (or
‘links’) allow for exchange of valuable information. For example, personal contacts play a large
role in information about job opportunities and referrals, suggesting an important effect of
social interaction on employment outcomes and wages (see Jackson, 2009, for a review of the
literature). Social interaction can also provide other economic opportunities, including trade,
favour exchange, or economic support such as risk sharing and other valuable joint endeavours
(Angelucci et al., 2015). We assume all individuals provide the same opportunities for economic
exchange.21
Crucially, personal connections and social interaction require commonality of some degree.
If two individuals do not speak the same language it limits exchange of information, discussion
and agreement on trade, and any other activities that involve verbal communication (Lazear,
1999). Diversity more generally has been found to reduce communication and interaction within
organisations (see Williams and O’Reilly, 1998, for a review). Communication difficulties aside,
if two individuals take part in completely different activities then not only do they rarely meet
(thus reducing opportunity for exchange), but even when they do meet they may not have
relevant information to exchange.22 There are two sides to this story: on the one hand a lack of
commonality can make forming a tie more costly or difficult, and, on the other, it will make a
tie less valuable if there are complementarities in information exchange and activities.
We model this formally as follows. Individual i chooses whether or not to form a social tie
with the other n−1 individuals in the population. If individual i forms a social tie with individual
j, we denote this by gij = 1, if not gij = 0. There is a fixed cost to forming a social tie, L. Player
21There are two ways to relax this assumption in the current framework. The first is for one group to have
greater opportunities, so that, all else equal, members of that group would make a more valuable partner. The
other is to include some degree of ‘love of diversity’ to allow for benefits of getting different information and
opportunities from different types. To introduce this one might assume that the first tie with someone of a
different type is highly valuable, while the value may decline the more contacts of that type. The key trade-off
of the model remains in place provided coordination remains important to interaction.
22For further discussion on the need for coordination in interaction see Lazear (1999) and Kuran and Sandholm
(2008).
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i’s choice of social ties can be represented by a vector of 0’s and 1’s, gi = (gi1, gi2, . . . , gin), where
gii = 0. If i forms a social tie with j, the value of that social tie is increasing the more activities
the two individuals have in common. The value i receives from a social tie with j is
αpi1(xi, xj) + (1− α)pi2(yi, yj)− L,
where
pi1(xi, xj) =
 1 if xi = xj0 if xi 6= xj
pi2(yi, yj) =
 1 if yi = yj0 if yi 6= yj
and 0 < L < 1.
The benefit from a tie is increasing in commonality of actions, while the cost is fixed. Note
that the parameter α measures the relevance of cultural versus non-cultural actions in economic
exchange. The framework can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either, there is a fixed value
normalised to 1 of having a personal connection with another individual in the population,
where the cost or difficulty of forming that tie depends on how much the two individuals have
in common. Alternatively, we can think of a fixed cost L to forming a personal connection,
where the possibility (or value) of economic exchange is increasing the more individuals have in
common.
4.2.3 Payoffs
Each individual i ∈ {1, .., n} chooses a cultural action xi ∈ {xM , xm}, a non-cultural action
yi ∈ {yA, yB}, and social ties gi = (gi1, gi2, . . . , gin). An individual’s strategy is thus represented
by the vector
si = (xi, yi, gi) ∈ Si. (4.1)
The utility of individual i of type k ∈ {M,m} is given by
uk(si, s−i) =
∑
j
(αpi1(xi, xj) + (1− α)pi2(yi, yj)− L)gij − ck(xi). (4.2)
The model presented describes an n-player game where each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} chooses a
strategy si ∈ Si and receives a payoff uk(si, s−i). The strategy profile (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) is a Nash
equilibrium if uk(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ uk(si, s∗−i) for all i ∈ N and for all si ∈ Si. We refer to a strategy
profile (s1, . . . , sn) as a ‘state’. We examine pure strategy equilibria.
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The set-up is akin to a version of a battle-of-the-sexes game between groups. An individual
gets a higher payoff the better he coordinates with his social ties, allowing for greater economic
exchange. But, he would rather coordinate on his own cultural practices. The framework has
the additional twist that each individual chooses his social ties. An individual also gets a higher
payoff the more social ties he has with whom he is coordinating, again allowing for greater
economic exchange. The assumption here, that more contacts are better, has support from the
literature on social interaction (Currarini et al., 2009; Currarini and Vega-Redondo, 2011). It
implies that individuals might trade-off cultural costs against the benefits of more contacts.23
Note two things. Individual i cannot differentiate his choice of action by social tie. Intuitively,
this requires that an individual be ‘consistent’ in his behaviour within the given population.24
For example, it is often not possible to adopt two different religions. Religious activities might
take place at the same time, the different practices might be contradictory, it could be too time-
consuming to do both, or it might be made impossible because of hostility from others. Second,
social ties are one-sided. If i forms a social tie with j then the value of the social tie accrues to
individual i but not to individual j unless individual j forms a social tie with i. In equilibrium,
however, if i forms a social tie with j then j will also form a social tie with i. The model of
link formation presented here is not the only way to model social interactions and is chosen to
simplify the exposition (see Subsection 4.6.3 for further discussion).25
4.3 Analysis of the Model
In this section we characterise the Nash equilibria of the game and provide comparative statics.26
We first introduce two assumptions made to simplify the exposition. Assumption 4.1 rules out
the uninteresting case where a single individual prefers to maintain his cultural action even if
the rest of the population all adopt a common, different cultural action.
Assumption 4.1. (No Man is an Island)
(1− L)(n− 1)− c > max{0, (1− α− L)(n− 1)}.
23We discuss alternative specifications of this assumption in Subsection 4.6.3.
24A population consists of n individuals who each have the opportunity to interact with all the others. Thus
a population refers to a workplace, a neighbourhood, a school, etc. An individual may interact in multiple
populations and play different strategies in different populations. This framework then does not prohibit different
behaviours at work or school from those in the neighbourhood, for example.
25The Nash equilibria in this chapter also all satisfy the definition of pairwise stability, an important measure
of stability in network formation when link formation is reciprocal (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), although these
are not the only pairwise stable outcomes. Alternatively, a two-sided link formation model, related to pairwise
stability, where an individual could delete any number of links and form any number of agreed upon links would
produce the same outcomes as the link formation model we use (see Subsection 4.6.3 for more details of this issue
also).
26In Section 4.7 we consider a multiple generation framework, and study which of these Nash equilibria are
persistent when we introduce cultural transmission, and what influence this has on the comparative statics.
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Second, we assume that when an individual is indifferent between forming a tie or not, the
tie is formed.27
4.3.1 Characterisation of Nash Equilibria
Proposition 4.1 describes the Nash equilibria of the game. Nash equilibria take one of three
contrasting forms: (i) assimilation, (ii) segregation, or (iii) multiculturalism. Nash equilibria are
characterised by thresholds on the share of immigrants in the population: if the immigrant group
is small, assimilation states are the only equilibria; if the immigrant group forms a large enough
share of a population, different social structures can emerge in equilibrium. For convenience we
first introduce our formal definition of assimilation, segregation, and multiculturalism.
Definition 1. A state s = (s1, . . . , sn) is defined as:
Assimilation if all individuals adopt the same actions, xi = xj, yi = yj ∀i, j ∈ N , and
each individual forms a social tie with all other individuals.
Segregation if type M adopt action xM , type m adopt action xm, and each individual
forms a social tie to all other individuals of the same type as him but does not form a
social tie to individuals of a different type.
Multiculturalism if type M adopt action xM , type m adopt action xm, both types adopt
the same non-cultural action yi = yj ∀i, j ∈ N , and each individual forms a social tie to
all other individuals.
Proposition 4.1. States which satisfy the definition of assimilation, segregation, and multicul-
turalism are the only possible Nash equilibria of the game. Further,
(i) Any assimilation state is always a Nash equilibrium;
(ii) There exists a Nash equilibrium which satisfies the definition of segregation if and only if
the share of the minority group in the population weakly exceeds δ;
(iii) There exists a Nash equilibrium which satisfies the definition of multiculturalism if and only
if the share of the minority group in the population weakly exceeds η;
where
δ = max
{
1
2
− c+ L− 1
2n(1− L) ,
1− α− L
2(1− α)− L +
1− α
(2(1− α)− L)n
}
, η =

1
2 − c−α2nα if 1− α ≥ L
1 if 1− α < L
27Both can be relaxed.
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The proof is found in Section 4.6. Only three types of social structure are Nash equilibria.
Assimilation: one group pays the cost of switching cultural action to facilitate interaction with
the other group. Segregation: groups do not pay the cost of switching cultural action but
restrict interaction within their own group. And a third structure, multiculturalism, in which
groups each maintain their respective cultural action but adopt a common non-cultural action.
Crucially, coordination on these non-cultural practices enables interaction across groups.28
In our framework, an individual’s payoff from taking an action is weakly increasing in the
number of others that take that same action. It is important to highlight the role that such
strategic complementarities play in our findings. First, this interaction between the individual’s
payoff and what the rest of the community are doing gives rise to multiple equilibria, allowing
similar populations to end up in contrasting states. To see this, suppose individual i’s group
assimilates, so everyone in the population adopts the other group’s cultural practices. Main-
taining his own cultural practices then becomes very costly to i since it hampers interaction
with everyone else, thus he can do no better than assimilate also. Hence assimilation is clearly
an equilibrium. Now consider the other extreme: suppose everyone in i’s group segregates and
maintains their own cultural practices. Maintaining his own cultural practices is now much less
costly to i, since he can still interact fruitfully with everyone in his group. Thus segregation
may also be sustainable as a Nash equilibrium. Second, strategic complementarities create a
multiplier effect, driving members of a group towards doing the same thing.29 Even if we add
some within group heterogeneity – see Subsection 4.6.4 for this addition to the model – because
of the multiplier effect, members of the same group will still have a tendency to do the same
thing (even if not everyone acts identically).
The two features discussed above lead to the key finding that equilibria are characterised by
thresholds on the share of the minority group. When the minority group is small, assimilation
states are the only equilibria; segregation and multiculturalism are equilibria only in populations
where the share of the minority group is above the thresholds given in Proposition 4.1. An easy
way to see this is to observe that maintaining a distinct culture is only ‘worth it’ if enough others
do so as well. Segregation is an equilibrium when no individual in the minority group is willing
to pay to switch culture and interact with the larger majority group, which is true only when the
share of the minority group is large enough. Thus only if the share of the minority group reaches
28These three distinct forms of social structure are evident in scholarly discussion of communities in the United
States following mass migration (Gordon, 1964). Assimilation among immigrants in certain communities per-
suaded early scholars that a single ‘American culture’ would prevail. As it became clear that not all communities
assimilated, but some ‘retained distinctive economic, polical and cultural patterns long after arriving in the
United States’, scholars accepted that assimilation was not the only possibility for diverse communities (Bisin
and Verdier, 2000). Even early on, however, there was discussion of a ‘third way’ where immigrants could become
‘American’ and integrate but also maintain some cultural distinction.
29By multiplier effect we mean the following. Once one individual adopts a particular action this raises the
relative payoff to that action, which may then induce other agents to adopt the action, which further raises the
payoff to that action, which may induce further agents to adopt, and so on.
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this ‘critical mass’ or ‘threshold’ can segregation be sustained. An analogous intuition holds for
multiculturalism.30 At these critical masses, a small change in the share of the minority group
can result in a large change in equilibrium social structure. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Nash equilibria and minority group size
The Nash equilibria are illustrated for parameter values 1 − α ≥ L. The axes measure the size of each
group. Group M is only in the majority above the 45◦ line, so the area below the 45◦ line is greyed
out. Assimilation is a Nash equilibrium in areas (A), (B), and (C) in the left hand panel of Figure 4.1.
Multiculturalism is an equilibrium in areas (B) and (C). Segregation is an equilibrium in area (C) only.
The right hand panel of Figure 4.1 illustrates the same graph, highlighting the results for a population
of fixed size n. The dashed line shows all possible shares for the minority group, from nm/n = 0 to
nm/n = 1/2, for a population of a given size n. The dotted lines illustrate, for this population of size n,
the size of the minority group above which multiculturalism and respectively segregation are equilibria.
Note, the size of a minority group that can sustain multiculturalism is smaller than the size of the
minority group that can sustain segregation because the cost to the minority group of multiculturalism is
less than the cost of segregation.
4.3.2 Comparative Statics
The parameters c, α, and L shift the location of the thresholds described in Proposition 4.1. That
is, c, α, and L determine the size of the critical mass of immigrants that is necessary to sustain
segregation or multiculturalism. The parameter L is the cost of forming a link. Parameters c
and α both measure ‘culture’ but have distinct interpretations. The magnitude of c is the cost of
adopting the other group’s cultural action. For example, it might be less costly to switch from
speaking German to English, which is a closely related language, than it would be to switch
from Italian. Contrast this with the parameter α, which measures the importance of cultural
activities relative to non-cultural activities in everyday interaction and economic exchange. A
high α environment is one in which cultural practices are frequently relevant to interaction. For
example, a environment in which most social activities taking place are organised by churches
30Under multiculturalism the minority group will interact with the majority group, but the benefit of interac-
tion is lower than if they were to assimilate, and therefore the same intuition holds.
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and other religious organisations. In this example, a low α environment is one in which social
activities related to religion comprise only a small part of daily life.
Corollary 4.1. The threshold share of the minority group above which segregation states are
Nash equilibria, δ, is decreasing in cultural distance, c; decreasing in the importance of culture,
α; and decreasing in the cost of forming a link, L.
The threshold share of the minority group above which multiculturalism states are Nash equi-
libria, η, is decreasing in cultural distance, c; but increasing in the importance of culture, α; and
increasing in the cost of forming a link L.
When cultural distance between groups, c, is higher, switching culture is more costly, and so
smaller minority groups are more willing to maintain their own culture. This makes it easier to
sustain both segregation and multiculturalism and the respective thresholds both fall.
Counterintuitively, an increase in the importance of culture, α, makes groups less willing to
maintain their own culture under multiculturalism (the threshold rises). This is because, under
multiculturalism, a higher α makes having a common culture more important to interaction,
so maintaining one’s own culture is more costly in terms of lost opportunities for exchange.
Indeed, when culture ‘dominates’ everyday life (precisely α > 1−L), social interaction based on
common non-cultural actions is not enough to sustain a tie and multiculturalism breaks down.
To see this, consider again an environment where most social activities are related to religion.
It is then difficult for individuals to maintain their own religious practices and integrate with
those who adopt different practices. The set of equilibria may be reduced to just segregation
and assimilation. An increase in α has the opposite effect on segregation making it a less costly
option. This is illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
A higher cost of forming a link, L, makes it easier to sustain segregation (lowers the threshold),
by making assimilation a less attractive option for minority members. The costs of assimilation
come from switching culture, while the benefits come from improved interaction with natives; a
higher cost of link formation lowers the relative benefits of interaction with natives. In contrast,
a higher cost of forming a link makes it harder to sustain multiculturalism. When the costs
of forming a link are high, these can outweigh the benefits of interaction with the other group
under multiculturalism.
To summarise, we find that one of only three structures – assimilation, segregation or multi-
culturalism – can arise in heterogeneous communities in equilibrium. Equilibria are characterised
by a threshold, or ‘critical mass’. When the minority group is small, assimilation is the only
equilibrium. The size of the critical mass of immigrants necessary to sustain segregation or
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multiculturalism depends on cultural distance, the importance of culture in everyday life, and
the cost of link formation. In Section 4.4 we find evidence of such thresholds in heterogeneous
communities in the United States in the age of mass migration: if immigrant groups hit a critical
mass in the local community (the magnitude of which we estimate) they are much more likely
to maintain their own practices and segregate.
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Figure 4.2: An increase in c
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Figure 4.3: A reduction in α
Figure 4.2 replicates Figure 4.1 and illustrates an increase in c. The arrows show that areas (B) and (C)
expand with an increase in c. That is, the parameter ranges under which segregation and multiculturalism
are equilibria expand with an increase in c. Figure 4.3 replicates Figure 4.1 and illustrates a reduction
in α. The arrows show that area (B) expands and area (C) shrinks with a reduction in α. That is, the
parameter range under which multiculturalism is an equilibrium expands with a reduction in α and the
parameter range under which segregation is an equilibrium shrinks.
A low importance of culture, α, appears at first to be a positive force for cross-group interac-
tion since it makes it easier to sustain multiculturalism. However, our second comparative static
result shows that a lower importance of culture leads to more polarising behaviour in segregation
equilibria.
Corollary 4.2. When α ≤ 1− L segregation is a Nash equilibrium when nm/n ≥ δ if and only
if groups adopt different cultural actions and different non-cultural actions.
When the importance of culture is low, α ≤ 1 − L, the segregation Nash equilibria require
that the two groups adopt different cultural actions and different non-cultural actions. Groups
differentiate their practices above and beyond ex ante cultural differences. This is not simply a
result of coordination on different non-cultural actions. Instead the minority group must adopt
a different non-cultural action y from the majority, in order to raise the cost of interaction with
the majority group such that segregation can be sustained. This outcome is an equilibrium,
despite the reduction in economic exchange that it entails. We refer to this type of segregation
equilibrium as ‘extreme segregation’.
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Emergent Cultures
Non-cultural actions, that is activities and practices with no type-specific costs, play an impor-
tant role in the social structures that emerge in equilibrium. It has long been recognised that
when groups with distinct cultures interact, individuals do not simply choose between which
of these cultures to practice. Instead, interaction can produce new ‘emergent cultures’, where
actions that were previously culturally inconsequential take on an important role in uniting or
dividing the community. This result can be seen clearly in the equilibria produced in our model.
In the multiculturalism equilibrium, groups maintain their different cultural actions, but the
two groups adopt a common non-cultural action, either yA or yB . Construction of common
practices is necessary to sustain integration when groups also retain some diversity of practices.
This equilibrium can be related to the frequently advanced ideal that populations can maintain,
for example, their diverse religions while at the same time having a common national identity
and culture.31 We show that this ‘ideal’ is feasible when culture is not ‘all encompassing’ in
society; groups must be able to find enough common ground to be able to interact.
At the other end of the spectrum, under the extreme segregation equilibria, practices can
become more polarised: groups differentiate their behaviours and practices beyond different
cultural actions. Harris (2009) writes that some minority groups hold ‘secondary cultural dif-
ferences . . . that emerge after the two groups have been in continuous contact.’ We show that
when α is low, segregation can be maintained only when each group coordinates on distinct non-
cultural actions. Rather than bridging the gap between groups, the non-cultural action is used
to emphasise differences between them. For example, groups practising two different religions
ex ante will also differentiate other behaviours that are un-related to religious requirements (for
example, dress code, increased food restrictions, and even sports).32 This appears to be a novel
explanation of this type of behaviour and we find it to be a positive signal of a model purporting
to explain cross-cultural interaction that there is an equilibrium admitting this possibility.33
31As early as 1915, at a time of fervent discussion of integration of immigrants in the United States, Harvard
philosopher Horance Kallen described the possibility of the United States being ‘a democracy of nationalities,
cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions’ where ‘the common language . . . would
be English, but each nationality would have . . . its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable
esthetic and intellectual forms.’ This is sometimes now referred to as the ‘salad bowl’.
32Berman (2000) describes the birth of Ultra-Orthodox Judaism in the late 18th and 19th Centuries which
followed emancipation and the possibility of greater integration with the local European populations. The Ultra-
Orthodox ‘were not only conservative about rejecting new forms of consumption . . . but amplified existing re-
strictions’, such as introducing new dietary restrictions, and ‘changed existing customs (dress codes, speaking
Yiddish) into religious acts’.
33A number of papers examine this type of outcome in detail including Berman (2000) on Ultra-Orthodox
Judaism; Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) on why some black students deride working hard at school as ‘acting
white’ and act in opposition to this; and Akerlof and Kranton (2002) and Bisin et al. (2011b) on the emergence
of oppositional identities, whereby groups increase their identification with their own culture in order to reduce
the psychological cost of interacting with those who adopt a different culture.
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4.4 Evidence from the Age of Mass Migration
The ‘Age of Mass Migration’ in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is one of the most important
episodes of migration of the modern era. From 1830 to 1930, 38 million people arrived in the
United States. They joined a population that in 1830 consisted of only 13 million people, and
which Alba (1985) describes as having both ‘culture and institutions, [that] derived largely from
the English models’. Immigrants came to America from around the world, including virtually
every country in Europe.34
We look at heterogeneous communities throughout the United States in this era and ask how
this heterogeneity manifested itself. Did immigrants adopt the behaviours and practices of the
local population? Did they integrate or form segregated communities? The setting provides a
natural environment in which to examine some of the implications of our model. Importantly, it
provides us with a large number of heterogeneous communities with different immigrant groups
of varying sizes.
We test two key predictions of our model: that group behaviour changes sharply once the
share of the immigrant group in the community reaches some (ex ante unknown) critical thresh-
old, and that the location of this threshold varies in the predicted way with the cultural distance
between immigrants and natives. In particular, we consider two choices facing immigrants:
speaking English, and in-marriage (homogamy).35
Testing these predictions of our model is important for two reasons. First, if our framework
captures an important trade-off, then we should expect to observe such thresholds in data.
Second, evidence of such thresholds, and hence of the forces which drive our model, has many
implications for policy, some of which we discuss in the concluding section.
4.4.1 Data Description
Data Sources
We use data from the 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 census samples provided by IPUMS. These are
5% (1900 and 1930) or 1% (1910 and 1920) samples. These censuses asked individuals whether
or not they speak English. They also allow us to link (almost all) married individuals to their
spouses, so we can measure whether individuals marry endogamously (i.e. within the same
nationality).36 Important to our question, in these particular years individuals were asked their
34Not all immigrants remained in the US permanently (Bandiera et al., 2013). We will discuss later the
implications of this for our results.
35In contrast to our baseline modeling assumption, immigrants could continue to speak both their native
language and learn English. As mentioned previously, our results will hold provided that the relative benefit of
learning English increases the greater the number of members of the immigrant group who learn it.
36Individuals whose spouses do not live in the same household cannot be matched. They make up less than
3.1% of married individuals in our sample.
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country of origin, and – unlike earlier and later censuses – their year of arrival in the US, allowing
us to control for how long individuals have lived in the US. Focusing on adult household heads,
we have a repeated cross-section with 611,000 migrants.
The census samples provide information on an individual’s place of residence down to the
county level. Counties are small administrative units, with on average 63 counties per state,
and an average population of 5300 households per county in 1900, of which 1300 were headed
by immigrants.37 We also use data from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), collected by Dyen et al.
(1992) and Fearon (2003), on the linguistic distance between pairs of languages.
Data Construction
We treat counties as the relevant population for our analysis. That is, individuals are presumed
to make their decisions about what behaviours to adopt and with whom to form ties, taking
those in the county as the pool of people they could potentially interact with.38
Within each county, we define an immigrant group as consisting of all household heads of
the same nationality (country of origin), with the exception that we group Germany, Austria,
and Switzerland into a single group; Sweden, Denmark, and Norway into a single group; and
the Netherlands and Belgium into a single group.39, 40 Our qualitative results are unchanged in
the absence of this aggregation. Henceforth, by ‘nationality’ we refer to these groups. In each
county, the ‘nationality share’ is the proportion of sampled adult household heads in that county
who have that nationality: this is the empirical analogue of nm/n in our model.
41
Since our model predictions are at the group level, we aggregate the behaviour of individuals
into ‘cohorts’. Cohorts are defined by nationality, d; year of arrival (in 10 year bands), a; time
37Note, the difference between these figures and Table 4.1 comes both from changes over time in county size
(the table pools all censuses), and from the fact that larger counties have more observed cohorts, so receive more
weight in the table.
38Counties are the finest population partition available to us. It seems possible that decisions are made based
on a more local population of people, such as the town/village. In that case we observe only a noisy measure of
the population share and population decisions, likely attenuating our estimated effect and reducing power.
39We focus on household heads since at the time they were likely to have made choices for the whole household.
In the case of in-marriage it also avoids the double counting of homogamous relationships. Finally, household
heads are less likely to have received education in the US which might influence the outcomes we observe.
40We made these groupings due to use of a common language and because accounts of communities in the
US suggest these amalgamations are appropriate. Austrians spoke, in main part, a form of German, and the
Swiss who emigrated were largely German speaking. At the time we are considering, Danish remained the official
language of Norway, and also Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian are considered mutually intelligible. The Belgians
who emigrated to the US were largely of Flemish descent, and so spoke Dutch.
41Note that this treats all individuals who are not members of that nationality group as though they were
members of the majority group. In all counties, the largest other group that immigrants could consider joining
is the native group. Hence, if an immigrant group is considering switching to another culture, this is likely to be
the most profitable. Although in some cases it may be lower cost to join another immigrant group due to their
lower cultural distance, this is likely mitigated both by our amalgamation of individuals from certain countries
and the fact that these groups are typically much smaller than the natives. In our analysis sample there are only
33 counties where more than one group exceeds 10% of the county population, 4 counties where more than one
group exceeds 15%, and none at a threshold of 20%. An alternative empirical specification would be to define
the denominator for nationality share as the sum of the number of immigrants of that nationality and natives,
thus excluding other immigrants. Our results are robust to this redefinition.
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since immigration (also grouped, to the nearest 10 years), t; and county, o.42 Splitting the
observed behaviour of immigrant groups into these cohorts allows us to control for arrival year
and tenure effects that might be important in explaining behaviour and might vary systematically
by nationality. For example, both ability to speak English and out-marriage are likely to be
positively related to tenure in the United States. Additionally, varying conditions and policies
over the decades we study, such as use of schooling to influence assimilation (Bandiera et al.,
2017), may have affected these decisions.
We measure English acquisition by the proportion of a cohort that reported to the enumerator
that they spoke English.43 For this analysis we exclude British, Irish, and Canadian immigrants,
since their mother tongue is likely to be English anyway. To proxy for social segregation, we
construct a measure of the extent to which each cohort marries people of the same nationality.
We calculate the proportion of married members of the cohort that are married to someone of
the same nationality.44 Although marriage is a partial description of social connections, it is
clearly defined and measured for this period, and marriage decisions are considered to be strongly
revealing of the dimensions that divide a society (for a review see McPherson et al., 2001).
Table 4.1 shows the mean and variance for these outcomes, as well as nationality size (nm in
our model), county size (n), and nationality share (nm/n), across the analysis sample. We also
provide the within-nationality variance, and the share of total variance that is within variance.
From this it can be seen that there is significant within nationality variation that we can exploit in
our analysis, allowing us to avoid concerns that the effects we capture come only from differences
across nationalities.
To measure the cost of learning English, c in our model, we use the data on linguistic distance.
The data from Dyen et al. (1992) define linguistic similarity between a pair of languages based
on the proportion of frequently used words that share a common root.45 We assume that
immigrants’ mother tongue is the majority language spoken in their country of origin. We also
assume that the cost of switching language to English is greater for those immigrants whose
mother tongue is more dissimilar to English. We then split cohorts into ‘near’ or ‘far’ from
42In particular, arrival years are grouped as 1886-1895, 1896-1905, and so on. Tenure (time since immigration)
is then measured as the difference between the midpoint of the arrival year band (1890, 1900, etc) and the census
year.
43Enumerators were instructed ‘Where difficulty is encountered in making the head of the family understand
what is wanted, you should call upon some other member of the family who is able to speak English . . . if no
member of the family can aid you in your work, then the assistance of some neighbour of the same nationality and
able to speak English should be obtained, whenever possible.’ Where this was also not possible, paid interpreters
were used. Hence this question is likely to have been able to meaningfully capture whether individuals were able
to speak English. https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/1900instructions.pdf
44The Coleman index provides an alternative popular measure of segregation (see Currarini et al., 2009). It
is not suitable for our context as it requires knowledge of the potential marriage market for a particular cohort
at the time marriage decisions were taken, something we do not observe. Our preferred measure is therefore
the simple ratio of in-marriage to total marriage for a cohort, which has the additional benefit of being easy to
interpret.
45This measure of distance is only available for Indo-European languages. We impute some of the missing
data using a variable from Fearon (2003) which measures linguistic proximity using a ‘language family tree’. Our
results are qualitatively robust to instead dropping these observations with missing data.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for key variables
(1) Mean (2) Total Variance (3) Within Var (4) Within/Total
Share speaking English .901 .023 .011 .489
Share of in-marriages .609 .055 .022 .391
Nationality Size (’000s) .459 .391 .374 .957
County Size (’000s) 8.79 106.9 96.5 .903
Nationality Share .085 .007 .005 .732
Observations 1746 1746 1746 1746
Notes. Observations are at the cohort level. Cohorts are defined by nationality, county, tenure in the US grouped
to the nearest 10 years, and year of arrival in 10 year bands. We include only cohorts with at least 30 individuals,
to ensure that cohort averages are well measured. Share speaking English measures the proportion of a cohort that
reports speaking English. Share of in-marriages measures the proportion of married individuals in a cohort who
are married to someone of the same nationality. Nationality size measures the number of people, in thousands, of
the same nationality (potentially of different cohorts) living in the same county. County size measures the number
of people, in thousands, living in the same county. Nationality share is the ratio of nationality size to county size.
Columns (1) and (2) provide the mean and variance for these variables. Column (3) shows the remaining variance
after removing nationality fixed effects, and Column (4) provides the share of total variance that remains once
nationality fixed effects are removed.
English, defining a language as far from English if less that 40% of the words are mutually
intelligible with English.46
For our analysis we also only consider cohorts with at least 30 observations, so that the
average group behaviour is well estimated. This means that we exclude counties where the
number of immigrants was very small. There is a trade-off between choosing a low minimum
threshold for immigrant group size, to minimise the bias that comes from effectively ignoring
very small community shares, and choosing a high threshold to reduce noise in estimated group
behaviour. We test the sensitivity of our results to this by also using cut off points of 20 or of
40, and find no qualitative difference. As an alternative sensitivity test, we also performed our
analysis with weighted regressions. In particular, the weight given to an observation was equal
to the number of observations with the same nationality share in the full sample, divided by the
number with that nationality share in the estimation sample.47 This over-weights observations
with small nationality shares, since these are the ones excluded by our group size thresholds.
Again we find similar results. These results are presented in Section 4.8.
In total we have 1746 cohorts, when we impose a minimum cohort size of 30, of which
Germans and Italians are the biggest groups. Table 4.7 in Section 4.8 shows the number of
immigrant cohorts we observe, and splits out some of the larger nationalities. It also shows how
this varies depending on the minimum size we require for a cohort to be included in our sample.
46We take this cut-off from Advani and Rasul (2015), who choose it because there are no languages in the
range 30− 50% mutually intelligible with English, so it forms a natural break. According to this metric, Spanish
and Greek are considered far from English, whilst German and Danish are considered close.
47For constructing weights we split nationality share into deciles, with all observations in the decile being given
equal weight.
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4.4.2 Empirical Framework
To formally test for the existence of a threshold in community behaviour we use a linear regression
of the form
Ydato = β0 + β11{zdo > τ}+ γ0zdo + γ1zdo1{zdo > τ}+ κd + λa + νt + εdato (4.3)
where Ydato is the share of immigrants of nationality d, arriving in year a, with tenure t, in
county o, who speak English (respectively, in-marry); zdo is the nationality share of immigrants
of nationality d in county o; and τ is the proposed threshold immigrant share. κ, λ, and ν are
respectively the nationality, arrival year, and tenure fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β1:
the coefficient on the indicator function showing whether there is a ‘break’ in the level of speaking
English (respectively, in-marriage) when the nationality share zdo crosses the threshold τ .
Since we do not know theoretically where the threshold τ should be, we use an iterative
regression procedure, and test for significance using a Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test
(Quandt, 1960; Andrews, 1993). We perform a sequence of regressions, testing a prespecified
range of values for τ . For each regression we calculate the F-statistic, comparing the model
with the threshold to the same model but without a threshold. We then select from among
these regressions, the one with the highest F-statistic. The corresponding break point in that
regression is then taken as the estimated location of the threshold, denoted τ∗. To test whether
this threshold value is ‘significant’, we compare the F-statistic to the limiting distribution for
this statistic under the null (Andrews, 1993), thus correcting for the multiple testing.48, 49
We also estimate Equation 4.3 separately for cohorts that are ‘far from’ and ‘near to’ English,
and compare the point estimates, to see whether τ∗far < τ
∗
near, for both speaking English and
in-marriage. However, we are unaware of any formal way to test for the statistical significance
of any difference in location.
4.4.3 Results
Threshold in proportion speaking English
Figure 4.4 shows graphically the evidence for a threshold in the share of the immigrant group
that speaks English, as its share of the community rises. Each dot shows the mean proportion
that report speaking English for a two percentage point range of nationality share. That is, the
48For robustness, we also use an entirely non-parametric approach to finding the threshold location, as proposed
by Henderson et al. (2015). The intuition of this approach is similar to the parametric approach, searching over
a sequence of thresholds, but without any functional form restrictions away from the threshold. The location of
the thresholds we find are the same as for the parametric approach.
49An alternative method, followed by Card et al. (2008), is to split the sample into a test sample, which one
can use to select between multiple potential thresholds, and an analysis sample where the selected threshold can
be used. This allows conventional testing approaches with more standard distributions, but at the cost of reduced
test power.
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Figure 4.4: Share of people in the cohort that speak English
Figure 4.5: Share of married people in the cohort that are married to someone
of the same nationality
Notes. The figures show the relationship between the share of a cohort that speak English (Fig 4.4) or marries
within its nationality (Fig 4.5), and the proportion of adult household heads in their county that are of the same
nationality. Dots show the mean share speaking English/in-married, grouping nationality share into bins two
percentage points wide. The line shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel
with bandwidth of 7% fit through the whole (i.e. unbinned) data. In each figure the local mean is estimated either
side of an estimated threshold: .31 for Fig 4.4 and .35 for Fig 4.5. These points are chosen using the Quandt
Likelihood Ratio procedure descibed in Subsection 4.4.2. Cohorts are defined by nationality, 10 year grouped
arrival year, 10 year grouped tenure in the US, and county of residence. A minimum cohort size of 30 is used.
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Table 4.2: Testing for a threshold effect in share speaking English
Dependent Variable: Proportion of people in the cohort that speak English
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Cohorts defined by Nationality, County, Grouped Year of Arrival, Grouped Tenure
(1) Unconditional (2) With Fixed Effects (3) With Slopes
Optimal threshold (β1|τ=τ∗) -.509*** -.257*** -.375***
(.025) (.017) (.062)
Constant (β0) .885*** .878*** .913***
(.004) (.002) (.004)
Optimal Threshold Level (τ∗) .31 .31 .31
F-statistic 423 241 37
1% critical value for F-statistic 6.6 6.6 6.6
Cohort Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Slopes in Nationality Share No No Yes
Observations 1272 1272 1272
Notes. *** denotes significance at 0.1%, ** at 1%, and * at 5% level, when treated as a standalone regression.
The outcome measures the proportion of the cohort that speaks English. Cohorts with English, Canadian, and Irish
nationalities are excluded from the sample, since English is likely to be their mother tongue. Minimum cohort size
of 30. Cohort fixed effects are composed of nationality, arrival year (grouped), and tenure (grouped) fixed effects.
Column (1) is a regression of share speaking English on a constant, and a dummy for whether nationality share in
the county exceeds a threshold. Column (2) allows for cohort fixed effects. Column (3) allows the share speaking
English to also have a slope in nationality share, and allows this slope to vary either side of the threshold. All
covariates except the threshold are demeaned, so the constant (β0) can be interpreted as an estimate of the mean
share speaking English at nationality shares below the threshold. These specifications are run sequentially at different
values of the threshold, varying the threshold between .20 and .40, at intervals of .01. We provide the results for
the threshold among these which produced a regression with the highest F-statistic when tested against the null of no
threshold. The value for this threshold, the estimated F-statistic, and the 1% critical value for this statistic (which
corrects for the repeated testing, see Andrews, 1993) are provided at the bottom of the table.
leftmost dot shows the mean proportion of immigrants speaking English for all immigrants in
groups that constitute 0-2% of their community. We also plot a kernel-weighted local mean,
fitting it separately either side of a nationality share, zdo, of .31 (below we describe how this
point was chosen). From this figure we can immediately see three things: (i) when immigrants
make up only a small share of the population, the proportion of the cohort that speaks English
is high, at around 90%; (ii) there is a sharp drop in this mean, to less than 40%, when the
immigrant group reaches approximately 1/3 of the population; (iii) there is more variation in
the mean after the threshold. These three findings are consistent with our model. The first
result shows clear evidence that small groups of migrants are assimilated into American culture,
almost all learning the language. The visually striking threshold is clearly suggestive of the type
of strategic complementarity notion at the heart of our model. And the final result is consistent
with the existence of multiple equilibria above the threshold, so that in some communities we
may see assimilation outcomes even at these high nationality shares.
The choice of .31 for the break in our local mean plot comes from performing a formal
test for the presence and location of a significant break. We use the QLR test described above,
searching a grid between [.20, .40] with increments of .01, and test for the most likely value of the
threshold, τ , in a sequence of increasingly flexible models. We consistently find a significant break
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in English acquisition, and find the most likely value for the threshold is when the immigrant
group constitutes 31% of the population. Table 4.2 shows the results of the tests.
The first specification includes only a constant and a threshold term, so that any systematic
variation in the share of the cohort speaking English can only be picked up as some kind of
threshold effect. This amounts to imposing that the slope terms are zero (γ0 = γ1 = 0) and
ruling out nationality, year of arrival, and tenure fixed effects (κd = λa = νt = 0) in Equation 4.3.
We find a strong support for the presence of a threshold, with an F-statistic of 423 (compared
with a 1% critical value of 6.6, taken from Andrews, 1993), and the most likely location for the
threshold is τ∗ = .31.50
Our next specification allows for nationality, arrival year, and tenure fixed effects, so we only
impose γ0 = γ1 = 0. This allows for the possibility that, for example, Germans might live
in groups with systematically smaller nationality shares than Italians and also find it easier to
learn English, although even this sort of story is unlikely to give rise to so clear a threshold as
seen in Figure 4.4. Similarly we now allow for variation in settlement patterns and language
acquisition by groups arriving in different years, and who have been present in the US for different
tenures. Again we can strongly reject that no threshold exists (F-statistic of 241), with the same
location. We also now see that the point estimate for β1|τ = τ∗ is reduced, showing that some
of the reduction in English speaking is explained by the fixed effects.
Finally, in Column (3) we allow also for slopes either side of the potential threshold. Although
our model as written does not have such effects, simple extensions of the model, such as allowing
some heterogeneity in costs or benefits, might allow some sort of slope either side of the threshold.
Even allowing for such effects, we find continued support for a threshold, again when immigrants
make up 31% of the local population, with an F-statistic of 37.
Threshold in proportion in-married
We now repeat the above analysis using proportion in-married as the outcome variable. Fig-
ure 4.5 is constructed in the same way as Figure 4.4, and tells a similar story to that seen with
speaking English. We see that: (i) when immigrants make up only a small share of the popula-
tion, the assimilation type outcome is apparent, with relatively less in-marriage; (ii) in-marriage
rises sharply after the threshold; and (iii) we see increased variation after the threshold. The
picture is less sharp here, since the choice of whether to in-marry only captures a single, limited
dimension of interaction between different groups. Additionally, since the timing of the marriages
are unknown, some of the in-marriage might reflect relationships formed prior to immigration,
50These results are robust to minimum cohort size chosen. Table 4.8 replicates Column (1) using different
sample size thresholds, and also using the weighting method discussed earlier. The location and significance of the
threshold τ∗ remains unchanged. The same threshold is also found when we use the completely non-parametric
search procedure suggested by Henderson et al. (2015).
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Table 4.3: Testing for a threshold effect on share in-married
Dependent Variable: Proportion of the married people in the cohort that are married to
someone of the same nationality
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Cohorts defined by Nationality, County, Grouped Year of Arrival, Grouped Tenure
(1) Unconditional (2) With Fixed Effects (3) With Slopes
Optimal threshold (β1|τ=τ∗) .151*** .065*** .166***
(.042) (.017) (.049)
Constant (β0) .606*** .606*** .562***
(.006) (.003) (.006)
Optimal Threshold Level (τ∗) .35 .23 .23
F-statistic 13.0 15.0 11.5
1% critical value for F-statistic 6.6 6.6 6.6
Cohort Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Slopes in Nationality Share No No Yes
Observations 1746 1746 1746
Notes. *** denotes significance at 0.1%, ** at 1%, and * at 5% level, when treated as a standalone regression. The
outcome measures the married proportion of the cohort that is ‘in-married’ i.e. married to someone of the same
nationality. Minimum cohort size of 30. Cohort fixed effects are composed of nationality, arrival year (grouped),
and tenure (grouped) fixed effects.
Column (1) is a regression of share in-married on a constant, and a dummy for whether nationality share in the
county exceeds a threshold. Column (2) allows for cohort fixed effects. Column (3) allows the share in-married to
also have a slope in nationality share, and allows this slope to vary either side of the threshold. All covariates except
the threshold are demeaned, so the constant (β0) can be interpreted as an estimate of the mean share in-married at
nationality shares below the threshold. These specifications are run sequentially at different values of the threshold,
varying the threshold between .20 and .40, at intervals of .01. We provide the results for the threshold among these
which produced a regression with the highest F-statistic when tested against the null of no threshold. The value for
this threshold, the estimated F-statistic, and the 1% critical value for this statistic (which corrects for the repeated
testing, see Andrews, 1993) are provided at the bottom of the table.
giving a relatively high level of in-marriage even when nationality shares are very low. Despite
these limitations, at the threshold we see a jump of one-fifth, from less than 60% to more than
75% in-married.
Table 4.3 shows our main formal results on in-marriage, again testing for the presence and
location of a significant break using the QLR procedure described above (searching a grid between
[.20, .40] with increments of .01). Column (1) estimates our empirical specification without fixed
effects (κd = λa = νt = 0) or slopes (γ0 = γ1 = 0). We find a significant break (F-statistic
of 13.0 against a 1% critical value of 6.6) in in-marriage when the immigrant group constitutes
35% of the population. Levels of in-marriage rise from 60% to 75% at this threshold.51 Column
(2) includes fixed effects, and Column (3) additionally allows slopes to vary. We continue to find
a significant break in in-marriage (F-statistics of 15.0 and 11.5 respectively), although it now
occurs earlier, when the immigrant group constitutes 23% of the population.
In summary, we show evidence of stable levels of in-marriage in communities where the
immigrant group is below approximately a quarter of the population (once we account for fixed
51These results are robust to minimum cohort size chosen. Table 4.9 in Section 4.8 replicates Column (1) using
different sample size thresholds, and also using a weighting method, and significance of the threshold τ∗ remains
unchanged. The same threshold is also found when we use the completely non-parametric search procedure
suggested by Henderson et al. (2015).
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Table 4.4: Comparing threshold locations for linguistically far and near cohorts
Dependent Variable: (A) Proportion of people in the cohort that speak English;
(B) Proportion of cohort in-married
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Cohorts defined by Nationality, County, Grouped Year of Arrival, Grouped Tenure
(A) Speaking English (B) In-Married
(1) Ling. Far (2) Ling. Near (1) Ling. Far (2) Ling. Near
Optimal threshold (β1|τ=τ∗) -.118*** -.115** -.031 .182*
(.029) (.035) (.034) (.079)
Constant (β0) .876*** .977*** .761*** .402***
(.005) (.007) (.006) (.011)
Optimal Threshold Level (τ∗) .31 .39 .39 .23
F-statistic 17.0 10.7 .80 5.3
5% critical value for F-statistic 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
1% critical value for F-statistic 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slopes in Nationality Share Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 810 462 810 936
Notes. *** denotes significance at 0.1%, ** at 1%, and * at 5% level, when treated as a standalone regression.
In Panel A the outcome measures the proportion of the cohort that speaks English, and cohorts with English,
Canadian, and Irish nationalities are excluded from the sample. In Panel B the outcome measures the married
proportion of the cohort that is ‘in-married’ i.e. married to someone of the same nationality. Minimum cohort
size of 30. Cohort fixed effects are composed of nationality, arrival year (grouped), and tenure (grouped) fixed
effects.
All columns present regressions of the outcome variable on a constant, an indicator for whether nationality share
is above a threshold, cohort fixed effects, and nationality share itself (allowing for different slopes either side of
the threshold). In both panels, Column (1) includes only the subset of cohorts from our main sample that come
from countries whose main language is deemed far from English (less than 40% mutual intelligibility), whilst
Column (2) uses those who are linguistically near. All covariates except the threshold are demeaned, so the
constant (β0) can be interpreted as an estimate of the mean share speaking English at nationality shares below the
threshold. In each case we vary the threshold between .20 and .40, at intervals of .01. We provide the results for
the threshold among these which produced a regression with the highest F-statistic when tested against the null of
no threshold. The value for this threshold, the estimated F-statistic, and the 5% and 1% critical values for this
statistic (Andrews, 1993) are provided at the bottom of the table.
effects). When the immigrant group reaches this nationality share we find a significant jump
upwards in rates of in-marriage. This discontinuous increase in segregation, even when using a
partial measure of interaction, provides strongly supportive evidence of the mechanisms driving
our model.
Higher thresholds when culturally closer
Our model predicts not only the presence of a threshold, but also that the threshold should vary
with c. In Table 4.4 we now estimate the location and significance of the threshold separately
for groups who are from countries with a language ‘near to’ or ‘far from’ English. Splitting the
sample into these two cases, we estimate the unrestricted version of Equation 4.3, analagous to
the third columns of Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the results graphically.
For speaking English (Panel A) we find a significant threshold at the 1% level for both far and
near nationalities. As predicted, for near nationalities the threshold occurs at a larger nationality
share (τ∗ = .39) than for far nationalities (τ∗ = .31). This is consistent with our theoretical
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Figure 4.6: Share of people in the cohort that speak English, for linguistically
near and far cohorts
Figure 4.7: Share of married people in the cohort that are married to someone
of the same nationality, for linguistically near and far cohorts
Notes. The figures show the relationship between the share of a cohort that speak English (Fig 4.4) or marries
within its nationality (Fig 4.5), and the proportion of adult household heads in their county that are of the same
nationality, splitting cohorts into those which are linguistically near and those which are linguistically far. The
line shows the kernel-weighted local mean, estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The shaded areas denote the
95% confidence intervals. In each figure the local mean for the near and far cohorts is estimated separately either
side of an estimated threshold, chosen using the Quandt Likelihood Ratio procedure descibed in Subsection 4.4.2.
A vertical line is shown in the cases where the threshold was found to be significant in the parametric testing.
Cohorts are defined by nationality, 10 year grouped arrival year, 10 year grouped tenure in the US, and county
of residence. A minimum cohort size of 25 is used.
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finding that nationalities that are culturally closer to English need to make up a relatively larger
proportion of the local population before they choose to retain their own language.
For in-marriage (Panel B), we see a significant threshold still for the near group, at 23%
(significant at 5% level), but we do not find a significant threshold for the far group. In part
this is likely due again to our measure of interactions being only a partial one.
4.4.4 Discussion of results and limitations
In interpreting our results, we have so far abstracted from the important issue of location choice
and the influence that selection might have on our results. We argue that the presence of such
selection does not change our ability to draw conclusions about the key trade-offs inherent in
our model.
The first question of selection is whether migrants choose where to live based on their in-
dividual costs and benefits of interaction, and of the actions they take. The worry might be
that any heterogeneity in the cost of switching cultural practices (for example, different costs
of learning English or different preferences for maintaining religious practices) will manifest as
sorting into different areas. Immigrants with higher costs of switching cultural practices would
have a higher relative return from locating in areas where their group continues to maintain
their own practices. Such selection would only be a problem for us if we were to imagine that
there were discontinuities in the distribution of heterogeneity. Without this, the discontinuity
we observe in behaviour must be driven by the structure of the game played by individuals in
these communities. Sorting by individuals may still mean that migrants with different costs
choose to locate in systematically different communities but, as argued by Lazear (1999), this
is simply ‘a question of timing’. If individuals sort, knowing that after choosing their location
their action choice and payoff will depend on those around them, then this is still supportive
of the mechanism of our model. The policy implications will differ, however, if some of the
difference between the assimilated and segregated communities comes from differences in the
costs of assimilation.
The second role for selection relates to who stays in the US. We know from Bandiera et al.
(2013) that there was significant churn, with 60-75% of migrants leaving the US. If migrants
knew ex ante that they were planning to leave the US and go back to their native country,
then they would discount the benefits of adopting the practices of the new community.52 The
benefits would now only be felt for a more limited period, whilst the costs of adoption would
remain unchanged. This is equivalent to these individuals having the same benefits but higher
costs of learning English, and hence the same logic as selection into location applies.
52If the individuals do not know that they might leave, then it cannot influence their decision.
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Clearly we do not capture all the richness of the theoretical model. For example, it may be
that multiculturalism manifests as the whole community speaking English to one another and
sharing some other norms of behaviour, but at the same time different immigrant groups main-
taining different religious practices, different cuisines, or other different activities. By looking
only at the choice to learn English or not we cannot discern such an outcome. Similarly we may
miss evidence of ‘extreme segregation’ because we do not have a rich enough set of outcome
variables. An extension of the empirical analysis that looks at choices along more dimensions
might allow us to better ‘pull apart’ the different equilibria. However, the data requirements
for such an analysis are strong, including information on social interaction and various action
choices among multiple heterogenous populations. Although we can only pick up some of the
detail of the theoretical model in our empirical analysis, the variables we do consider show clear
evidence that the shape of the relationship is consistent with our predictions.
4.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This chapter builds a tractable framework to answer two questions: what social structures can
arise in heterogeneous populations, and what environmental features determine which social
structure arises. At the center of our analysis is the idea that group behaviour and practices,
as well as social cohesion, are endogenous. Heterogeneity itself, as well as social relations in
heterogeneous populations, greatly depend on the environment.
Understanding how the environment shapes heterogeneous populations is critical for policy
design. Integration of immigrant and minority groups receives a lot of political attention, and
governments frequently propose and implement policies intended to influence the way minority
groups integrate. Our findings paint a nuanced picture of both the relevance and effects of such
policies. We briefly consider what our framework implies for two important policies.
First, our model suggests that secularisation policies, rather than restraining religion, can
actually make groups more likely to maintain diverse religious practices. Secularism prescribes
some degree of restriction on religion in public life. In France in 2004 the principle of secularism
was applied to ban all conspicuous religious symbols (including veils of any kind) from public
schools. Our framework shows that policies which reduce the relevance of cultural practices
in everyday life, such as removing religion from state institutions, can enable multiculturalism.
That is, it implies that maintaining diverse religions is easier in a more secular society!
Second, our framework implies that policies which reduce barriers to interaction across groups
(e.g. school bussing or desegregation) may result in a response whereby groups not only remain
segregated but amplify their differences. Reduced costs of interaction require minority groups to
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distinguish themselves even more if they are to remain segregated. Thus increased opportunities
for interaction can lead to ‘secondary’ differences where minority groups begin to create new dis-
tinguishing features and emphasise previously insignificant behaviours as culturally important.53
Our framework does not rule out a role for policy however. The key welfare tension in the
model comes from the inability of group members to coordinate, which can lead to ‘inefficient
segregation’.54 A failure to coordinate among immigrants allows segregation to arise in situations
where a collective move to assimilation or multiculturalism would be a Pareto improvement. This
is because when groups are segregated under Nash equilibrium, a minority individual does worse
by switching culture and joining the majority group, even though the minority group as a whole
might do better by adopting majority culture. Policy can influence this by reducing the costs
of switching culture for at least some minority individuals, thus breaking down the segregation
equilibrium. Schooling policy provides an example of this, where the teaching of national values
to the children of immigrants makes it easier for them to integrate with natives, thus making
it harder for their parents to remain segregated (see Alesina and Reich (2015), Bandiera et al.
(2017) and references therein).
Of course, the costs of switching culture and the ubiquity of cultural and religious practices in
daily life could be influenced not only by governments by also by individuals and groups. ‘Group
leaders’ might be able to influence these parameters to achieve their individual aims. For example
religious leaders might care most about preserving religious adherence, and attempt to adjust
the cost of switching practices or increase the ubiquity of religious activities, even at the cost
of lowering the utility of group members. Alternatively, the costs of switching culture and the
relevance of cultural and religious practices could emerge endogenously in a decentralised model.
This chapter takes a key step in understanding endogeneity of heterogeneity.55 However, there
remain many important avenues for further work in this direction.
A second important direction for future research would be to allow for not just more than
two types of individual but different dimensions of types. For example, we may have two dif-
ferent nationality groups with ex ante different practices, but each nationality group may itself
be composed of a mix of people of two different religions which have their own associated prac-
tices. An illustration is provided by the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, which saw Protestants in
England, Scotland, and Ireland (before the formation of the United Kingdom) fighting together
against Catholics from their own countries. Adapting our framework with such an addition may
provide answers to questions about when and why one divide (for example religion) becomes
more important than another (for example ethnicity) in different societies.
53This result is also present in Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin and Verdier (2000), but through a different
mechanism
54See Subsection 4.6.5 for an expanded welfare analysis.
55For work on the endogeneity of national culture see Alesina and Reich (2015).
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4.6 Theoretical Appendix
4.6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
In a Nash equilibrium all players of the same type must play the same pair of actions. Suppose
not, and that two players of the same type, i and j, play different pairs of actions. One player,
without loss of generality player i, must do weakly worse than the other. Then i can do strictly
better by mimicking j’s strategy and also forming a tie with j. Forming a tie with j ensures
that player i either has an additional tie compared to j’s previous strategy, or that the value i
receives from the tie between himself and j is higher than the value j would have been receiving
from this tie, since they now coordinate on more actions. Hence in equilibrium i and j must
play the same actions. In equilibrium each player must also link with all others who adopt the
same action pair since the value of such a tie is strictly positive. Thus all individuals in the same
group form a tie in equilibrium.
Suppose 1−α < L. Suppose there is (at least) one tie between different types in equilibrium.
If the two types do not have culture in common then the payoff from this tie is at most 1−α−L <
0, and the individual can do strictly better by dropping the tie. In equilibrium the two groups
must have culture in common for there to be a tie between groups. Suppose the two groups
have culture but do not have non-cultural practices in common. Then a player from the weakly
smaller group can do strictly better by adopting the non-cultural action of the weakly larger
group and linking accordingly. Therefore, if there is a tie between groups in equilibrium, all
individuals must play the same action pair and thus all individuals must be linked.
Suppose there are no ties between different types in equilibrium. If the two types adopt
the same cultural practices but do not have non-cultural practices in common, then a player
from the weakly smaller group can do strictly better by adopting the non-cultural action of the
weakly larger group and instead linking with that group. If the two types adopt the same action
pair, then they would have strictly higher utility by linking across groups. Thus if there are no
ties between different types, in equilibrium the two types must adopt different cultural actions.
Further, each type must adopt its own cultural action since, if not, a type M must be doing
weakly better by playing xm and linking with his group than playing xM and linking with the
other group. But then a type m must do strictly better by playing xm, linking with the other
group and not paying the cost of switching culture. A contradiction.
We have ruled out all states apart from assimilation and segregation states as possible equilib-
ria. Assimilation is an equilibrium under all parameter values since we assumed (1−L)(n−1)−c >
max{0, (1 − α − L)(n − 1)}, and so all deviations by an individual do worse. Segregation is an
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equilibrium if (1 − L)(nm − 1) ≥ (1 − L)(n − nm) − c. It is straightforward to see that under
this condition all deviations by an individual do worse.
Suppose 1− α ≥ L. Suppose there are no ties between different types in equilibrium. If the
two types adopt the same cultural practices but do not have non-cultural practices in common,
then a player from the weakly smaller group can do strictly better by adopting the non-cultural
action of the weakly larger group and instead linking with that group. If the two types adopt
the same action pair, then they would have strictly higher utility by linking across groups. The
remaining possibility is that the two types adopt different cultural actions. If the two types
adopt the same non-cultural action the value of a tie with the other type is 1−α−L ≥ 0 and so
this is not an equilibrium. Thus different types must adopt different cultural and non-cultural
actions. Each type must also adopt their own cultural action, by the above.
Suppose there is (at least) one tie between different types in equilibrium. If the two types
have cultural practices in common then, by the proof above, they must also have non-cultural
actions in common and thus all individuals must be linked. If the two types do not have cultural
practices in common, then suppose they also do not have non-cultural practices in common.
Then the value of a tie between types is strictly negative and the individual with a tie to a
different type does strictly better by dropping it. If the two types do not have cultural practices
in common, then the remaining possibility is that they do have non-cultural practices in common.
Then the value of a tie with the other type is weakly positive and all individuals must be linked.
We have ruled out all states apart from assimilation, segregation, and multiculturalism as
possible equilibria. Assimilation is an equilibrium under all parameter values. Given the as-
sumption (1 − L)(n − 1) − c > (1 − α − L)(n − 1), any deviation from assimilation by a lone
individual results in a strictly lower payoff.
Segregation is an equilibrium when no player wants to deviate. No player wishes to deviate,
play the action pair of the other group, and link only with the other group if and only if
(1− L)(nm − 1) ≥ (1− L)(n− nm)− c
or deviate, switch non-cultural action, and link with the other group as well as their own type
if and only if
(1− L)(nm − 1) ≥ (α− L)(nm − 1) + (1− α− L)(n− nm).
It is straightforward to see that under these conditions all other deviations by an individual away
from segregation do worse. Multiculturalism is an equilibrium when no player wishes to mimic
210
the strategy of the other group if and only if
(1− L)(nm − 1) + (1− α− L)(n− nm) ≥ (1− L)(n− nm) + (1− α− L)(nm − 1)− c.
It is straightforward to see that under these conditions all deviations by an individual do worse.
4.6.2 Extending the model to action choices along more than two dimensions
We have modeled action choice along two dimensions. In reality, individuals make many more
than two decisions. The minority group may initially speak one language and the majority group
another, the minority group may participate in certain religious practices and the majority group
others, the culture of the minority group may permit alcohol while that of the majority group
forbids it, and so on. The baseline model condenses these many choices into just two: a choice
of cultural action, which represents choice over practices for which there is type-specific cost,
and a choice of non-cultural action, which represents choice over practices which have no type
specific cost. Very little intuition is lost through this abstraction. Here we relax this assumption
and highlight the novel features which arise.
Let xi1 denote i’s choice of language, which is chosen from the set {xm1 , xM1 }, where xm1 is
the language of the minority group and xM1 is the language of the majority. If two individuals
speak the same language then the benefit from interaction increases by α1. Suppose the cost
to switching language is c1. Let xi2 denote i’s choice to drink alcohol or not, chosen from
the set {xm2 , xM2 }, where group m permits alcohol and group M does not. Suppose α2 is the
importance of having this in common in terms of enabling interaction and economic exchange.
Let c2 be the cost of switching. Generally let (xi1, . . . , xiQ) denote the Q ‘cultural choices’ of
individual i. The set (xm1 , . . . , x
m
Q ) contains the ex ante cultural practices of group m, and the
set (xM1 , . . . , x
M
Q ) the ex ante cultural practices of group M . Some cultural practices may be
very costly to switch away from and others less so, represented by the cost of switching for each
practice, cr, r ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. Some practices may be very relevant to interaction and others less
so, represented by αr, r ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. Non-cultural actions are modeled similarly. Individual
i chooses R non-cultural actions, (yiQ+1, . . . , yiQ+R), where for each action there is a choice,
{yAQ+1, yBQ+1}, . . . , {yAQ+R, yBQ+R}, where the choice is denoted by the superscripts A and B. Any
non-cultural choice has an associated cost of zero, cr = 0. The importance of each practice in
terms of social interaction is given by αr, r ∈ {Q + 1, . . . , Q + R}. We normalise these to sum
to one.
Q+R∑
r=1
αr = 1.
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Each individual chooses social ties as before, but now chooses a larger set of actions
(xi1, . . . , xiQ, yiQ+1, . . . , yiQ+R). The utility function is now
uk(si, s−i) =
n∑
j=1
 ∑
r∈{1,...,Q}
αrpir(xir, xjr) +
∑
r∈{Q+1,...,Q+R}
αrpir(yir, yjr)− L
 gij −∑
r
ck(xir) (4.4)
where
pi(xir, xjr) =
 1 if xir = xjr0 if xir 6= xjr
pi(yir, yjr) =
 1 if yir = yjr0 if yir 6= yjr
and for individual i of type k ∈ {M,m}
ck(xir) =
 0 if xir = x
k
r
cr if xir 6= xkr
The Nash equilibria and comparative statics with multiple dimensions are analogous to those
in the main model presented. We highlight only the notable richness that adding more dimensions
brings. Under similar conditions to the main model, assimilation outcomes are Nash equilibria,
where all individuals form a tie, all adopt the same practices where one group adopts all the
cultural practices of the other group. There now exist what we refer to as ‘melting pot’ equilibria,
a type of assimilation equilibrium where all individuals form a tie and all adopt the same practices
(both cultural and non-cultural), but the action choices could be a mix of the ex ante cultural
practices of the two groups. Thus the ex post culture that emerges is a mix of the ex ante different
cultures (Kuran and Sandholm, 2008). There are also multiculturalism equilibria, similar to main
model, whereby all individuals form a tie, have all non-cultural practices in common, but the
different groups maintain at least some of their different cultural practices. There is some added
richness here which does not appear when there are only two action choices: the smaller the
minority group the fewer minority traits they can sustain in a multiculturalism equilibrium.
There is a sequence of multiculturalism equilibria, from the case where each group maintains
all their own cultural actions, to fewer and fewer of one group’s traits being retained, moving
towards assimilation. The only other Nash equilibria are segregation equilibria: individuals form
ties only within their group and not to the other group, and adopt sufficiently different action
sets (this includes versions of the ‘extreme segregation’ outcome).56 There is also added richness
56The segregation equilibria have the feature that, although a group will mainly adopt its own cultural prac-
tices, it may be that a group adopts a few cultural practices of the other group. This is a feature of examining
Nash equilibria in a coordination game.
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here: the smaller the minority group, the more they must differentiate their practices in order
for segregation to be a Nash equilibrium. This is consistent with empirical findings (Bisin et al.,
2013) and theoretical findings (Bisin and Verdier, 2000) that smaller minority groups must exert
more effort to retain their diverse traits.
4.6.3 Discussion of alternative models of link formation
As mentioned, the model of link formation presented here is not the only way to model social
interactions. For example, the Nash equilibria in this chapter all satisfy the definition of pairwise
stability, an important measure of stability in network formation (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
In fact, a two-sided link formation model, related to pairwise stability, where an individual could
delete any number of links and form any number of mutually agreed upon links would produce
the same outcomes as the link formation model we use. There are many ways to model how
individuals form ties and in any framework a choice must be made. The key consideration
in choosing the model of link formation here was to avoid a multitude of equilibria (often a
feature of social interaction models) that add complication without giving additional intuition
with respect to the questions we seek to answer.
Another way of modeling social interaction would be to add a cap on the number of ties
an individual can form, or to assume decreasing returns in the number of ties. With such
assumptions, the qualitative results would remain in smaller communities and we would see more
segregation in larger populations where the cap on the number of contacts becomes relevant to
decision making.
4.6.4 Heterogeneous costs of switching culture.
Suppose for members of the immigrant group that the costs of switching culture are given by
c1m ≤ c2m ≤ . . . ≤ cnmm
and similarly for the native group
c1M ≤ c2M ≤ . . . ≤ cnMM .
Let us consider the case where 1− α < L. Then individuals will not form a tie if they have
only non-cultural actions in common.
Assimilation (to immigrant or native culture) is always an equilibrium provided that the following
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condition, analogous to the previous no man is an island assumption, holds:
(1− L)(n− 1)− ch > 0 ∀h ∈ {1m, 2m, . . . , nmm, 1M, 2M, . . . , nMM}.
Suppose all individuals in the population adopt the same cultural action, then by the same
argument as the proof of Proposition 1, in equilibrium all must adopt the same non-cultural
action and form a link. Thus assimilation states are Nash equilibria under all parameters and
they are the only Nash equilibria where all individuals adopt the same cultural action.
Suppose some individuals in the population adopt different cultural actions. Let n1 be the
size of the group adopting xm and n2 be the size of the group adopting xM . In equilibrium those
playing the same cultural action must play the same non-cultural action and link otherwise there
are profitable deviations.
Suppose n1 ≥ n2. Then any minority individuals playing xM do strictly better by switch-
ing to play xm and so in any Nash equilibrium all minority individuals must be in group n1. No
minority individual wishes to deviate. A majority individual in group n1 with cost ch does not
want to deviate if
(1− L)(n1 − 1)− ch ≥ (1− L)n2
and a majority individual in group n2 with cost c
′
h does not want to deviate if
(1− L)(n2 − 1) ≥ (1− L)n1 − c′h.
Note that the final two conditions hold only if all majority individuals in group n1 have a lower
cost of switching, ch, than all individuals in group n2.
Instead suppose n2 ≥ n1. In any Nash equilibrium all majority individuals must be in group n2.
No minority individual with cost ch wishes to deviate from group n2 if
(1− L)(n2 − 1)− ch ≥ (1− L)n1
No minority individual with cost c′h wishes to deviate from group n2 if
(1− L)(n1 − 1) ≥ (1− L)n2 − c′h.
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This is the same as above, although it is not guaranteed that it will hold even if the whole
minority group is part of n1. As with the homogeneous cost case segregation only holds when
the minority group is large enough.
4.6.5 Welfare results and discussion
We will consider which states are Pareto efficient and which would be chosen by a social planner,
where the social planner maximises the sum of utilities in the population
∑
i
uk(si, s−i).
We highlight three findings.
First, multiculturalism is Pareto efficient under the same parameters that multiculturalism
will persist in the long run. Similarly segregation is Pareto efficient exactly when it will persist
in the long run.57 That is, segregation and multiculturalism are likely to emerge in the long-run
exactly when this outcome is in the minority group’s best interest.58
Second, assimilation is always Pareto efficient. A group can do no better than when the
other group assimilates, since this maximises interaction and the other group pays the cost of
switching culture. This suggests that when a group is able to do so, it will put pressure on
other groups to do the assimilating. Calls for immigrants to adopt local languages and cultural
practices by the public or by politicians are thus unsurprising. In contrast, a social planner will
not always choose assimilation.
The third point to highlight is the result of Proposition 4.2 (below). This reveals a tension
between when segregation is a Nash equilibrium, when it is optimal for the minority group,
and when it is optimal for the social planner. Proposition 4.2 says that segregation is a Nash
equilibrium under a larger set of parameters than those for which it is Pareto optimal, and segre-
gation is Pareto optimal under a larger set of parameters than those for which the social planner
would choose to implement segregation. The reason for this tension is that segregation is a Nash
equilibrium when, given the population is segregated, no individual from the minority group
does better by switching culture and joining the majority group. However, even if a minority
individual in this situation prefers to stick with minority culture, it could be that the minority
group as a whole would do better by adopting majority culture. The social planner chooses
segregation under a yet smaller set of parameters, since the social planner also incorporates the
costs of segregation to the majority group. This same reasoning applies to multiculturalism
under the parameters 1− α ≥ L.
57The only difference is that we do not need to account for discreteness as in Proposition 4.3.
58Excluding the case where the majority group assimilate to minority culture, which the minority group would
prefer but cannot influence.
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Let δW denote the threshold size of the minority group above which segregation is chosen
by the social planner, let δP denote the threshold above which segregation is Pareto efficient,
and δ is the threshold above which segregation is a Nash equilibrium, given in Proposition 4.1.
Analogously for ηW , ηP , and η for multiculturalism. Observe in Proposition 4.2 that a social
planner would choose multiculturalism when 1 − α ≥ L and the minority group is large, again
lending support to the proposed ideal of a multicultural society.
Proposition 4.2. When 1− α < L:
δW > δP > δ.
Proposition 4.2. When 1− α ≥ L:
ηW > ηP > η.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Any assimilation state is always Pareto efficient since any individual whose cultural action is
played attains his maximum payoff, doing strictly worse under any other state.
Segregation is Pareto efficient when (4.5) holds and 1−α < L. Each individual in the minority
group gets a strictly higher payoff from segregation than assimilation to majority culture when
(1− L)(nm − 1) > (1− L)(n− 1)− c
rewritten
nm/n > 1− c/n(1− L). (4.5)
It is immediate to see that individuals in the minority group get a higher payoff from segregation
than any other state where only the majority cultural action is played. Symmetrically for the
majority group. It remains to show that some individual does strictly worse in any state, other
than segregation, where at least two individuals adopt different cultural actions. Since 1−α < L,
any individual who links with someone adopting a different cultural action does strictly worse.
If fewer individuals play the minority cultural action, then those remaining playing the minority
action must be strictly worse off (symmetrically for the majority cultural action). The remaining
possibility is that the size of each group playing either cultural action remains the same, but
some majority and minority individuals switch strategy. Clearly some individuals do strictly
worse.
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Multiculturalism is Pareto efficient when 1 − α ≥ L and the minority group does strictly
worse by assimilating
(1− L)(nm − 1) + (1− α− L)nM > (1− L)(n− 1)− c
rewritten
nm/n > 1− c
αn
.
The proof follows from above, also noting that under 1−α ≥ L individuals do weakly better by
all adopting the same non-cultural action and linking.
Assimilation by the minority gives higher welfare than any other state in which a single
cultural action is played. When 1−α < L, in any state that maximises welfare with two cultural
actions being played, any two individuals playing the same cultural action must also play the
same non-cultural action and must link, and any two individuals playing different cultural actions
must not link. Segregation gives weakly higher total welfare than assimilation by the minority
when
nm(1− L)(nm − 1) + nM (1− L)(nM − 1) ≥ nm[(1− L)(n− 1)− c] + nM (1− L)(n− 1)
rewritten
nm/n ≥ 1− c/2n(1− L).
It remains to show that total welfare is weakly lower when some other combination of individuals
play different cultural actions. Suppose a smaller group of minority individuals, nm−n1, play the
minority cultural action and the rest, n1, play the majority cultural action, for n1 ∈ {1, . . . , nm−
1}. Total welfare is higher than under segregation if
(nm − n1)(1− L)(nm − n1 − 1) + (nM + n1)(1− L)(nM + n1 − 1)− n1c
≥ nm(1− L)(nm − 1) + nM (1− L)(nM − 1)
rewritten
(nM + n1)/n− c/2n(1− L) ≥ nm/n.
A contradiction. The same applies if a smaller group of majority individuals play the major-
ity cultural action. Finally it is clear that each type playing their respective cultural action
maximises welfare in this situation.
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Multiculturalism maximises the social planner’s problem when 1−α ≥ L and it gives higher
total welfare than assimilation by the minority, that is
nm(1− L)(nm − 1) + nM (1− L)(nM − 1) + nm(1− α− L)nM
+ nM (1− α− L)nm ≥ nm[(1− L)(n− 1)− c] + nM (1− L)(n− 1)
rewritten
nm/n ≥ 1− c/2αn.
The result follows similarly to above. 2
4.7 Extending the Model: Multiple Generations with
Cultural Transmission
Section 4.3 characterises the Nash equilibria of the game. In this Appendix we incorporate
the framework into a model of cultural transmission over generations. Considering multiple
generations is interesting for two reasons. First, it may be that some outcomes that are Nash
equilibria in a single generation are likely to die out in the long run. Second, since the static model
has multiple equilibria for a given configuration of parameters, it is useful to consider whether
some Nash equilibria are more ‘likely’ than others, thus the multiple generation framework acts
as an equilibrium refinement.
We incorporate dynamic features into our baseline model. First, we assume a multiple
generation framework where parents pass on their type to their children (a simplified version of
Bisin and Verdier, 2000). Second, we do not assume that the population automatically starts off
at an equilibrium. Children, once born, choose their actions and social ties optimally as above,
but taking as given the existing choices of the population they are born into. This means that
all else equal, a child born into a more assimilated group may behave differently to one born
into a more segregated group, again capturing the importance of the behaviour of the rest of
the community. Finally, we allow for a few members of a new generation to ‘experiment’ or
‘make mistakes’. We can also think of these as temporary shocks which happen infrequently.
For example, suppose the population is in a state where members of the minority group maintain
their minority culture. In the next generation, however, a few children in the minority group
‘experiment’ and try out majority culture. This can set in motion a move to a different Nash
equilibrium: if enough people experiment it may be optimal for future minority group children
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to also adopt majority culture. These shocks allow populations to move away from ‘less stable’
Nash equilibria and towards ‘more stable’ ones.59
The dynamic is modeled formally as follows. Suppose at (discrete) time t the population of
size n is in some state which is described by (st1, s
t
2, . . . , s
t
n), where s
t
i is the choice of actions and
social ties of individual i at time t. A strategy at time t, sti, is given by (4.1), as in the single
generation (Nash) case. The state need not be a Nash equilibrium. At time t + 1 there is an
independent probability q ∈ (0, 1) for each individual i (parent) that they die and are replaced
by a child, also denoted i. The child is the same type as the parent, M or m, and chooses an
action which maximises his utility given the state in period t:
st+1i ∈ arg max
Si
uk(s
t+1
i , s
t
−i)
where uk(s
t+1
i , s
t
−i) is given by (4.2). Under this dynamic the population moves to a Nash
equilibrium, and once it reaches an equilibrium it will stay there for all future generations.
However, we also allow that with probability  the child instead adopts some other strategy
randomly. This is how we model experimentation by children.
We examine the case where the probability of experimenting, , is small. The process detailed
above defines an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. The following proposition tells us that,
for any given parameter values, a single outcome will be observed almost all of the time.60 Which
outcome is observed in the long-run depends on the parameters of the population in a similar way
to the single generation case. We make the following assumption, which ensures cultural distance
is sufficiently important that the trade-off between maintaining one’s own cultural practices and
forming social ties is economically relevant.61
Assumption 4.2. c ≥ (1− L)(nm + 1)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 we get the following result.
Proposition 4.3. When the probability of experimenting is small,  → 0, and t → ∞, the
following outcome is observed with probability tending to 1:
(i) When 1− α < L there exists a threshold δ∗ such that
Assimilation by the minority group is observed if nm/n ≤ δ∗ − 1/n;
Segregation is observed if nm/n ≥ δ∗ + 1/n.
59As described in Young (1993), the process we model ‘selects the equilibrium that is easiest to flow into from
all other states combined, including both equilibrium and non-equilibrium states’.
60There is a unique stationary distribution which puts all weight on a single state.
61It is made for ease of exposition. If Assumption 4.2 does not hold, then the cost of switching culture is low,
and both assimilation to M or assimilation to m could persist in the long run. See the proof of Proposition 4.3
for details.
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(ii) When 1− α ≥ L+ ( 1nM−1 ) there exists a threshold η∗ such that
Assimilation by the minority group is observed if nm/n ≤ η∗ − 1/n;
Multiculturalism is observed if nm/n ≥ η∗ + 1/n.
In the long-run, a unique outcome emerges (or is more likely to emerge). Proposition 4.3
tells us that if the minority group is small, assimilation occurs and it is the minority group that
assimilates. It also shows that multiculturalism can be sustained as a stable long-run outcome
in a diverse population. This occurs when culture is not too important in everyday life (α low)
and the minority group is large. If culture is very important (α high) and the minority group is
large, then we will see long-run segregation of groups.
Analogous to the single generation model, higher cultural costs, c, allow populations with
a smaller proportion of minority individuals to sustain segregation or multiculturalism in the
long run. A lower importance of culture, α, can ensure multiculturalism is a long-run outcome
instead of segregation, and allows multiculturalism to be sustained in populations with a smaller
proportion of minority individuals. The result that different cultural practices can persist, under
certain parameters, even in the long-run, is consistent with the findings and discussion in Bisin
and Verdier (2000).
The proof of Proposition 4.3 involves assessing the minimum number of shocks needed to
induce a transition from one Nash equilibrium to another, and then aggregating to determine
which of the equilibria is most likely to occur in the long-run. We simplify this by using a ‘tree
pruning’ argument, the details of which can be found below. The +1/n and −1/n terms added
to the thresholds and the small positive term +( 1nM−1 ) in Proposition 4.3 are there to avoid
having to make a more complex statement about what happens at the boundary parameters
between one long-run outcome and another. Details and precise values for thresholds can also
be found below.
The forces driving the results of Proposition 4.3 are intuitive. First, why does the minority
group assimilate and not the majority group? Suppose in generation t the minority group and
majority group adopt their respective cultural practices. In generation t+1 some members of the
minority group experiment by adopting majority culture and interacting with the majority group.
If enough members experiment, then future minority group members will choose to switch and
also adopt majority culture. Since the minority group is smaller, less experimentation is required
to induce further minority group members to optimally choose to assimilate to majority culture
than if we repeat the same scenario with the majority group. For a similar reason, assimilation
occurs only when minority individuals constitute a small share of the population: the smaller the
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minority group, the less experimentation it takes to induce movement in the minority population
towards assimilation.
A natural extension of the multiple generation framework would allow the costs of practices
to change over generations. If a parent assimilates, the cost to the child of switching culture may
be less than the cost the parent faced. Alternatively, where a parental generation segregates and
further differentiates non-cultural actions, the child may face type-specific costs over the actions
for which the parents faced no cost.62 This would be an interesting avenue for future research.63
Proof of Proposition 4.3
The process described defines an aperiodic and irreducible Markov Chain; it therefore has a
unique stationary distribution. We briefly describe our notation and method of computing the
stationary distribution as  → 0. We refer to the strict Nash equilibria of the game, denoted
here by σ, as nodes. There is a minimum number of players required to make a mistake in their
strategy for there to be a positive probability of transiting from one strict Nash equilibrium,
call it σ′, to another strict Nash equilibrium, say σ, by the best response dynamics. We refer
to this minimum mistake transition from node σ′ to node σ as the link from σ′ to σ and the
minimum number of players required to make a mistake as its weight. A path from node σ′ to
σ is a sequence of directed links starting at σ′ and connecting to σ. A σ − tree is graph with
no cycles such that for each strict Nash equilibrium σ′ 6= σ a unique path connects it (directly
or indirectly) to σ. The stochastic potential of σ is the total weight of the σ − tree whose links
sum to the lowest total weight. A stochastically stable state is a state with positive probability
in the stationary distribution when  → 0. The stochastically stable states are the strict Nash
equilibria with minimum stochastic potential. This result and details can be found in Young
(1993).64
To find the σ − tree for each strict Nash equilibrium σ would involve enumerating a lot of
possibilities. We use a tree-pruning argument to simplify things. We first give the proof for the
case where 1− α < L, and then for the complementary parameter range.
62Observe, it is not the case that cultural costs necessarily fall over generations. Suppose one individual from
the parent generation experiments and assimilates while the rest of his group segregates. Then the cost to his
child of speaking the other group’s language falls somewhat. However that child may still find it preferable to
choose to segregate, in which case the costs of speaking the other group’s language may go up again for the
grandchild.
63One way to do this would be to combine the current framework with features of Kuran and Sandholm (2008),
which allows costs of taking an action to change as actions taken change.
64This result also requires that the process without experimenting converges almost surely to a strict Nash
equilibria. This is straightforward and, for completeness, is found at the end of this Appendix.
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Proof for the case when culture is relatively important
The proof here is given for the parameter range 1−α < L. The result for the reverse inequality
is given below.
Lemma 4.1. Partition the strict Nash equilibria into three sets: segregation; assimilation to M
(‘M -assimilation’); and assimilation to m (‘m-assimilation’). Such a set is denoted Σz1 , and
z1 ∈ {s,M,m} respectively indexes the set. All equilibria in a set, σ ∈ Σz1 , have the same
stochastic potential.
Proof. Equilibria in a given set are symmetric so, for any σ − tree, an equivalent σ − tree
can be constructed with the same total weight for any other equilibrium in the same set.
Lemma 4.2. A strict Nash equilibrium σˆ ∈ Σz1 has lower stochastic potential than a strict Nash
equilibrium σ˜ ∈ Σz2 , z2 6= z1, if the link from σ˜ to σˆ has lower weight than the link from σˆ to σ
for all σ ∈ Σz3 , for all z3 6= z1.
Proof. Take a tree which defines the stochastic potential of node σ˜. Denote by pσ1σ˜ the path
from some node denoted σ1 to σ˜ in such a tree. Next find the link from σ˜ to σˆ and denote
this link by lσ˜σˆ. Adding this link to the tree forms a graph that contains paths from all nodes
to σˆ, since the graph contains the path pσ1σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ for all σ1. Observe that the tree to σ˜ must
involve a link from the chosen σˆ equilibrium to some other node σ2, denoted lσˆσ2 . This link,
lσˆσ2 is incorporated into a path from σ1 as follows: pσ1σˆ + lσˆσ2 + pσ2σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ (where it can be
that σ1 = σˆ, so the path starts at σˆ, and/or σ2 = σ˜ so the link from σˆ in the original tree is
directly to σ˜). It is clear that by deleting the link lσˆσ2 there is still a path from any node to the
node σˆ. If the weight of the link added (lσ˜σˆ) is lower than the weight of the link deleted (some
lσˆσ2) then the lowest weight tree to σˆ has lower total weight than the lowest weight tree to σ˜.
To show that one need only examine links from σˆ out of the set Σz1 , observe the following.
If the link lσˆσ2 is to some σ2 ∈ Σz1 , then the path pσ2σ˜ must include a link from a node in Σz1 ,
denoted σ3 to a node, denoted σ4, where σ4 ∈ Σz2 , z2 6= z1, (where it could be that σ3 = σ2).
The path lσˆσ2 + pσ2σ˜ must include a path from σˆ to σ3 that links only nodes in Σz1 . Now delete
the link from σ3 to σ4 ∈ Σz2 , lσ3σ4 , and reverse all links on the path from σˆ to σ3. This changes
the path pσ1σˆ + lσˆσ2 +pσ2σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ into the following paths pσ1σˆ, pσ3σˆ, and pσ4σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ. By deleting
the link lσ3σ4 there is still a path from any node on the path pσ1σˆ + lσˆσ2 + pσ2σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ to the node
σˆ. Similarly if the path from any node j includes any node on the path pσ1σˆ + lσˆσ2 + pσ2σ˜ + lσ˜σˆ
then there continues to be a link to σˆ. Observe that reversing a link between two nodes in a
given set does not change the weight of the link. Thus if the weight of link lσ3σ4 is higher than
that of link lσ˜σˆ then the lowest weight tree to σˆ has lower total weight than the lowest weight
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tree to σ˜. To conclude the proof, note that equilibria are symmetric so the path lσ3σ4 will have
an analogous path from σˆ. 2
To simplify notation, we denote an equilibrium where both types play (xM , yA) by (M,A)
and analogously for other assimilation equilibria. We denote an equilibrium where type M
play (xM , yA) and type m play (xm, yB) by (M,A;m,B), and analogously for other segregation
equilibria. The lowest weight link between each group, denoted φ, is detailed in Table 4.5. For
now we allow the weight of a link to be a real number, φ ∈ R, and address the integer nature of
mistakes at the end of the proof. Given Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the following statements follow in
a straightforward manner from Table 4.5.
M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential than segregation when φsM < φMs.
Take the lowest weight tree to any segregation strict Nash equilibrium. The lowest weight link
from this node to some M -assimilation equilibrium is φsM . It can be seen from Table 4.5 that
the weight of any link from M -assimilation to m-assimilation, or to segregation, is at least φMs.
Thus the result follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2.
Segregation has lower stochastic potential than M -assimilation when φMs < φsM .
Take the lowest weight tree to any M -assimilation equilibrium. The lowest weight link from this
node to some segregation equilibrium is φMs. Any link from segregation to M -assimilation, or
to m-assimilation, has weight at least φsM . By Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 the statement holds.
Segregation has lower stochastic potential than m-assimilation when φMs < φsM .
The lowest weight link from any m-assimilation equilibrium to segregation is φMs. The result
follows as above.
M -assimilation has equal stochastic potential to m-assimilation when φsM < φsm < φMs.
Take the lowest weight tree to any M -assimilation equilibrium. The lowest weight link from
this node to some m-assimilation equilibrium is φMs, since φsm < φMs. Any link from m-
assimilation to M -assimilation, or to segregation, has weight at least φMs, since φsM < φMs.
By Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, m-assimilation has weakly lower stochastic potential than M -
assimilation. Starting from the lowest weight tree to any m-assimilation equilibrium repeat the
process to show M -assimilation has weakly lower stochastic potential than m-assimilation.
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M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential than m-assimilation when φsM < φMs < φsm.
Take the lowest weight tree to any m-assimilation equilibrium. Suppose this lowest weight tree
includes a link from one of the segregation equilibria to (m,A) or (m,B). The minimum weight
link from some segregation equilibrium to some m-assimilation equilibrium is φsm. Delete this
link and form a link from the same segregation equilibrium, by the lowest weight link, to either
(M,A) or (M,B), which will have weight φsM . The new graph has strictly lower total weight.
Now form a link from the m-assimilation equilibrium to the same node, either (M,A) or (M,B),
which will be weight φMs, and delete a link from the node either (M,A) or (M,B), which are all
of weight at least φMs. Thus we have a graph from all nodes to (M,A) or (M,B) with strictly
lower total weight than the tree to m-assimilation.
Suppose instead the lowest weight tree to any m-assimilation equilibrium has no link from
a segregation equilibria to (m,A) or (m,B). Then there must be a link from either (M,A) or
(M,B) to either (m,A) or (m,B) in order to have a tree to m-assimilation. Now a link from
either (M,A) or (M,B) has the same weight to either (m,A) or (m,B) so we can replace it
with a link to the chosen m-assimilation equilibrium while maintaining the tree and without
affecting the weight of the tree. Now we delete this link and form the reverse link from the
chosen m-assimilation equilibrium to the node (M,A) or (M,B) whose link to m-assimilation
was just deleted. The graph now has strictly lower weight and maintains a link to all nodes.
Above we suppose φ ∈ R. Since our population is discrete, the minimum weights are in
fact the lowest integer greater than or equal to a given φ. Given the discrete nature of the
population the equilibrium is guaranteed to be unique when φMs < φsM if φsM − φMs ≥ 1
and when φMs > φsM if φMs − φsM ≥ 1. Since φsM R φMs implies nm R n − c/(1 − L),
φsM − φMs ≥ 1 is equivalent to nm ≥ n − c/(1 − L) + 1 = δ∗ + 1, and φMs − φsM ≥ 1 is
equivalent to nm ≤ n − c/(1 − L) − 1 = δ∗ − 1. M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential
than m-assimilation when φsm > φMs, allowing for discreteness requires φsm − φMs ≥ 1 which
implies nm ≤ c/(1− L)− 1. This final inequality is Assumption 4.2.
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Proof for the case when culture is relatively unimportant
The proof here is given for the parameter range 1− α > L.
Lemma 4.1 becomes Lemma 4.3:
Lemma 4.3. Partition the strict Nash equilibria into four sets: segregation; multiculturalism;
M -assimilation; and m-assimilation. Such a set is denoted Σz1 and z1 ∈ {s, u,M,m} respectively
indexes the set. All equilibria in a set, σ ∈ Σz1 , have the same stochastic potential.
Lemma 4.2 continues to apply. Notation is simplified in the same way as the proof for
1−α < L. Table 4.6 finds the lowest weight link between sets i.e. from some node in set Σz1 to
some node in another set Σz2 .
Multiculturalism has lower stochastic potential than M -assimilation when φMu < φuM .
Take the lowest weight tree to an M -assimilation equilibrium. The lowest weight link from this
node to some multiculturalism equilibrium is φMu. It can be seen from Table 4.6 that the weight
of any link from multiculturalism to M -assimilation, m-assimilation or segregation is at least the
minimum of φuM and
nm−1
2 +
1−α−L
2(1−L) nM . Observe φuM + φMu = nm − 1 and so φMu < nm−12 .
Thus the result follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Multiculturalism has lower stochastic potential than m-assimilation when φMu < φuM .
The transit from m-assimilation to multiculturalism also has weight φMu so the argument follows
as above.
M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential than multiculturalism when φuM < φMu.
Observe that φuM is the lowest weight transition from multiculturalism to M -assimilation when
φuM < φMu since then φuM <
nm−1
2 . From Table 4.6, any transition from M -assimilation to
multiculturalism, segregation or m-assimilation has weight at least φMu (since φMs > φMu).
The result follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential than segregation when φuM < φMu.
The transit from segregation to M -assimilation has lower weight than φuM and so the result
follows from above.
Multiculturalism has lower stochastic potential than segregation when φMu < φuM .
The inequality φMu < φuM implies
n−1
2 − c2α < nm−nM−12 + c2α which implies nM < cα .
Thus the lowest weight link from segregation to some multiculturalism equilibrium requires
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nm−1
2 − 1−α−L2(1−L) nM mistakes. It can be seen from Table 4.6 that any link out of multiculturalism
is of weight at least the minimum of φuM and
nm−1
2 +
1−α−L
2(1−L) nM .
M -assimilation has lower stochastic potential than m-assimilation when φuM < φMu and φsm >
φMs.
Observe φum > φsm > φMs > φMu > φuM . Since φMu > φuM then nM > c/α and so
φMs > φsM but we know φMu < φMs and so φMu is the minimum weight transition from
m-assimilation to M -assimilation.
Without loss of generality consider the tree to (m,A). Suppose the tree has a link from
(M,A) to (m,A), which is of weight φum, or from (M,A) to (m,B), which is of weight φsm.
Form a link from (m,A) to (M,A), of weight φMu, and delete the link from (M,A) that goes to
either (m,A) or (m,B), to form a tree to (M,A) with strictly lower total weight. Suppose the
new tree has a link from (M,B) to (m,A), which is of weight φsm, or from (M,B) to (m,B),
which is of weight φum. Delete this link and form (m,A) to (M,B), of weight φMs, to form a
tree to (M,B) with strictly lower total weight.
Suppose instead the tree to (m,A) has no direct links from any M -assimilation node to any
m-assimilation node. Then there must be a direct link from segregation and/or multiculturalism
to some m-assimilation node. Suppose the direct link is from (MA;mA) to either (m,A) or
(m,B). This link is of weight at least φum or
nm−1
2 +
1−α−L
2(1−L) nM . Delete such a link and from
the same node send the link instead to (M,A) of weight φuM <
nm−1
2 .
65 Now form a link from
(m,A) to (M,A) of weight φMu and delete any link from (M,A) which are all of weight at least
φMu. Suppose the direct link is from (MA;mB) to either (m,A) or (m,B). This link is of
weight at least φsm. Delete such a link and from the same node send the link instead to (M,A)
of weight φsM . Now form a link from (m,A) to (M,A) of weight φMu and delete any link from
(M,A) which are all of weight at least φMu.
Finally suppose none of the other links are present in the tree to (m,A). Then there must
be a link from (mB;mA) or (MB;mB) to either (m,A) or (m,B) or both, and no other direct
links. Transfer all such links to (M,B) which, as above, produces a graph of strictly lower total
weight. Every node now has a path to (M,B) apart from (m,A) (and possibly (m,B) if it links
directly to (m,A)). So finally form a link from (m,A) to (MA;mA) of weight φMu and delete
a link from (M,B) which is at least φMu.
65Observe that the difference between φuM and φum is the same as the difference between φsM and φsm.
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For φ ∈ R, under any parameters there is a unique set, Σz1 , with lowest stochastic potential.
However, in a finite population φ is discrete. Because of this discreteness we can get intervals
where the set is not unique. To avoid issues associated with discreteness we examine the param-
eter range |φuM−φMu| ≥ 1. Then φuM−φMu ≥ 1 implies nm ≥ n−c/α+1, and φMu−φuM ≥ 1
implies nm ≤ n−c/α−1. To avoid the same issues associated with discreteness close to parame-
ter values 1−L = α we also require nm−12 + 1−α−L2(1−L) nM−min{φMu, φuM} ≥ 1. Since φuM+φMu =
nm − 1 combined with the assumption φuM − φMu ≥ 1 implies min{φMu, φuM} ≤ nm−12 − 12 ,
this implies 1− L ≥ α+ 1nM−1 .66 Finally Assumption 2 continues to ensure φsm − φMs ≥ 1.
Proof that the Markov process converges almost surely to a strict Nash equilibrium
We show there exists no recurrence class other than the strict Nash equilibria. To do so it suffices
to show that from any state there are a finite number of positive probability events which lead
to a strict Nash equilibrium.
Suppose n1 ≤ n players play (M,A), n2 ≤ n players play (m,A), n3 ≤ n players play (M,B)
and n4 ≤ n players play (m,B), where either type can be playing either action. With positive
probability a given type M is selected to update his strategy. Suppose the type M does (at
least weakly) best by playing (M,A), and chooses (M,A). Suppose next a different individual
of type M is selected to update his strategy; again this occurs with positive probability. This
individual must strictly prefer (M,A) since the payoff from playing (M,A) relative to other
actions has strictly increased and it was weakly optimal for a type M in the previous period.
Let this continue such that all type M are selected and no type m. All type M now play (M,A).
Next a given type m is selected to update his strategy with positive probability. His optimal
strategy may be either (M,A), (m,A), or (m,B). He chooses one of these actions. Let this
continue until all type m have been selected to update their strategy. The action chosen by the
first type m agent selected to update his strategy is strictly best for all type m that follow. The
process arrives at a strict Nash equilibrium since all type M play (M,A) and all type m play one
of either (M,A), (m,A), or (m,B). Thus we have either assimilation by type m, segregation,
or multiculturalism. The same argument holds if instead the initial type M selected to update
his strategy selects (M,B). If instead the initial type M selected to update his strategy selects
(m,A), then all type M or m that follow must do strictly best by playing (m,A). The result
follows. Similarly if instead the initial type M selected does best by playing (m,B).
66This also guarantees that the alternative link from segregation to mulitculturalism has weight at least one unit
higher than the alternative link from multiculturalism to segregation: nm−1
2
+ 1−α−L
2(1−L) nM−[nm−12 − 1−α−L2(1−L) nM ] ≥
1.
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4.8 Additional empirical results
Table 4.7: Number of observed cohorts by nationality
Minimum cohort size of
(1) 30 (2) 20 (3) 40
Germany 303 455 234
Italy 291 404 225
Poland 196 276 149
Canada 174 259 116
Britain 167 248 127
Russia 151 219 122
Sweden 139 242 96
Ireland 133 185 109
Mexico 59 102 38
Other 133 227 91
Total 1746 2617 1307
Notes. Number of cohorts we observe, broken down by nationality. Co-
horts are defined by nationality, county, tenure in the US grouped to the
nearest 10 years, and year of arrival in 10 year bands. Column (1) shows
the number of cohorts when we require cohorts to contain a minimum
of 30 people. Columns (2) and (3) show how these results change when
thresholds of 20 or 40 are used instead. Germany includes Germans and
Austrians. Sweden includes Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Other is
composed (in order of size, at cohort size 30) of Romania, Japan, Nether-
lands, Greece, Finland, Portugal, West Indies, France, China, Spain, Bel-
gium, Cuba, South America. These nationalities are treated as seperate
from each other in our analysis, and are aggregated here only for brevity.
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Chapter 5
The Dynamic Effects of Tax
Audits
1
5.1 Introduction
Central to the efficient functioning of a modern tax authority is the ability to assess and collect
tax revenue owed by taxpayers in a timely and cost-effective manner. One tool used by many
tax authorities to help achieve this aim is taxpayer audits. Audits have a mechanical benefit
in terms of the unpaid revenue they identify and recover. Historically, this is primarily what
tax authorities such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have focused on when selecting tax
returns for further scrutiny (see Bloomquist, 2013). However, since most taxpayers both pay
taxes over many years and interact with other taxpayers, it is important to understand the extent
of any indirect (behavioural) effects of audits that arise due to updated information about the
likelihood, effectiveness or cost of audits. These indirect effects take two forms: dynamic effects
and spillover effects. Dynamic effects are changes in the future behaviour of audited taxpayers.
Spillover effects are changes in the behaviour of other taxpayers who know an audited taxpayer.2
Measuring these wider impacts of audits is crucial for determining audit strategy including the
optimal extent of enforcement.
1This chapter is co-authored with William Elming and Jonathan Shaw. The authors thank Richard Blundell,
Tracey Bowler, Monica Costa Dias, Costas Meghir, Imran Rasul and seminar participants at the Tax Systems
Conference in October 2014, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference in April 2015, the International Institute
of Public Finance Annual Congress in August 2015, the Louis-Andre´ Ge´rard-Varet Conference in June 2016 and
the European Economic Association Annual Conference in August 2016 for helpful comments. This work contains
statistical data from HMRC which is Crown Copyright. The research datasets used may not exactly reproduce
HMRC aggregates. The use of HMRC statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of HMRC in
relation to the interpretation or analysis of the information.
2There is also the possibility of a general deterrence effect of audits that extends beyond the group of taxpayers
who know someone who has been audited.
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In this chpater we study the dynamic effects of audits on individual income tax payers in
the UK. Our contribution is twofold: we demonstrate how the response to audits evolves over
time and show how it varies across different income sources subject to varying degrees of third-
party reporting. Typically, this is challenging to do robustly because most audits are targeted
towards taxpayers believed to be noncompliant. We address this by exploiting a random audit
programme run by the UK tax authority (HM Revenue and Customs, HMRC) that focuses on
income tax self-assessment taxpayers. As a control group, we use individuals who could have
been selected for a random audit but weren’t. The parameter we estimate is an intention to
treat (ITT) parameter because some of those assigned to audit do not end up being audited
(e.g. because their case is not worked before the required deadline). Thus, our results should be
interpreted as the effect of being selected for random audit relative to a baseline of not being
selected for random audit but facing the normal policy environment, which includes a small
chance of a targeted audit.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that audits lead to a modest increase in
survival in self assessment for two years after the audit that peaks at 1.1 percentage points
and is consistent with individuals being more diligent in filing their tax returns while audit
investigations are ongoing. Second, we uncover little in the way of an impact on reported total
taxable income and total tax, except for a statistically significant increase in total taxable income
of £795 (3.0 per cent of taxable income) in the second year after audit. Nevertheless, while not
significant, some of the point estimates remain substantial. Third, we demonstrate that there are
marked differences in the response across different reported income components. Components
not subject to third-party reporting tend to experience a significant increase after audit. For
example, self-employment earnings and property income peak 5.6 per cent and 7.9 per cent
higher respectively, but these increases largely fall away after four years, suggesting individuals
are reverting to their old behaviour. In contrast, audits do not seem to have an impact on income
components that are subject to third-party reporting, such as employment earnings, suggesting
compliance levels here are already high. Pension income does record a significant and sustained
increase after audit despite extensive third-party reporting, a pattern that might be due to the
correction of previously undetected errors.
This chapter contributes to a small but growing literature on the dynamic effect of audits.
Kleven et al. (2011) analyse the effect of a tax enforcement field experiment in Denmark. Half
of a sample of income tax filers were randomly audited based on their 2006 return, while the
other half were not. The following year, before 2007 returns had been filed, letters threatening
an audit were randomly assigned to a subset of tax filers in both groups. Declarations in 2007
returns were then followed up. Their results suggest that the overall deterrence effect of audits
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is positive but modest, corresponding to an increase in reported total net income of about 2,500
Danish kroner, or around 1% of income. This effect is driven entirely by self-reported income;
there is no impact on third-party reported income. They do not follow taxpayers beyond the
first year.
Gemmell and Ratto (2012) investigate behavioural responses to taxpayer audits in the UK
in the year 2000 using a much more limited version of the random audit data we use. They find
no impact on overall tax declared. They also distinguish between taxpayers found to be non-
compliant and those found to be compliant, arguing that the former are likely to increase their
subsequent compliance while the latter could reduce their compliance. However, this distinction
between compliant and non-compliant taxpayers is endogenous, making it hard to interpret the
comparison with an unconditionally randomly selected control group as causal.
In work conducted concurrently with this study, DeBacker et al. (2015) investigate the impact
of random audits conducted by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) between 2006 and 2009
on subsequent taxpaying behaviour. They find that audits increase reported taxable income by
over $1,000 per year, equivalent to 2.7% of average income. The effect is only 0.4% for wage
income compared to 7.5% for self-employment income but the former lasts over time while the
latter doesn’t. Over a five-year horizon, the static revenue gain from the audit understates the
total revenue gain by more than half. Earlier studies for the US include Long and Schwartz
(1987), Erard (1992) and Tauchen et al. (1993).
We extend this work by considering a longer horizon (up to eight years after audit) and by
providing a detailed breakdown for different income sources (see DeBacker et al., 2015). For
example, we find somewhat larger initial results than Kleven et al. (2011) but show that these
effects are largely transitory.
Using laboratory experiments, Maciejovsky et al. (2007) and Kastlunger et al. (2009) find that
compliance decreases immediately after an audit, suggestive of a ‘bomb-crater effect’.3 These
studies are based on experiments using students. Choo et al. (2013), whose results are based on
an experiment with taxpayers rather than students, do not find any evidence of a bomb crater
effect. Bruttel and Friehe (2014) explore in an experimental context whether past enforcement
regimes have an impact on current income declarations. We build on this work by demonstrating
that a bomb crater effect does not exist for taxpayers as a whole, based on a set of real (rather
than experimental) compliance decisions.
3The ‘bomb-crater effect’ refers to the idea that individuals might perceive the risk of being audited to fall
immediately after an audit. The name originates from preference of World War I soldiers to hide out in bomb
craters, believing that it was unlikely that a bomb would strike exactly the same place again (see Mittone, 2006).
A competing explanation for the decline in reported tax following an audit is the mechanism of loss repair:
experiencing an audit may make taxpayers “want to evade more in the future in an attempt to ‘get back’ at the
tax agency” (see Andreoni et al., 1998, p. 844).
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the policy context
and data sources, while Section 5.3 sets out the method we use. The results are presented in
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Policy context
In this chapter, we focus on individuals who file an income tax self assessment return in the UK.
Self assessment returns are used to collect three main taxes: income tax, National Insurance
contributions and capital gains tax. Income tax is the largest of all UK taxes, contributing 25.0
per cent of total government receipts in 2014-15. Most sources of income are subject to income
tax, including earnings, retirement pensions, income from property, interest on deposits in bank
accounts, dividends and some welfare benefits. Income tax is levied on an individual basis and
operates through a system of allowances and bands. Each individual has a personal allowance,
which is deducted from total income. The remainder—taxable income—is then subject to a
progressive schedule of tax rates. National Insurance contributions comprised 16.8 per cent of
government receipts in 2014-15. It operates through a similar system of allowances and bands
as income tax but is levied only on employment earnings and self employment profits. Capital
gains tax made up 0.9 per cent of government receipts in 2014-15. It is levied on the increase
in the value of assets when ownership changes. The structure of the tax has been reformed a
number of times; for much of our period of interest the tax rate individuals faced depended on
the type of asset, the holding period and their marginal income tax rate.
Unlike the US, not all taxpayers have to file a tax return in the UK: for the tax year 2014-15,
around 10 million individuals filed a return (around 30 million individuals were liable for income
tax). Individuals required to submit a tax return tend to be individuals with forms of income
not subject to withholding or for whom the tax system struggles to calculate and withhold the
right amount of tax. It includes self-employed individuals, those with incomes over £100,000,
company directors, landlords and many pensioners.
Since incomes covered by self assessment tend to be harder to verify, there is a significant
risk of non-compliance. As a result, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC, the UK tax authority)
carries out audits each year to deter non-compliance and recover lost revenue. HMRC runs
two types of audit. Targeted audits are based on perceived risks of non-compliance. Random
audits are used to ensure that all self-assessment taxpayers face a positive probability of being
audited, as well as to collect information about the scale of non-compliance and predictors of
non-compliance.
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The timeline for the audit process is as follows. The tax year ends on 5 April. Shortly after
the end of the tax year, HMRC issues a ‘notice to file’ to taxpayers who they believe need to
submit a tax return. This is based on information that HMRC held shortly before the end of
the tax year. Random audit cases are provisionally selected from the population of individuals
issued with a notice to file. The deadline by which taxpayers must submit their tax return is 31
January the following calendar year (e.g. 31 January 2010 for the 2008-09 tax year). Once returns
have been submitted, HMRC deselects some random audit cases (e.g. due to an audit already
being open or having recently concluded). At the same time, targeted audits are selected on
the basis of the information provided in self-assessment returns and other intelligence. Random
audits are selected before targeted audits, and individuals cannot be selected for a targeted
audit in the same tax year as a random audit. The list of taxpayers to be audited is passed
on to local compliance teams who carry out the audits. Audits must be opened within a year
of the date when the return was filed.4 Taxpayers subject to an audit are informed when it
is opened but they are not told whether it is a random or targeted audit. A small number of
taxpayers on the list passed on to local compliance teams end up not being audited, typically
due to resource constraints. Because deselections and non-worked cases are not random, we
cannot simply compare individuals who actually get audited under the random audit program
with non-audited individuals. We discuss the implications for what parameter we are able to
recover in Subsection 5.3.1.
5.2.2 Data
We exploit data on income tax self assessment random audits together with information on
income tax returns. This combines a number of different HMRC datasets, linked together on
the basis of encrypted taxpayer reference number and tax year.
Audit records for tax years 1998-99 to 2008-09 come from CQI (Compliance Quality Initia-
tive), an HMRC operational dataset that records audits made into income tax self assessment
and corporation tax self assessment returns. It does not include audits by the HMRC’s Large
Business Service, Special Investigations or Employer Compliance Reviews. It includes opera-
tional information about the audits, such as start and end dates and audit outcomes (whether
noncompliance was found, and the size of any correction, penalties and interest).
We track individuals before and after the audit using information from tax returns for the
years 1998-99 to 2011-12. This comes from two datasets: SA302 and Valid View. The SA302
dataset contains information that is sent out to taxpayers summarising their income and tax
liability (the SA302 tax calculation form). It is derived from self assessment returns, which
4For tax returns relating to 2006-07 or earlier, audits had to be opened within a year from the 31 January
filing deadline for returns filed on time.
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have been put through a tax calculation process. It contains information about total income
and tax liability as well as a breakdown into different income sources (employment earnings,
self employment profits, pensions, property income etc). For all of these variables, we uprate to
2012 using the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Winsorise at the 99.95th percentile to avoid
outliers having an undue impact on the results. We supplement these variables with information
from Valid View, a dataset that draws directly from individuals’ tax returns. For our purposes,
Valid View provides demographics and filing information (e.g. filing date). Note that we cannot
identify actual compliance behaviour subsequent to the audit: the number of random audit
taxpayers that are re-audited is far too small for it to be possible to focus just on them.
5.2.3 Audit descriptives
Table 5.1 shows the average number of individuals per year who face an income tax random
audit over the period 1998-99 to 2008-09.5 HMRC selected an average of 3,299 cases for random
audits and 178,829 cases for targeted audits per year. The corresponding probabilities of being
selected for an audit are 0.04 per cent (four in 10,000) for random audits and 2.1 per cent for
targeted audits.
Table 5.1: Average number of cases selected for income tax audits
Number per year Audit probability
Random 3,299 0.0004
Targeted 178,829 0.0210
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998-99 to 2008-09. Includes all individuals who face an audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
Table 5.2 provides some summary statistics for lags in, and durations of, the audit process
among random audit cases. As described above, up to and including the 2006-07 return, HMRC
had to begin an audit within 12 months of the 31 January filing deadline; since then, HMRC
has had to begin an audit within 12 months of the filing date. The average lag between when
the tax return was filed and when the random audit was started is 8.9 months, but 10 per cent
have a lag of 14 months or more. The average duration of audits is 5.3 months, but 10 per cent
experience a duration of 13 months or more. Taken together, this means that the average time
between when a return is filed and when the audit is concluded is 14.3 months but there is a
long tail for whom the experience is much more drawn out: for 10 per cent it is almost two years
or more. This means that individuals will generally have filed at least one subsequent tax return
before the outcome of the audit is clear and some will have filed two tax returns. This will be
relevant for interpreting the results in Section 5.4.
5There are also a small number of partnerships and trusts that are audited, but we exclude these from our
analysis.
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Table 5.2: Random audit lags and durations
Mean Std. dev. Median 75th 90th
Lag to audit start (months) 8.9 4.0 9 11 14
Audit duration (months) 5.3 6.6 3 7 13
Total time to audit end (months) 14.3 7.3 13 17 23
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998-99 to 2008-09. Includes all individuals with a completed random
audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
Table 5.3 summarises the outcomes of random audits on individuals. More than half of all
returns are found to be correct, 11 per cent are found to be incorrect but with no underpay-
ment of tax and 36 per cent are ‘non-compliant’ and have a tax underpayment. Among the
non-compliant, the average additional tax owed is £1,912 (across all taxpayers, the figure is
£683). However, the distribution is heavily skewed: 65 per cent of non-compliant individuals
owe additional tax of £1,000 or less, whilst a small fraction (three per cent) owe more than
£10,000.
Table 5.3: Random audit outcomes
Mean Std. dev.
Proportion of audited returns deemed
Correct 0.533 0.499
Incorrect but no underpayment 0.111 0.314
Incorrect with underpayment (non-compliant) 0.357 0.479
Mean additional tax if non-compliant (£) 1,912 8,177
Distribution of additional tax if non-compliant
Share £1-100 0.149 0.356
Share £101-1,000 0.498 0.500
Share £1,001-10,000 0.324 0.468
Share £10,001+ 0.029 0.169
Notes: Annual averages for tax years 1998-99 to 2008-09. Includes all individuals with a completed random
audit.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Parameters of interest
For each taxpayer in self assessment, we observe the amount of tax paid in year t + h, Yt+h.
If D(t) is the event that a taxpayer is audited in year t, then we can define the tax paid h
years after audit as Yt+h|D(t). The question we wish to answer is: what effect do audits have
on individuals subsequent tax reporting decisions? A second question is: how does this vary
across income components subject to differing degrees of third-party reporting? More formally,
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we want to know the average effect of an audit on the expected tax liability h years after audit:
βATEth = E [Yt+h|D(t) = 1]− E [Yt+h|D(t) = 0] (5.1)
This parameter is an average across tells us the average amount of additional tax HMRC should
expect to receive h years after an audit in year t if they select taxpayers to audit uniformly
randomly from the population of self-assessment taxpayers. We are interested in knowing this
parameter averaged across all audit years, βATEh = E [[]βATEth ]. We are also interested in the
corresponding parameters for reported total income and income components (rather than for
tax liability).
To answer these questions, we compare a treatment group of all individuals who are selected
for a random tax audit in year t, denoted Z(t) = 1, to a control group of individuals who could
have been selected for a random audit, but who weren’t, Z(t) = 0. Since we have data on the full
population of taxpayers, our potential control group is very large. For computational reasons,
we limit the control group to being six times the size of the treatment group in each year t. A
simple comparison of the average tax paid between the two groups, gives us the average effect of
being assigned to the audit group (sometimes described as the ‘intention to treat’ parameter):
βITTth = E [Yt+h|Z(t) = 1]− E [Yt+h|Z(t) = 0] (5.2)
Again, we average this across audit years, βITTh = E [[]βITTth ]. If compliance were perfect, so all
individuals in the treatment group and none in the control group were audited, i.e. Z(t) = D(t),
then this would be equal to the average treatment effect parameter, βATEh . However, there
are three reasons why these parameters differ in the present context: (i) targeted audits; (ii)
deselections; and (iii) incomplete auditing. We discuss these in turn.
First, HMRC’s targeted audit programme selects for audit individuals who they believe are
likely to be cheating. This happens after random audit cases have been selected (see Subsec-
tion 5.2.1). As a result, our control group will contain a small number of high-risk taxpayers
who have been audited (Table 5.1 suggests that around 2 per cent of cases will be affected). To
the extent that these individuals respond to audit, the intention to treat parameter will differ
from the desired average treatment effect such that βITTh will be attenuated relative to β
ATE
h .
A second issue is that some taxpayers are deselected from audit after being assigned to
the treatment group. In the majority of cases, this happens because the notice to file has
been sent to a taxpayer that does not need to file a return (e.g. they no longer meet the self-
assessment criteria). This does not cause a problem for us, since the parameter of interest is
defined for individuals who are in self assessment in the audit year. We therefore exclude these
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individuals from both the treatment and control groups. However, a small number of individuals
are deselected despite filing a tax return. In 2008-09, this affected 4 per cent of those initially
assigned to the treatment group. The main reason this happens is if an audit is already open or
has recently concluded. In these cases, no audit will be carried out. This will again mean that
the estimated βITTh parameter will be attenuated relative to β
ATE
h .
A third reason why the intention to treat parameter will differ from the average treatment
effect is that not all taxpayers who are selected for a random audit actually end up being audited.
Having been selected for a random audit, taxpayers’ details are passed to local compliance teams,
where random (and targeted) audits are worked by compliance officers. While these officers are
informed that random audit cases are considered high priority, they often receive more cases
than they can complete and so some (around 5 per cent in 2008-09) end up not being worked.
This again will tend to attenuate the estimated βITTh parameter relative to β
ATE
h , but the effect
of this may not be large if (as seems reasonable) the cases left until last are the ones with the
lowest expected return.
These three reasons mean that the intention to treat parameter we recover will differ from
the average treatment effect. Given the arguments above, the estimated βITTh parameter will
attenuated relative to βATEh .
5.3.2 Assessing balancing
The approach just outlined exploits the randomisation of the random audit programme to select
a suitable control group. For this to be a valid approach, we need random audits to have been
selected randomly. We check this by carrying out a set of balancing tests to confirm whether
outcomes in the treatment and control groups are balanced with each other in the run-up to the
audit. We do this between five years and one year before the audit for income and tax totals,
income components and individual characteristics.
Overall balancing statistics suggest that the samples are fairly well balanced. The p-value of
the likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors is 0.181, while the mean
and median absolute standardised percentage bias across all outcomes of interest are low at 2.4
per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively.6 Similarly, Rubin’s B and R statistics are 10.8 and 0.983,
well within reasonable thresholds to consider the samples to be balanced.7
6The standardised percentage bias is the difference in the sample means between treated and control groups
as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups (see
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
7Rubin’s B is the absolute standardized difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score
in the treated and control group. Rubin’s R is the ratio of treated to control variances of the propensity score
index. Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be
considered sufficiently balanced.
243
Table 5.4: Balancing tests of characteristics, income and tax totals, and income
components
Years after audit -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Characteristics
Female Mean 0.274 0.276 0.278 0.282 0.287
Difference -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
p-value 0.221 0.359 0.606 0.627 0.863
Age Mean 49.2 49.3 49.3 49.4 49.5
Difference 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
p-value 0.756 0.586 0.390 0.610 0.057
In London or SE Mean 0.333 0.334 0.335 0.333 0.331
Difference -0.006 0.001* 0.004* 0.002 0.002
p-value 0.177 0.025 0.011 0.281 0.152
Has tax agent Mean 0.628 0.614 0.603 0.589 0.573
Difference 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005
p-value 0.547 0.508 0.405 0.396 0.412
Survives Mean 0.624 0.669 0.728 0.803 0.892
Difference 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.050***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income and tax totals
Total taxable income Mean 35,075 34,670 34,030 32,912 31,755
Difference 881 492 403* 1,051* 1,095*
p-value 0.374 0.157 0.028 0.012 0.012
Total tax Mean 9,646 9,539 9,321 8,979 8,635
Difference 260 63 82 310 337*
p-value 0.539 0.303 0.055 0.064 0.027
Income components
Employment Mean 22,508 22,534 22,266 21,708 21,145
Difference -31 -136 180* 909** 721*
p-value 0.162 0.371 0.028 0.006 0.027
Self employment Mean 6,546 6,379 6,200 5,950 5,581
Difference 356 328 173 99 200*
p-value 0.151 0.174 0.311 0.106 0.025
Interest and dividends Mean 4,007 3,905 3,895 3,759 3,645
Difference -36 208 18 63 112
p-value 0.767 0.432 0.700 0.578 0.580
Pensions Mean 3,493 3,542 3,561 3,562 3,531
Difference 176 168 128 148 159
p-value 0.425 0.478 0.642 0.307 0.327
Property Mean 869 844 811 769 726
Difference 18 -2 37 47 31
p-value 0.813 0.952 0.576 0.498 0.134
Foreign Mean 194 193 194 181 169
Difference 23 -1 -5 -6 1
p-value 0.759 0.240 0.956 0.317 0.766
Trusts and estates Mean 150 145 145 131 123
Difference 46 17 8 19 8
p-value 0.245 0.367 0.290 0.125 0.367
Share schemes Mean 91 104 68 62 55
Difference 17* 24 22** 11 -6**
p-value 0.043 0.062 0.004 0.132 0.008
Other Mean 80 75 76 73 71
Difference -1 -4 0 5 6
p-value 0.747 0.675 0.645 0.796 0.167
Notes: ‘Mean’ is the mean outcome in the control (not selected for audit) group across all years. ‘Difference’
is the coefficient on the treatment dummy in a regression of the outcome on a treatment dummy. Treatment
dummy equals 1 if taxpayer was selected by HMRC for a random audit. p-values are derived from an F-test
that coefficients on all interactions between treatment and tax year dummies are all zero in a regression of the
outcome of interest on tax year dummies and interactions between treatment and tax year dummies. Tests for all
outcomes other than ‘survives’ are conditional on survives = 1. Monetary values are in 2012 prices. Standard
errors are clustered by taxpayer. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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There are, however, some problems with individual outcome variables, as shown by the t-
tests in Table 5.4. Most important of these is survival (whether the individual remains in self
assessment): there is a strongly significant difference of between three and five percentage points
in all five years before the audit. There are also statistically significant imbalances in total
income and employment income in the three years immediately before audit, total tax and self-
employment income in the year before audit, and income from share schemes in three of the
five years before audit. Other income components and most demographics are well balanced.
Overall, 18 out of 80 tests (22.5 per cent) are significant at the five per cent level.
As a consequence of these differences, we are reluctant to judge the audited and non-audited
samples as being adequately balanced. Imbalances are the result of the audit timeline described
in Subsection 5.2.1. To understand how this happens, consider random audits for the 2006-07
tax year. These were selected on the basis of information held by HMRC in around February
2007. Suppose that by then HMRC had the full list of filers for the 2005-06 tax year, and
that they used only this to select the 2006-07 random audit sample. Then, by definition, every
random audit case they draw will have a 2005-06 tax return. In contrast, we take the actual list
of 2006-07 filers. Some of these will be new to self assessment in 2006-07, so will not be in the
2005-06 self assessment data. Consequently, the proportion of taxpayers that survive one year
before the audit will be higher in the audited group than in the non-audited group—just as we
find.
In reality, things were not quite that simple, but the same underlying arguments apply. In
February 2007, HMRC did already know about some taxpayers who would be first-time filers
for the 2006-07 tax year (e.g. because they had reported it to HMRC). This explains why not
every randomly audited case has a tax return the year before the audit. In addition, HMRC did
not have a complete list of all filers for the 2005-06 tax year: the filing deadline for these returns
(31 January 2007) had only just passed so many of the returns were yet to be processed. This
meant HMRC was partly working off information for 2004-05, two years prior to the tax year in
question.
5.3.3 Propensity score matching approach
One seemingly simple solution to the lack of balancing would be for us to go back and draw our
control sample on the basis of information HMRC held at the time random audits were selected.
Unfortunately, this is not possible because HMRC has not held onto the relevant datasets. We
therefore use propensity score matching techniques to reweight the non-audited group to look
like the audited group.
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Table 5.5: Matched balancing tests of characteristics, income and tax totals, and
income components
Years after audit -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Characteristics
Survives Mean 0.653 0.705 0.770 0.851 0.941
Difference 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.000
p-value 0.532 0.467 0.117 0.654 0.918
Income and tax totals
Total taxable income Mean 22,718 24,120 25,910 27,729 29,480
Difference 235 167 147 278 256
p-value 0.562 0.639 0.663 0.367 0.447
Total tax Mean 6,230 6,591 7,049 7,499 8,083
Difference 55 -1 27 98 91
p-value 0.704 0.991 0.818 0.378 0.452
Income components
Employment Mean 14,534 15,681 17,087 18,667 20,174
Difference -146 -156 -55 158 26
p-value 0.618 0.556 0.831 0.531 0.922
Self employment Mean 4,340 4,569 4,844 5,116 5,415
Difference 161 155 62 1 43
p-value 0.107 0.086 0.466 0.991 0.604
Interest and dividends Mean 2,588 2,693 2,893 3,116 3,438
Difference -79 111 60 23 2
p-value 0.357 0.198 0.447 0.756 0.982
Pensions Mean 2,364 2,592 2,823 3,130 3,507
Difference 27 27 26 17 21
p-value 0.660 0.651 0.635 0.756 0.709
Property Mean 573 594 629 667 703
Difference 3 -3 17 17 14
p-value 0.915 0.882 0.432 0.405 0.508
Foreign Mean 117 123 133 135 141
Difference 14 -2 -3 -4 3
p-value 0.304 0.887 0.791 0.712 0.775
Trusts and estates Mean 87 93 107 100 97
Difference 15 -5 -11 2 5
p-value 0.284 0.663 0.292 0.825 0.621
Share schemes Mean 59 76 50 40 24
Difference 6 5 15 11 5
p-value 0.701 0.758 0.232 0.252 0.412
Other Mean 48 51 56 59 57
Difference 0 -4 0 1 3
p-value 0.966 0.419 0.952 0.876 0.463
Notes: The variables matched upon are survives, total taxable income, total tax and all income components.
‘Mean’ is the mean outcome in the matched control (not selected for audit) group. ‘Difference’ is the mean
difference between matched treated and control groups. p-values are derived from a test that the outcome of
interest is not significantly different between matched treated and control groups. Monetary values are in 2012
prices. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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We use radius matching with a small caliper of 0.0005, though we have experimented with
other matching techniques and it makes little difference to the results. We control for survival,
income and tax totals and all the income components in the two years prior to audit.8 We choose
two years because of the two-year lag in information described above. We match separately for
each audit year and then weight together the results across audit years based on the number
of observations in the audited group. Table 5.5 shows that, once we perform the matching,
all outcomes of interest are balanced across treated and control samples in all five years before
audit.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Aggregate results
In this subsection we present results for survival in self assessment, total taxable income and
total tax; in the following subsection we break these results down by type of income. We consider
outcomes between the tax year selected for audit and eight years after audit. We include the
year of audit as a year potentially affected by the audit because, in some cases, HMRC adjusts
tax returns to reflect underpayments they uncover. Table 5.6 sets out overall results for survival,
total income and total tax liability. Taking survival first, it is not clear a priori what direction
to expect the effect of audit to work: it could increase survival (e.g. because individuals become
more diligent about filing their tax returns) or it could decrease survival (e.g. because borderline
businesses are forced out of existence). In fact we find the former: survival increases by a modest
but statistically significant 0.6 and 1.1 percentage points one and two years after audit. Given
the lags involved in starting and completing audits (see Table 5.2), this corresponds to the period
while many audits are being conducted. The increase in survival is short-lived, however, with
estimates insignificant from year three onwards. This pattern is shown in Figure 5.1, which
also plots pre-audit outcomes to demonstrate balancing. Note that there is no difference in the
year of the audit because everyone in the treatment and control groups is necessarily in self
assessment in that year.
Results for reported total taxable income and total tax in Table 5.6 are averages across all
individuals, including those who do not survive in self assessment. For reported total taxable
income, we find a statistically significant increase of £795 two years after audit, equivalent to 3.0
per cent of average total taxable income. This somewhat larger than the 1 per cent effect found
by Kleven et al. (2011) for Denmark and of a comparable magnitude to the 2.7 per cent found by
8To get balanced samples, it turns out to be sufficient to control just for survival (results available from the
authors on request). We additionally control for income and tax totals and the income components to reduce the
amount of noise in outcomes in the run-up to the audit.
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Figure 5.1: Impact of audit on survival in self assessment
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Notes: ‘Point estimate’ is the difference between treated and control groups and corresponds to the relevant
‘Difference’ row in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Estimates are derived from a propensity score matching procedure
described in Subsection 5.3.3.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
DeBacker et al. (2015) for the US. Increases in subsequent years are not significant but are still
substantial at around £500 until at least the sixth year after audit. This is shown in Figure 5.2.
For total tax, the point estimates are all positive—and indeed are all above £100 from year two
onwards—but none are significant. This is plotted in Figure 5.3. Taking these point estimates
at face value, they suggest a dynamic effect of audit (the amount of additional tax raised aside
from any audit adjustment) of around 0.5 per cent of taxable income each year. The cumulative
additional revenue raised between years one and eight is over £1,000, roughly the same order
of magnitude as the average initial audit adjustment of £700.9 Thus, for total taxable income
and total tax, there is no evidence of a ‘bomb-crater effect’ or loss repair whereby individuals
report less income after the audit. Since we cannot link self-assessment tax records to other
tax records, we cannot see whether non-survivors leave the tax system altogether, or merely
switch to paying tax only through withholding e.g. on employment earnings. For simplicity, our
estimates ignore any spillover effects onto other means of tax collection. Also, we only observe
what taxpayers report, so can’t be sure whether any change in reported income reflects a change
in true underlying income or just in what is reported (though the latter seems more likely).
9£700 is the product of the noncompliant share and the mean additional tax if noncompliant in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.2: Impact of audit on reported total taxable income
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Figure 5.3: Impact of audit on total tax
Notes: ‘Point estimate’ is the difference between audited and non-audited groups and corresponds to the relevant
‘Difference’ row in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Estimates are derived from a propensity score matching procedure
described in Subsection 5.3.3.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Table 5.7: Proportion of individuals reporting positive income, by income com-
ponent
Income component Proportion
Employment 0.309
Self employment 0.240
Interest and dividends 0.420
Pensions 0.193
Property 0.087
Foreign 0.031
Trusts and estates 0.007
Share schemes 0.001
Other 0.020
Notes: Denominator includes non-surviving individuals.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
5.4.2 Results for different income components
We now consider how the results vary across different income components. To help interpret
the results, Table 5.7 shows what proportion of individuals in the control group (including non-
survivors) report positive amounts of each type of income. 31 per cent report employment
earnings, 24 per cent report self employment profits, 42 per cent report interest and dividends
and 19 per cent report pensions. All other categories are reported by less than 10 per cent of
individuals.
Results split by income component are set out in Table 5.8. This table shows that there
are significant impacts on reporting for three of the major types of income: self employment,
pensions and property. The largest of these is reported self-employment profits, where we find
positive dynamic impacts that peak at £272 (5.6 per cent of self-employment profits) in year
two and last until year three but fall away sharply after that. Given that only 24 per cent of
individuals report positive amounts of self employment income, this corresponds to over £1,000
for each self-employed individual, or a total of over £3,000 across the three years after audit.
These patterns are plotted in Figure 5.4.
Reported pension income records a sustained increase that is significant at the five per cent
level in two years (£135 in year four and £167 in year seven) and borderline significant in many
others. This is shown in Figure 5.5. The values in the two significant years correspond to 3.6
and 4.5 per cent of pension income respectively. Given that 19 per cent of individuals report
pension income, this equates to around £700 per pensioner.
There is a significant increase in reported property income of £48, £57 and £51 in years one,
three and four respectively (see Figure 5.6). These figures correspond to between 6.6 and 7.9
per cent of property income. By year six, the difference has fallen back close to zero.
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Figure 5.4: Impact of audit on reported self employment profits
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Figure 5.5: Impact of audit on reported pension income
Notes: ‘Point estimate’ is the difference between audited and non-audited groups and corresponds to the relevant
‘Difference’ row in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Estimates are derived from a propensity score matching procedure
described in Subsection 5.3.3.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 5.6: Impact of audit on reported property income
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Notes: ‘Point estimate’ is the difference between treatment and control groups and corresponds to the relevant
‘Difference’ row in Tables 5.5 and 5.8. Estimates are derived from a propensity score matching procedure
described in Subsection 5.3.3.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
Reported share schemes record a significant decrease in two years and other income a sig-
nificant decrease in one year, but the magnitudes involved are small because such a small pro-
portion of individuals report income of these types. As for the other income types—including
employment income and interests and dividends—none of the differences in reported income are
significant.
What might explain the differing patterns across income components? To get a handle on
the mechanisms involved, Table 5.9 sets out the extent of third-party reporting arrangements
across different income types. Third-party reporting describes the situation in which there is an
obligation on an agent other than the taxpayer (e.g. the employer) to pass information to the
tax authority about income received by the taxpayer. The table shows that there is third-party
reporting for employment earnings, interest, pensions and share schemes; partial third-party
reporting for foreign income, trusts and estates and other income; and no third-party reporting
for dividends, self-employment profits and property income.
There are two main points to note. First, the biggest responses are for income components
where there is little or no third-party reporting. Self-employment profits and property income—
for which there is little third-party reporting—both exhibit substantial reported increases, peak-
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Table 5.9: Third-party reporting arrangements in the UK for different income
components
Income component Degree of third-party reporting
Employment Yes through the employer
Self employment No unless an entertainer, sportsman or contractor in the construction
industry
Interest and dividends Yes through bank for interest, no for dividends
Pensions Yes through pension provider
Property No
Foreign Depends on the jurisdiction
Trusts and estates Partial but complicated
Share schemes Yes
Other Partial
Source: Personal communication with Tracey Bowler, Tax Law Review Committee.
ing at 5.6 per cent and 7.9 per cent respectively. In contrast, in most cases where there is
extensive third-party reporting (e.g. employment income) no significant response is recorded.
This is consistent with the findings in Kleven et al. (2011) and DeBacker et al. (2015), both
of which highlight the importance of third-party information reporting. It also makes intuitive
sense: in the absence of third-party reporting, opportunities for noncompliance are greater, and
therefore it is more likely that there is misreporting that can be corrected. Second, although
the impact on components with little or no third-party reporting lasts for a number of years,
effects are ultimately transitory: four years after the audit the difference between treatment and
control groups has largely returned to zero. This may suggest that taxpayers think they are
being monitored for some time after audit but that this effect dies away so taxpayers revert to
their previous behaviour.
For pension income, the story is different. Here there is widespread third-party reporting,
but nevertheless audits have a dynamic impact and this impact is persistent. The most likely ex-
planation is accidental errors in withholding. Pensioners often end up in self assessment because
they have a number of different pension (and other) income sources that PAYE struggles to deal
with accurately in combination. An audit may bring to light errors that previously lay hidden,
allowing them to be corrected for all future years through revised withholding arrangements.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the dynamic effects of audits on income reported in subsequent tax
returns. Understanding these effects is important both from the perspective of quantifying the
returns to the tax authority an audit, and for assessing the mechanisms by which audits might
influence taxpayer behaviour. To answer this question we exploited a random audit program
run by the UK tax authority (HMRC) under which an average of around 3,000 individuals are
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selected for audit each year. We used data on audits over the period 1998-99 to 2008-09 and
tracked responses in tax returns between 1998-99 and 2011-12.
Our results suggest that audits lead to a modest increase in survival in self assessment for
two years after the audit, peaking at 1.1 percentage points in year two before falling back. This
pattern is consistent with individuals being more diligent in filing their tax returns while audit
investigations are ongoing. For reported total taxable income, we find a statistically significant
increase of £795 two years after audit. Increases in subsequent years are not significant but are
still substantial at around £500 until at least the sixth year after audit. For total tax, the point
estimates are all positive but are not significant.
Breaking these overall results down by income component reveals some marked differences
that point towards the importance of third-party reporting for maintaining high levels of com-
pliance. Reported self-employment profits and property income—neither of which are subject to
third-party reporting—both record significant increases after audit, peaking at the equivalent of
5.6 per cent of self-employment profits and 7.9 per cent of property income. But these increases
largely fall away after year four suggesting individuals are reverting to their old behaviour. In
contrast, income components subject to third-party reporting, such as reported employment
earnings, do not exhibit any significant impact suggesting there is already a high level of com-
pliance for these components. Reported pension income does record a significant and persistent
increase after audit despite extensive third-party reporting, a pattern that might be due to the
correction of previously undetected errors.
Our results have three main policy implications. First, taking dynamic effects into account
substantially increases the estimated revenue impact of audits. This suggests that the optimal
audit rate should be increased relative to the situation where there are no dynamic effects. Sec-
ond, the variation in dynamic effects observed across different income components alters the way
in which targeted audits should be targeted: audits should focus more on individuals reporting
types of income with the largest dynamic effects. For example, the maximum annual impact on
reported self-employment income for each self-employed individual is over £1,000, higher than
other components. This suggests focusing more on individuals reporting self-employment income.
Likewise, although the maximum annual impact on pension income is lower, it is persistent, so
there may be more incentive to target individuals reporting pension of income. Third, there are
implications for setting optimal re-auditing strategies. Impacts for reported self-employment in-
come and property income die away after about four years, so it might make sense to revisit these
individuals after this sort of horizon. In contrast, the impact on reported pension income seems
to persist for at least eight years, implying that there is less need to re-audit these individuals
so soon.
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We have only been able to investigate the dynamic impacts of audits on the subsequent
behaviour of audited taxpayers. In future work it would be interesting to explore the extent
of any spillovers from the audit onto the behaviour of other taxpayers who know an audited
taxpayer.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis comprises four self-contained chapters on the economics of networks, each with its
own conclusions. Rather than recapitulate these here, in this chapter I propose some directions
for future work and lessons for policy, building on the work set out in the previous chapters.
Following the structure of Chapter 2, these can be grouped into three broad areas: (i) social
effects, (ii) network formation, and (iii) measurement.
6.1 Social Effects
Each of Chapters 3 to 5 offers a natural direction for the further study of social effects. In
Chapter 3, I examined the potential for informal risk-sharing networks to allow borrowing for
the purpose of (lumpy) investment. To model this, I studied a dynamic contracting model, in
the spirit of Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (2002), where any risk-sharing or borrowing
agreement had to be self-enforcing. A useful simplification made in this chapter was that transfers
could take place between any pair of agents, so network structure played no role. Work by
e.g. Ambrus et al. (2014), Ambrus et al. (2015), and Mila´n (2016) shows how different results in
pure risk-sharing models can look when network structure constrains the ability to risk share.
Combining this network-constrained risk-sharing with the possibility of investment would be an
interesting and useful path for further work if a more detailed quantitative understanding of the
mechanism is to be achieved.
In Chapter 4, we explored the trade-off between economic and cultural incentives in deter-
mining choices by migrants. Recent work has shown the importance of migrant networks for
labour market outcomes (Beaman, 2012; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012a; and Patel and Vella,
2013). A fruitful path for further study would be to combine these ideas, and use the discon-
tinuity in network structure to examine directly how social incentives translate into economic
259
outcomes, in terms of employment as well as return migration (which was important at this time;
see Bandiera et al., 2013). This allows a quantitative assessment of the value of culture, based
on the financial cost to migrants of retaining their culture, as well as the ‘price of anarchy’, the
inefficiency cost from being potentially unable to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.
In Chapter 5 we studied the indirect revenue raised due to dynamic effects: the impact
that being audited has on a taxpayer’s future tax declarations. A natural avenue for further
work, discussed above, is to study spillover effects: the indirect revenue raised from audits by
changing the declarations of taxpayers connected to the audited taxpayer. These might arise due
to salience effects of the likelihood of audit, additional information about how taxes should be
correctly filed, or shifts in beliefs about the ability of the tax authority to detect errors (or some
combination of these). As with dynamic effects, capturing spillovers is important for determining
the optimal audit rate.
6.2 Network Formation
Another broad area of research in networks that is ripe for further work is the interplay between
economic incentives and network formation decisions. Chapter 4 studied this explicitly, consid-
ering the choice by migrants of what links to form, when the costs and benefits were endogenous.
These represented the costs of interacting with someone of similar or different culture, and the
gains from this interaction. Extending this idea into, say, the model of Chapter 3 would allow
the study of additional related questions.
The model presented assumed a complete network, among an appropriately selected subgroup
of the village. This was justified by the lack of fixed costs of creating or maintaining links. With
a complete network, risk-sharing transfers would in principle be possible between all pairs of
households, though in practice some pairs may never need to make any bilateral transfer. If
instead there were fixed costs of some intermediate size, an insurance network would exist but
it would be incomplete, as some links may not provide enough benefit to be worth maintaining.
As noted in the previous section, this has important implications for the amount of risk-
sharing that takes place, the distribution of surplus from risk-sharing, and the ability to borrow
for investment. Households will make choices about what links to form based on the cost of these
links, and the gains that arise endogenously from being able to make transfers. Capturing this
is important both for welfare analysis and policymaking. From a welfare standpoint, if network
structure is not a constraint but a choice, then differences in network position (partly) reflect
differences in households’ valuations of those links, although there may also be externalities that
affect choices. Malleability of network structure is also important for policy, since it drives a
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wedge between the direct, partial equilibrium effect of the policy, when network structure has
not responded, and the general equilibrium effect once link choices adjust.1, 2 This is closely
related to the well-understood result that formal institutions affect the functioning of informal
ones e.g. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), and Ligon et al. (2000).
6.3 Measurement
A final important direction for future research is in thinking about issues of measurement. In
Chapter 2, we discussed two important measurement issues in networks: the choice of sampling
scheme, and the problems of measurement error. However, a third crucial issue, which has not
yet received much attention, is the deceptively difficult decision of how to define a link between
two nodes. Links may be directed or undirected: for example, a loan will typically be from one
individual to another, whilst friendship is typically two-way. Links may be binary or weighted:
they may measure whether two individuals are friends, or how much time they spend together.
Links may also have many dimensions: a student might study with one group of people, play
sports with another group, and ask advice from yet another.
These choices of definition can be critical. For example, if only the ‘extensive margin’ of link
presence were measured, one might conclude that a policy led to link severing, when instead
only the intensity of the link changed. It is also important in the absence of a program: when
we observe informal transfers between some set of individuals, it does not necessarily tell us
whether these are the same paths through which information flows occur. Recent work (e.g.
Banerjee et al., 2015a) has begun to recognise the importance of considering intensive as well
as extensive margins, and different dimensions of relationships, but there is little firm guidance
in how to handle these issues generally. Given the particular problems caused by measurement
error in the context of networks, as discussed in Chapter 2, this is a particularly important area
for future research.
1For example, work by Banerjee et al. (2015a) finds that offering microfinance in India can crowd out or
crowd in informal credit, depending on the borrower type
2Some inital discussion of how to estimate such a model was provided in Chapter 2. See also Badev (2013)
for an example in the context of friendship formation and smoking decisions.
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